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Acronyms and abbreviations 
 
ALADI  Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración 
ANP   Administración Nacional de Puertos 
ANTEL Administración  Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 
BCU  Banco Central del Uruguay 
BROU  Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay 
BRS Black  River  Sturgeon 
BSE  Banco de Seguros del Estado 
CAN Comunidad  Andina 
CCC  Centro de Construcción de Cardioestimuladores 
CEPAL  Comisión Económica para América Latina 
CES   Centro de Ensayos de Software 
CET   Common External Tariff 
CITES   Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
CIU  Cámara de Industrias de Uruguay  
COFIS  Impuesto de Contribución al Financiamiento de la Seguridad Social 
COFOSA   Compañía Forestal Oriental S.A. 
COFUSA Compañía  Forestal Uruguaya S.A. 
CUTI  Cámara Uruguay de Tecnologías de la Comunicación 
DILAVE División  Laboratorios Veterinarios 
DILFA  Dirección de Lucha contra la Fiebre Aftosa 
DINAMA  Dirección Nacional de Medio Ambiente 
DINARA  Dirección Nacional de Recursos Acuáticos 
DNPI  Dirección Nacional de la Propiedad Intelectual 
EU European  Union 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FMD Foot-and-Mouth  Disease 
FTZ   Free Trade Zones 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GDP  Gross domestic product 
IDB  Inter-American Development Bank 
ICT  Information and Communication Technologies 
IIBCE  Instituto de Investigación Biológica Clemente Estable 
IIE  Instituto de Ingeniería Eléctrica 
IIP   Instituto de Investigaciones Pesqueras  
IMESI   Impuesto Específico Interno  
INAPE  Instituto Nacional de Pesca 
INAVI  Instituto Nacional de Vitivinicultura 
InCo   Instituto de Computación  
INIA  Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agrícola 
IRIC  Impuesto a las Rentas de la Industria y Comercio 
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency 
LATU Laboratorio  Tecnológico del Uruguay 
LKS  Local Knowledge Spillovers   4
MERCOSUR  Mercado Común del Sur 
MGAP  Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca 
NADE   Nomenclatura Arancelaria de Exportación  
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
PACC  Programa de Apoyo a la Competitividad de Conglomerados y Cadenas Productivas  
PACPYMES  Programa de Apoyo a la Competitividad y Promoción de Exportaciones de la 
Pequeña y Mediana Empresa 
PDT  Programa de Desarrollo Tecnológico 
PEDECIBA  Programa para el Desarrollo de las Ciencias Básicas 
PRENADER Programa Recursos Naturales y Desarrollo del Riego 
R&D  Research and development 
R&D  Research and Development 
R-H model  Rodrik and Hausmann model 
SME   Small and Medium Size Enterprises 
SME  Small and medium size enterprises 
TAR   Admission Regime 
UDELAR  Universidad de la República 
USA  United States of America 
UTE  Administración Nacional de Usinas y Trasmisiones Eléctricas 
VAT   Value Added Tax 
VCP  Vino de Calidad Preferente 




This paper consists of four case studies of the emergence of four successful export 
activities in Uruguay: computer software, forest products, caviar and sturgeon 
meat, and animal vaccines. Each case study discusses how companies, 
associations, and governments at various levels have addressed market failures and 
facilitated the provision of public goods necessary for each activity. The case 
studies additionally profile first movers in each activity and describe the positive 
externalities they provide to imitators, particularly diffusion of export knowledge. 
Also included in each case study is a counterfactual case of a less successful 
activity (electronics, wine, frog meat, and biotechnology, respectively) and a 
section on policy implications. 
 
JEL Classifications: H41, L26, L65, L84, Q13 
Keywords: Agriculture, Exports, Manufacturing, Services, Uruguay  
                                          
* This paper was undertaken as part of the Latin American and Caribbean Research Network project “The Emergence 
of New Successful Export Activities in Latin America.”   6
 
“Social benefits from self-discovery are huge: for a small economy such as Uruguay, detecting a 
few products that can be profitably produced for world markets can make the difference between 
prosperity and stagnation. Generating incentives for self- discovery should therefore be a key 
objective of economic policy.”  
 




1.  Introduction 
 
This study was conceived to contribute to the Inter-American Development Bank’s project on 
“The Emergence of New Successful Export Activities in Latin America,” which seeks to: 
•  Identify the key elements in successful export cases to inform an outward-
oriented development strategy in each country.  
•  Promote and facilitate policy reforms that are more likely to achieve the 
desired development objectives, based on a more thorough understanding of 
the relative importance of various market failures. 
Accordingly, the specific objectives of the Uruguayan study included:   
•  Carrying out in-depth case studies of four export activities that are new for the 
country, within the theoretical framework proposed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and according to the common methodology defined 
for all participating countries, and drawing conclusions in terms of policy 
lessons. 
•  Constructing a harmonized database of Uruguayan exports at the product and 
firm levels, because changes introduced on four occasions in the product 
market (1985, 1990, 1997, and 2002) impeded work with consistent, long 
time-series; and using the new database to analyze export activity at the firm 
and product levels in the past two decades. 
 
The starting point and underlying approach of the study can be conveniently summarized in 
the following statements by Hausmann, Rodriguez-Clare, and Rodrik (2005): 
   7
“Markets are pretty good at signaling the profitability of activities that already 
exist, but poor at uncovering the profitability of activities that might exist but do 
not. Even if these activities are not new in the sense that they are present in other, 
richer economies, they confront potential producers with considerable uncertainty 
as regards costs and productivity under local conditions. Breaking into these new 
sectors typically requires a pioneer investor, who signals to other investors the 
profitability of these new activities. We call this process of discovery of the 
underlying cost structure of the economy ‘self discovery.’”  (Hausmann and 
Rodrik, 2003) 
 
“The self discovery process is rife with information externalities because the cost 
information discovered by an entrepreneur cannot be kept private. If the pioneer is 
profitable, this can be readily observable by others. Imitative entry then follows, 
the incumbent’s rents are dissipated, and a new sector takes off. If, on the other 
hand, the pioneer firm goes bankrupt, the losses are borne in full by the 
entrepreneur. Hence entrepreneurship of this kind is not a very rewarding 
economic activity: the losses are private while the gains are socialized. 
Consequently markets underprovide  entrepreneurship in new activities.” 
(Hausmann, Rodriguez-Clare, and Rodrik, 2005). 
 
This study aims to reach a better understanding of these issues in the case of Uruguay. It 
is structured in five chapters. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of Uruguayan export 
performance and the main features of its trade policy, as a framework for the core of the study. 
Chapter 3 presents the preliminary results obtained from the newly constructed database at the 
firm and product levels. In Chapter 4, we present the case studies for the four selected export 
discoveries in Uruguay—namely, software, forestry, caviar and sturgeon, and animal vaccines—
with their corresponding conclusions. Finally, we conclude the study in Chapter 5 with some 
policy lessons that can be drawn from the research.   8
2.  Background on Export Performance and Policies 
2.1  General Export Trends 
Despite exchange rate-based stabilization polices that led to considerable exchange rate 
depreciation, Uruguayan exports presented an increasing path in the 1990s. Exports reached their 
maximum level of that decade in 1997-1998 (Graph 2.1). Exports then decreased until 2001, 
along with Uruguay’s gross domestic product (GDP). The mid-2002 devaluation that 
accompanied the 2001-2002 crisis was followed by large increases in exports in 2003-2005. 
 
Graph 2.1 - Exports of goods and share in 
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The economic recovery that took place starting in 2003 was closely related to export 
growth, which was spurred by the fall in dollar terms of national production and a very favorable 
international context for commodities. From 2002 to 2005, exports grew at an average annual rate 
of 22.4 percent and reached US$3,400 million (close to US$4,000 million in 2006), a 
significantly higher level than the maximum value attained in the 1990s (US$2,700 million in 
1997). The share of exports in GDP reached 22 percent in 2005, about twice the ratio of the mid-
1990s. 
The contraction in imports and exports during the crisis resulted in equilibrium in the 
external trade balance in 2003, after 12 years of increasing trade deficits. However, the recovered 
dynamism of the economy in the following years was accompanied by even greater growth in 
imports than exports, and consequently a trade deficit (Graph 2.2). 
   9
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The destination of exports has changed considerably in recent years. The 1990s were 
characterized by the signing of the MERCOSUR Treaty between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay, which established a schedule of tariff reductions and convergence to a common 
external tariff. Uruguay’s large neighbors also pursued macro policies that led to depreciation. 
However, when this was done at a faster rate than in Uruguay, it increased the competitiveness of 
Uruguayan exports with respect to Argentina and Brazil, which represented an important share of 
Uruguayan exports. 
After the Brazilian devaluation of 1999 and the deep Argentinean crisis of 1999-2002, the 
effects of currency devaluation in Uruguay implied that extra-regional exports became 
increasingly important (Graph 2.3). The European Union (EU) and, mostly, the United States 
increased significantly their share. In the latter case, the share grew from 6 percent in 1998 to 22 
percent in 2005. In the early 1990s, meat represented 1 percent of exports to the United States; it 
now represents 60 percent.    10
Graph 2.3 - Exports of goods by  
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Along with the increase in export volumes, prices evolved favorably in 2003-04 after 
several years of falling export prices in the 1990s. Once Uruguay abandoned a fixed exchange 
rate and started a floating regime in 2002, the currency depreciated significantly and hence the 
competitiveness of Uruguayan exports increased sharply. This process came to a halt in 2004, 
when real exchange rate devaluation was observed to some extent. The fall in competitiveness 
has been larger with respect to the EU and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
trade partners than with the region. 
 
2.2  Composition of Exports 
Most Uruguayan exports can be classified as basic foodstuffs highly associated with agriculture 
and livestock (meat, dairy products, citrus fruit, rice, barley, oils, etc.), raw inputs (wool, leather, 
wood, fish, etc.), natural resource based manufacturing products (processed food, beverages, 
textiles, leather, and paper goods), or other manufacturing goods (glass, ceramics, chemicals, 
plastics, and metallurgical products). Graph 2.4 shows the overwhelming share of agro-industry 
related products in exports, notably basic foodstuffs.
1 Exports are also very concentrated in a 
limited number of products: bovine meat, leather and dairy products, rice, and plastics accounted 
for close to half of total exports in 2005. 
                                          
1 The increased share of basic foodstuffs in total exports was mainly the consequence of meat sales, which 
represented 22 percent of total exports in 2005 as compared with only 10 percent in the early 1990s.   11
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Sales to the region are of a larger manufacturing content than extra-regional exports. Basically, 
exports to the region are intensive in industrial products; Uruguay’s exports to the rest of the 
world are basically commodities. 
When looking at the long-term trend in the composition of exports and imports in 
Uruguay (Table 2.1), a significant increase in manufactured goods and technology-based products 
can be observed throughout the second half of the last century. However, the limits of this 
process of export transformation are evident in the import structure, which is highly intensive in 
manufactured and technology-based products (Bértola et al., 2004). 
 











Fuel  Total 
  Imp.  Exp.  Imp. Exp.  Imp. Exp.  Imp. Exp.  Imp.  Exp. 
1950-69  43.16  88.63  12.64 10.55  28.10 0.31  16.09 0.51  100.0  100.0 
1970-89  14.91  66.62  14.79 27.53  42.88 5.51  27.42 0.33  100.0  100.0 
1990-00  13.43  52.65  24.56 34.49  50.69 12.20 11.32 0.57  100.0  100.0 
Source: Duque and Roman (2003). 
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2.3  Trade Policy 
 
Uruguay's trade policy is mainly determined by its membership in MERCOSUR. In spite of the 
existence of special regimes and exceptions to the Common External Tariff (CET), the country 
has little flexibility in using trade policy with a view toward attaining industrial policy objectives. 
The sector structure of CET was the result of negotiations in which the interests of the major 
nations prevailed and these only partially corresponded to Uruguay's needs. This section presents 
the main features of the export-promotion regime, the general MERCOSUR regime and its 
exceptions, and the role of the real exchange rate. 
 
2.3.1 Export  Promotion
2 
 
Refund of Export Taxes (Law 17.555) and VAT  
 
The objective of these measures is to refund all indirect taxes levied during the production 
process in order not to restrict export competitiveness through the domestic fiscal system. Exports 
of goods and services are thus exempted from the value-added tax (VAT) (Texto Ordenado, 
1996, tit. 10, art. 5) and some other taxes. Decree 220/998 establishes that exporters can deduct  
from their general VAT liabilities the VAT paid on acquisitions integrating the exported goods. 
Beneficiaries include both producing firms and trading companies that export their products 
(Decree 54/003, 2003). This regime is relevant for some economic activities in which exports 
depend on this refund to be profitable, although the refund level is rather limited (6 percent). 
Decree 393/991 (1991) establishes that the indirect tax policy should be sufficiently 
explicit to create a stable and foreseeable framework for investment decisions, notably allowing 
the anticipation of possible changes in the refund level and items included. In fact, although the 
tax refund regime has been applied without interruption since its (re)introduction in 1991, this 
mechanism has often been subordinated to the public accounts situation, which implied delays in 
the promulgation of extensions and refund level decrees, thereby creating uncertainties 
concerning its prolongation and structure.  
                                          
2 This section is mainly based on Terra et al. (2004, Chapter V). See also Giordano and Quevedo (2006).   13
Export Financing 
This regime allows exporters to access credit at a preferential interest rate for an amount 
equivalent to a certain proportion of the committed exports. The proportion (10 or 30 percent of 
the committed exports) depends on the guarantee level chosen by the beneficiary. This 
mechanism is applicable to the acquisition or production of goods destined for export (pre-
financing) and to the exporting process itself until final payment.   
 
Temporary Admission Regime and Drawback 
 
These regimes date from the early twentieth century and entitle the executive in power to grant 
incentives to national firms that process and export products with foreign raw inputs (Law 3.816 
of 1911 and Law 4.268 of 1912). The Temporary Admission Regime (TAR, regulated by Decree 
420/990, 1990) allows duty-free imports of inputs that are further substantially transformed or 
embodied in the production of goods for export. The exports must be completed within 18 
months. The Drawback mechanism establishes the refund of various import duties; but it is 
virtually not used, probably due to the flexibility of the TAR, which allows the eventual re-export 
of—or payment of import duties payment for—the corresponding input. 
It has been estimated that about 20 percent of total imports were channeled through the 
TAR in 2003-04, and that it represents an average savings of more than 13 percent of the total 
amount of goods imported through it. The TAR has been an essential factor for the initiation of 
exports in several import-substituting industries and for enhancing competitiveness in the main 
export sectors.  
Maintaining the regime in the region is one of the main claims of the Uruguayan industrial 
sector in the MERCOSUR negotiations, together with the special regime for capital and 
intermediate goods, and the special regime for imports of agricultural inputs. The negotiations led 
to the extension of the TAR until the end of 2010 (Decision 32/03, 2003). Although special 
import regimes in the region are in principle inconsistent with a customs union, the argument for 
maintaining the regime is based on the existence of important asymmetries in the region. 
   14
Export Insurance 
The Banco de Seguros del Estado (BSE) is the only institution providing insurance for export 
credit. The insurance covers breach of payment of foreign clients but, in contrast to countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, it does not cover political, foreign exchange, or 
extraordinary risks. The cost of insurance includes premiums of between 0.7 and 4 percent of 
total exports (according to destination market and importer qualification) and the cost of 
investigation of the importer’s reliability. Uruguayan exporters consider that the insurance has 
several shortcomings. 
 
2.3.2  MERCOSUR General Regime 
 
Imports from a MERCOSUR country member are not subject to tariffs but require a Certificate of 
Origin establishing that the good complies with the origin conditions (at least 60 percent of the 
value must be of regional origin). When the good has a lower percentage of regional integration, 
it is treated as an extra-regional product and the CET is applied. 
Imports coming from extra-regional countries with no special agreements are subject to 
the CET, with a number of exceptions. The CET has 11 levels, going from 0 to 20 percent.
3 In 
general terms, the CET level increases with the level of value added of the imported good. 
However some inputs produced in the region are protected by relatively high tariffs, which can 
lead to negative effective protection in activities that use them in their production process. 
Indeed, this has been a complaint of the Uruguayan electronics sector.  
Import tariffs in the framework of preferential agreements depend on the particular 
conditions that were agreed upon. Such agreements exist between MERCOSUR and Chile and 
Bolivia (complete trade liberalization in 2014 and 2015), the Comunidad Andia (CAN) countries, 
and Venezuela. Uruguay has a special agreement with Mexico that foresees tariff relief for all 
items. Also in force are the partial agreements signed with ALADI member countries before the 
setting up of MERCOSUR. 
                                          
3 Agricultural products in their original state or with minimal processing: 10 percent; agro-foodstuffs: 14 to 16 
percent; agricultural inputs: 0 to 6 percent, except <?> for agrochemicals (12 or 14 percent; in the case of Uruguay: 0 
percent); petroleum and derivates: 0 percent; chemicals and petrochemicals: 2 percent if no national production, 10-
14 percent otherwise; other minerals: 2 to 6 percent; textile products: depends on added value (maximum 20 percent 
for garment industry). Manufactured products for final consumption: 18 to 20 percent (Lorenzo 2004, in Giordano 
and Quevedo, 2006).   15
The Uruguayan fiscal system also includes other taxes, the effects of which are equivalent to 
tariff protection, mainly: a 3 percent tax to finance the social security system (COFIS) is levied 
on imports (except for TAR products) as on national products; the BROU commission (3 percent 
of imports, except for TA and capital goods); the consular tax (2 percent, same exceptions as 
previous); and VAT and IMESI advance deposits (3 to 10 percent of VAT).  
 
2.3.3  Exceptions to the CET 
A special regime was established for capital goods and informatics and telecommunication goods, 
as well as a schedule aiming at progressively converging toward the CET. However, the 
convergence process came to a halt and presently each member country applies its own criteria. 
In Uruguay, a 2 percent tariff is applied to capital goods when there is no local production. When 
domestic production exists, the CET is applied and can reach 14 percent for capital goods and 16 
percent for information technology (IT) goods.  A high CET for these good would imply a 
substantial surchange on investment in to be confirmed for these goods, the surcharge it would 
mean on investment in machinery and technological equipment, which are not extensively 
produced in Uruguay.  Special regimes also exist for the sugar and automotive industries. On the 
whole, each MERCOSUR member country has the possibility of selecting 125 items for CET 
exemption.  
 
2.3.4  Real Exchange Rate 
Undoubtedly, exchange rate and monetary policy has affected the export sector. Graph 2.5 
reveals the high volatility of the real exchange rate. This factor determined important difficulties 
for enterprises located in Uruguay in their planning and external insertion strategies as well as for 
newcomers with export strategies. 




Since 1990, inflation control policies operated by a pre-announced devaluation schedule. 
Inflation inertia in turn led to an appreciation of the effective real exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
extra-regional trade partners until 1995; it remained stable throughout the rest of the decade. An 
important outcome of the 2002 crisis management has been the reestablishment of macro balance 
in the context of a more competitive exchange rate. A significant degree of continuity can be 
found between the government administrations before and after 2004. 
The real intra-regional exchange rate was influenced by exchange rate policies in 
Argentina and Brazil, with both pursuing similar currency board arrangements. Appreciation also 
occurred vis-à-vis the neighboring economies, but it was to a lesser extent than with respect to the 
rest of the world. The gap between the two real effective exchange rates led to greater 
concentration of Uruguay’s exports with its MERCOSUR partners, at least until 1998. Since 
2001 the opposite effect has taken place, and incentives were set for a larger share of extra-
regional trade and diversification of export destinations. Only with Argentina are relative prices 
for Uruguay now in a situation that is less advantageous than before the 2002 crisis.  
Exchange rate volatility has thus led to changes in commercial destinations, which entails 
serious problems in terms of firms’ specialization. This in turn affects optimum resource 
allocation and the product policy of the firm.   17
2.4  Investment Promotion 
The 1998 Law for the Protection and Promotion of National and Foreign Investments (No. 
16.906) promotes and protects investments carried out by national and foreign investors in the 
national territory, without discriminating according to the origin of capital.
4 The main benefits of 
the law include: 
• Exemption from capital tax for fixed assets directly linked to the production 
process and for data processing equipment. 
• Exemption from VAT (23 percent) and excise tax (IMESI) for the import of 
these goods and refund of VAT when they are acquired in the domestic market. 
• Exemption from capital tax for fixed asset improvements that enhance 
manufacturing, agricultural and livestock activities, and certain intangible goods 
(patents, etc.) and other assets that incorporate technological innovation and 
involve technology transfer. 
• Exemption from income tax (IRIC, 30 percent) on 40 percent of net profits if the 
exempted profits are reinvested.  
• Training expenses of personnel in priority areas and expenses in research and 
development (R&D) and technological development may be deducted for 
income tax purpose at between 1.5 and 2 times the amount spent. 
 
    In addition, the law includes a series of specific benefits for projects declared of “national 
interest,”
5 mainly: 
•  Exemption from import duties, VAT, COFIS, and IMESI for imported fixed assets that do 
not compete with locally produced goods.  
•  Exemption from capital tax for three years in Montevideo and five years in the rest of the 
territory, for fixed assets incorporated into the project.  
•  Exemption from income tax on 50 percent of the investment financed by the company’s 
own capital. 
                                          
4 Foreign direct investment does not need approval or previous registration and it has the guarantee of free transfers 
of profits and capital. 
5 Fiscal benefits for projects declared of national interest have existed since 1974 and were regulated by a previous 
law until 1998.   18
    In principle, to be declared of national interest, investments must: incorporate technical 
progress, increase and diversify exports, generate productive employment, promote activities of 
small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), and contribute to decentralization. In fact, this 
instrument has been applied loosely, without much discrimination according to projects’   
objectives and multiplier effects on the economy. Between 1992 and 1998, industrial projects 
were approved under this regime for a total of US$817 million, 45.6 percent of which 
corresponded to foreign companies. Tourism-related projects totaled US$1,184 million between 
1993 and 1998 (70 percent of foreign investment). Although investors now resort more than 
before to this mechanism, a serious shortfall derives from not using it pro-actively. The recently 
created Office for Investor Assistance—a single office coordinating all investment-related 
procedures—tends to improve the system’s efficiency, but no systematic actions are undertaken 
to seek or call potential investors on the basis of the incentives offered. Moreover, there is no 
evaluation of its work. 
    The creation of a Free Trade Zones Regime has also promoted investment. Free trade 
zones have been established in seven cities in Uruguay. The most relevant in terms of 
international business and technology is Zonamerica, located 20 km from Montevideo.
6 It offers 
high quality installations, infrastructure (including telecommunications), and services to 
international and national companies involved in logistics, financial services, biotechnology, 
informatics, call centers, consultancies, and trade in general. Companies operating in Zonamerica 
or other Free Trade Zones (FTZs) enjoy a very favorable fiscal regime that exempts them from all 
national and import taxes. Additional non-tax benefits include the following: 
 
•  There are simplified procedures for setting up the relevant legal entities. 
•  State utility monopolies (telecommunications, fuel, and energy) are not in 
force in the FTZ. 
•  There is unrestricted freedom to transfer securities and local and foreign 
currency into or out of the FTZ. Although this may seem redundant because 
the same right applies in the Uruguayan customs territory, the relevant point is 
                                          
6 In 1987, Law No. 15.921 declared the development of free trade zones to be of “national interest” with the purpose 
of promoting investment, expanding exports, increasing the use of the Uruguayan labor force, and promoting the 
international integration of the economy.    19
that the state guarantees this benefit (and all other benefits) for FTZ users 
during the whole period of the respective contract. 
 
By law, at least 75 percent of the personnel hired by FTZ companies must be Uruguayans.  
Decision No. 8 of the MERCOSUR Council establishes that goods physically imported 
into the MERCOSUR territory from a Uruguayan FTZ are subject to the CET (in contrast with 
the FTZ regime prevailing in Tierra de Fuego, Argentina, and Manaus, Brazil). In the same way, 
goods introduced into an FTZ from Uruguayan territory are considered exports.  
    Exports of goods from Zonamerica to the rest of the world amounted to about US$277 
million in 2006 (CIU, 2006), which represents less than 7 percent of Uruguay exports (although 
FTZ exports are not considered in the official export records). Services are probably much more 
important than goods in Zonamerica, but no figures are available. There are 150 firms located in 
Zonamerica (including several Uruguayan software firms and Tata Consulting Services, the 
Indian informatics giant), employing around 2,000 people. Zonamerica thus still has a limited 
impact on the local labor market. A relevant spillover is its contribution to creating an image of 
the country abroad, especially as a “high-tech” producer. 
    This brief review of export and investment policies in Uruguay shows a diversity of 
measures and instruments providing, on the whole, substantial pecuniary incentives. Many if not 
most of them are inheritances of bygone days that, to some extent, have been mended or adjusted 
to present times without an overall perspective. A tax reform proposed by the administration of 
the present government, approved by the legislature, was scheduled for implementation in 2007.   20
3.  Export Activity at the Firm Level
7 
 
This chapter presents an exploratory statistical analysis of export activity at the firm level, as a 
contribution to our general framework. It is based on official Uruguayan export databases, which 
first had to be harmonized to obtain homogeneous, long time-series because four different 
classification criteria have been applied during the past decades.  
After briefly reviewing older research studies on Uruguayan exporting firms (Section 3.1), 
we explain how export data were treated in the present study (Section 3.2) and analyze the export 
growth process from the firm’s viewpoint (Section 3.3). We then track the discovery process 
using statistical methods (Section 3.4) and establish a link between exporting and productivity 
(Section 3.5). Finally, we summarize our main findings and highlight the shortcomings of using 
statistical data to detect export discoveries (Section 3.6). 
 
3.1  Prior Research Results 
 
Uruguayan exporting firms have been analyzed in a series of research papers, mainly using 
evidence from the 1980s. The first references are CEPAL (1989, 1990), which find a very 
concentrated structure of exports across firms, and a fluctuating mean value of exports by firm 
between 1981 and 1988. Roche and Vaillant (1990) analyze two main dimensions along which 
they evaluate the performance of exporting firms: survival in export markets and export growth. 
Firms present in all sample years (1981-1988)—generally larger firms—account for 80 percent of 
total export value. Roche and Vaillant estimate qualitative response models for several types of 
survival and growth performance (i.e., permanent exporters, dynamic exporters, etc.) conditional 
on size, measured by export value, and type of product. They find a relation between size and 
export performance that is interpreted as a life-cycle phenomenon, by which entering firms are 
smaller in size but dynamic, and tend to stabilize later, exporting larger values. 
Cassoni and Vaillant (1993) also analyze data from the 1980s. They define export 
performance using survival and growth of export value, based on data for survivors until 1990. 
They study the association of those indicators with size, sector, and product and market 
specialization/diversification, using contingency tables and log linear models. Their findings are 
interpreted in terms of the life-cycle of firms in the export market, characterizing the sequence of 
                                          
7 Gastón Carracelas provided excellent research assistance in the preparation of this chapter.   21
stages of the firms. These include the first stage for new firms, basically exporting to neighboring 
countries, concentrating their exports in a single product and a single destination market. In the 
second stage, firms seek to expand their export sales and diversify their destination markets and 
products. The third stage is characterized by stability and larger size. 
Vaillant and Bittencourt (2001) use data for a longer period, adding some years in the 
1990s. They find that although the number of Uruguayan exporting firms increased in the 1980s, 
entry began to decrease in the second half of the 1990s. They also find an increase in the mean 
export value by firm in the second half of the 1990s. Fewer than 100 firms accounted for more 
than 75 percent of total export value in both decades. Permanent exporters (i.e., firms present in 
all years of the sample since they first appeared) accounted for 90 percent of total exports in 
1998. 
Vaillant and Bittencourt find that a large part of firms entering in a given year exit in that 
year or the next. The authors also detect an increase in the number of foreign owned firms among 
Uruguayan exporters in the 1990s. Exports are concentrated among firms with only one 
destination market, and market diversification increases as firms stay longer in the export 
markets. In the 1990s, there is a clear increase in the number of firms with a regional orientation 
in their export sales. The authors find a pattern of association between destination orientation and 
product specialization, by which raw inputs are directed outside the region, while manufacturing 
goods are sold to neighboring countries. Exports of basic foodstuffs are more uniformly 
distributed between market destinations. 
 
3.2  Data 
 
We rely on Banco de la República (BROU) and Customs Office export records. The coverage 
includes export transactions on goods for all products during 1981-2005. The variables included 
are exporter ID, value, quantity, product, and destination market. Export values are recorded in 




BROU data cover 1981-99, and firms are identified by their exporter number. The BROU 
administered differential exchange rate policies when those were in place decades ago and 
managed some of the export tax incentive policies until the mid-1990s. Historically, every   22
transaction was recorded as exporters used to present their dollars for exchange to BROU. Hence, 
BROU registered firms with a banking criterion, and the exporter number is a current account 
number set for transactions related to exports. The exporter number does not always uniquely 
identify a firm, however, because companies subcontracting production from others may register 
many shipments under the same number. In addition, export transactions were recorded for firms 
that did not have continuing export activity or did not open a current account but did export. 
These firms were labeled with the code “999997”—the same for all—and termed “sporadic.” 
Thus, for a fraction of the transactions (about 1 percent of all sales), firms are not identified 
before 2000. The Foreign Trade Department of BROU was dismantled in the 1990s. Since 1999, 
registration of exports has been undertaken only by the National Customs Office, which also 
became the relevant source for national accounts compiled by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
The Customs Office records transactions by the firm’s Tax Register Number (RUC). 
Hence, the number of total exporting firms recorded is larger than the number that had an 
exporter number in BROU. Correspondence between BROU export numbers and RUC numbers 
was obtained for a significant portion of the exporting firms. As the shipping of commercial 
samples is also included, to avoid distortions we exclude in a given year those firms that exported 





Product classification criteria are not uniform throughout the period under study. Prior to 1993, 
the system was based on Brussels Tariff Nomenclature, which was the source for the Tariff 
Export Classification (Nomenclatura Arancelaria de Exportación, NADE). The first version 
present in our data is the NADE 1978, which was revised in 1985 (NADE 1985). Since the 
signature of MERCOSUR in 1990, the system has evolved toward adopting the Harmonized 
System (HS) and this led to a new NADE in 1993. The NADE 1993 had the first eight digits in 
common with the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) classification, based on the 
HS. In turn, it was replaced in 1997 by the Common MERCOSUR Classification (Nomenclatura 
Común del Mercosur, NCM), also based on the HS. The NCM finally went through a revision in 
2002, so along our period of analysis five different classifications were used.   23
An effort was made to construct conversion tables. The criterion was to adapt all data to 
the last classification used, i.e., NCM 2002. In practice, this implied recoding the observations 
starting with the first classification used, i.e., the NADE 1978 in 1981. The main problem here is 
that the classification changes, so that current items are disaggregated in many new, more 
detailed varieties; conversely, others are condensed in aggregates where individual categories 
cease to be identified.  
Categories that the new classifications aggregated in new, broader categories were also 
condensed in the older datasets to reflect the aggregation level of the last classification. 
Conversely, old categories that the new classification split in a larger number of new cells were 
aggregated in the newer datasets. Hence, the aggregation level is given by the minimum number 
of categories consistent with common classification criteria from 1981 to 2005. Conversion tables 
were constructed for those products that translated on a one-to-one basis onto the next 
classification. This included NADE 1978, NADE 1985, NADE 1993, NCM 1996, and NCM 
2002. As a result, we obtained a consistent database at the product, firm, and destination levels of 
Uruguayan exports, which is itself a product of this project and a contribution to future studies. 
The database is based on an 8-digit aggregation level, except for those categories that were 
collapsed into more-aggregated items for the sake of compatibility.  
 
Destination Codes and Prices 
 
Destination codes were not constant through time. We constructed a one-to-one conversion table 
whenever it was possible. In cases where countries have split up or combined in larger units, we 
maintained them as different countries. As price indexes at the product level are unavailable, we 
work with current dollar values across the entire sample period. 
 
3.3   The Export Growth Process from the Firm’s Viewpoint 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a picture of the export growth of Uruguayan firms. 
Using our export database, we undertake a description of the activity of exporting firms during 
the past two and a half decades, in terms of the value of exports, number of products, number and 
type of destination markets, concentration, diversification, cohort of entry into export markets, 
and survival of exporters. Statistical analysis describes the evolution of the number of firms, the 
contributions of entries into and exits from the export markets, and decompositions of export 
growth in terms of continuers, entry, and exit.   24
We analyze the value of exports in terms of the number of products and mean export sales 
by firm and product. The analysis provides simple decompositions of the change in export value 
between the contribution of increases in the value of products that were already being exported 
and those that were not previously traded.  
We analyze concentration in terms of products, firms, and markets, and provide measures 
of diversification in terms of destination market, by product and firm. Although we do not have 
data on the starting dates of firm activity, we can construct measures for cohorts of entrants. We 
do so to construct classes of exporting firms according to their degree of permanence in export 
markets. 
 
3.3.1  Number of Firms  
 
We provide two separate measures of the number of firms, due to different registration criteria 
before and after 1999. For 1981 to 1999, we use the number of exporter codes registered as 
exporting in BROU’s databases. This does not include all exporting firms for two reasons. First, 
more than one firm could export under the same exporter code. Second, firms that did not open a 
current account in BROU were assigned the same “sporadic” code. Therefore, the figure until 
1999 can be interpreted as an indicator of the number of more formal, established exporting firms 
in Uruguay. From 2000 to 2005, all RUC numbers are registered by the Customs Office, so every 
exporter is included.  
Measuring the number of exporter firms by those with recorded exports, there was a 
steady increase through the 1980s, reaching a peak in 1992 (Graph 3.1). At that point, macro 
policy had reverted to an exchange rate-based stabilization plan that led to considerable 
appreciation of the domestic currency. At the same time, the signature of the MERCOSUR treaty 
and advantageous relative exchange rates with its neighbors led to a redirection of Uruguay’s 
exports toward the region. The number of exporting firms declined until 1999. For 2000 on, we 
use the series of the total RUC numbers obtained from the Customs Office. There was a discrete 
upward jump due to the change of registration criteria, but also a steady increase in the number of 
exporting firms, particularly since 2002, corresponding to the sharp change in relative prices that 
followed devaluation in the 2002 crisis. By 2005, the number of exporting firms was 16 percent 
higher than in 2000.   25
Graph 3.1
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3.3.2  Value of Exports by Firm 
 
To provide a picture of the type and size of firms involved in export activities, we show their 
median and average export values during the period under study (Graphs 3.2 and 3.3). Again, we 
have to consider separately the 1981-99 and the 2000-05 series. The former tracks the behavior of 
export value for the set of more established and stable exporters. Both median and average values 
put the increase in value exported by firms between 1993 and 1998. The data after 2000 (Customs 
Office) reflect the weight of smaller exporters that the BROU dataset does not identify separately. 
Although the averages increase after 2002, median values still show a decreasing path.   26
Graph 3.2  
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As in the 1990s, the number of firms was decreasing, and those surviving or entering tended to be 
larger. After 2002, entry may be including a larger number of smaller-size firms.   27
3.3.3  Firm Export Concentration 
A complementary view of the development of export activity at the firm level is given by the 
evolution of concentration. This is measured by the traditional Herfindahl index
8 as well as by the 
share of export sales of the 100 largest firms in total sales. The story in both cases is the same.  
Graph 3.4 - Herfindahl by value exported 
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The data show the relative decline in concentration of exports among the largest exporters 
in the 1980s (Graph 3.4). The 1990s, by contrast, show a pattern of increasing concentration. The 
data for 2000-05, which include the whole set of firms, were expected to present a larger share of 
smaller firms and hence less concentration. This is not the case; the values of both indexes for 
2000 are not significantly different from those for 1999. From 2000 to 2005, in turn, the pattern 
seems to be of increased concentration. 
 
                                          














j j x x H , where  j x are exports of good j.   28
3.3.4  Entry and Exit of Firms 
 
To provide an overview of entry and exit in Uruguay’s export markets, we linked the two 
databases, finding correspondences between the export numbers in the BROU database and the 
RUC numbers in the Customs Office data. This was not feasible in a number of cases. However, 
using each of the databases, we can provide consistent statistics on entering, exiting, and 
continuing firms; the only year for which data are not available is 2000.  
We do not have data on the activity starting dates of firms, and we can only identify 
cohorts of entrants in the database using the first appearance of a firm in the data. Once entering, 
firms may not be present for a number of years and then re-enter, or exit the exporting activity not 
to reappear again. We define the entry and cohort of each firm by the year it first appears in the 
data. Continuers are those that were present in periods t and t-1, while we distinguish temporary 
exit (the firm will reappear at some future period) and re-entry (the firm was not present one 
period before but this is not its first time of appearance). Exit is defined when the firm does not 
reappear in the data. 
Graph 3.5 shows the flows of entry and exit, net of re-entries or temporary exits. Exits are 
calculated as the fraction of firms observed each year that are not be present in the data again. 
Entry is calculated as the fraction of the number of firms observed each year that are present in 
the data for the first time. Exit is not reported in 2005, and entry is not reported in 1981. The gaps 
in the series correspond to changes in data sources: exit is not calculated in 1999, and entry is not 
calculated in 2000.   29
Graph 3.5













The main message of the figure is that the dynamic of entry and exit is substantial in 
Uruguay’s export markets. Even in the years when we record firm activity by the BROU exporter 
number (and hence we expect more stability in attachment to export activity), we find that 
between 15 and 20 percent of the firms present in the data are newcomers or will not be present 
again. It should be kept in mind that firms with an exporter number (i.e., a bank account in 
BROU) are those with more established export activity. This figure increases sharply when we 
take into account the full registration of exporting activity by the Customs Office RUC records. 
With respect to entry, three clearly differentiated periods appear. Entry was important in 
the years following the 1982 crisis, with a sharp devaluation that increased incentives to export. 
The path was irregular until 1990, when a second decreasing period is observed until 1999. 
Changes in registration criteria imply a discrete jump but beyond that, during 2000-05, entry 
flows (relative to the incumbent stock) become more important.  
The contributions of entering and exiting firms represent a substantial portion of year-to-
year change in the number of firms. In spite of considerable churning in export markets, 
Uruguayan exports also display considerable stability in terms of the export value contribution of 
larger exporters. In a given year, those firms with relatively longer years of presence in the export 
market provide the bulk of the export value. We take as an example the year 1999, in which we 
recover the last observation from the BROU database. The caveat is that firm identification by the 
BROU exporter number biases the data toward the more established exporters.    30
 
Table  3.1 
Firms Exporting in 1999 by Entry Cohort 
Cohort 
Mean value 






1981 5,561,995 202 1,123,523,081 51.1 51.1 
1982 4,040,391  51 206,059,917  9.4 60.5 
1983 2,147,969  29 62,291,088  2.8 63.3 
1984 766,501  35 26,827,517  1.2 64.5 
1985 2,793,988  20 55,879,750  2.5 67.0 
1986 2,042,496  26 53,104,887  2.4 69.5 
1987 1,057,012  30 31,710,360  1.4 70.9 
1988 2,082,485  30 62,474,558  2.8 73.7 
1989 3,536,762  38 134,396,964  6.1 79.9 
1990 642,615  39 25,061,979  1.1 81.0 
1991 647,381  44 28,484,752  1.3 82.3 
1992 1,092,700  75 81,952,510  3.7 86.0 
1993 335,651  44 14,768,620  0.7 86.7 
1994 912,597  45 41,066,844  1.9 88.6 
1995 830,951  46 38,223,751  1.7 90.3 
1996 1,205,634  53 63,898,600  2.9 93.2 
1997 1,247,170  57 71,088,666  3.2 96.4 
1998 490,724  80 39,257,891  1.8 98.2 
1999 385,350 102 39,305,651  1.8 100.0 
Source: Customs records database. 
 
 
Table 3.1 presents the distribution of firms by year of first appearance in the records and 
decomposes 1999 exports by cohort. The data show that a large part of exports is explained by 
the largest, established firms. Roughly half of the export value in 1999 is supplied by firms that 
were in the export markets 20 years before. 
An interesting question is: What is the probability that a firm entering in a given cohort 
will survive in the exporting activity? To approximate this, we calculated for each cohort the ratio 
of firms that do not appear again in the data (i.e., the entry and exit date from the database 
coincide). The ratio is shown in Graph 3.6.  
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Graph 3.6 - Non surviving proportion 
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Because firms that exited in more recent years might reenter in the future, hazard rates are 
more likely to be overstated for years after 2000. At the same time, in 1982-99 we did not 
adequately register smaller and more sporadic firms because we used their BROU export 
numbers; hence, entry and exit may be underestimated. The figure shows high hazard rates even 
for the sample period in which we have underestimated such flows. The years 2000-04 provide a 
picture in which hazards are even higher.  
We also estimated the contributions to overall export growth of entries and exits from the 
export market.
9 Table 3.2 presents (for all years except 2000) a decomposition of export growth 
in terms of continuers, entry, and exit (irrespective of re-entries and temporary exits). The data 
show that the bulk of the change in export value is provided by the contribution of continuing 
firms. This seems to carry on after 2000, when we use a more encompassing registration of firms. 
                                          














t X X X X X X , where the sets C, E, and X denote continuers, 
entrants, and exiting firms, respectively.   32
 
Table 3.2 
Contributions to Export Growth by Continuing, Entry, 




rate Continuers Entry  Exit 
1982 -15.9  -17.5 4.5 -2.9 
1983 1.6 4.0 3.6  -6.1 
1984 -10.7 -8.0  2.1 -4.8 
1985 -8.4 -8.4 2.5  -2.4 
1986 27.5 25.3 4.1  -1.9 
1987 9.5 7.6 3.8  -1.9 
1988 17.3 17.5 2.3  -2.5 
1989 14.2 11.5 4.4  -1.8 
1990 7.0 5.3 3.2  -1.5 
1991 -7.5 -7.3 2.0  -2.3 
1992 6.8 5.2 3.8  -2.2 
1993 -4.4 -5.4 4.2  -3.2 
1994 18.0 16.3 3.2  -1.4 
1995 10.3 9.7  2.6  -2.0 
1996 13.7 14.1 2.7  -3.1 
1997 -4.6 -6.6 3.9  -1.9 
1998 18.3 16.7 2.5  -0.9 
1999 -18.0  -17.9 1.7 -1.8 
2000        
2001 -10.6  -10.4 1.3 -1.6 
2002 -9.1 -9.1 2.2  -2.2 
2003 19.5 17.7 3.9  -2.2 
2004 33.5 28.6 6.7  -1.8 
Source: Customs records database. 
 
 
3.3.5  Number of Products 
We also analyze the evolution of the number of products in Uruguayan exports. Classification 
changes many times along the sample period, in part reflecting the inclusion of products new in 
every respect, i.e., not known or produced before, as is the case of many information technology 
related products. In other cases, such products were already known but are new to Uruguayan   33
trade. The number of products may increase or decrease due to changes in classification criteria, 
which may condense in a single category products that were described by a larger number of 
more disaggregated items (as is the case with some Uruguayan meat products before 1993), or 
may allow for more detailed description of a number of categories described before by a single 
group. Reclassification may produce the statistical illusion of an increase or decrease in the 
number of products traded. 
Our approach is to analyze the changes in the number of products, keeping that caveat in 
mind, and comparing data from two classification exercises. One of them consists of considering 
the number of products traded in each of the sub-samples in which the same classification is used. 
Classification changes tend to open a significant number of new categories every time, affecting a 
large proportion of both goods and value traded. For instance, the 1996 NCM opens up in more 
detailed categories goods that account for more than 30 percent of the 1995 exports. 
The second approach is to produce a common classification that uses each year the 
minimum set of compatible categories for the whole sample period (1981-2005). The level of 
aggregation used is 8 digits. The common classification requires grouping some items at the 6-
digit level or sometimes lower levels; hence, this classification greatly reduces the number of 
products (between 43 and 61 percent of the number of products under the current classification in 
any given year). 
Graphs 3.7 and 3.8 depict the evolution of the number of products under both the current 
and the common classification.  
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The changes coincide in each period, using each of the classifications, and for the whole 
sample, using the common classification. However, in 1993, when the Brussels Trade 
Classification was abandoned to adopt versions of the Harmonized System (HS) in the context of 
MERCOSUR, the reduction of the number of categories can be attributed to the change of 
system. Both classifications indicate a reduction in the variety of products in the last half of the 
1990s. In the last years in our sample, the number of products exported increased. 
 
3.3.6  Sales by Product 
Graphs 3.9 to 3.12 provide information on mean and median sales by product. Both the original 
classification and the common classification tell the same story. Using both the current and 
common classifications, median sales by product increase until 1989 (the year before the change 
in exchange rate policy) and then follow a smoothly descending path (Graphs 3.9 and 3.10). 
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Mean sales by product follows an increasing path since 1985, so that in spite of the 
distribution of sales by product having shifted slightly to the left, the weight of the largest-selling 
products seems to have increased so as to pull the average value upward (Graphs 3.11 and 3.12). 
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3.3.7 Product  Concentration 
Changes in the relative weights of sales by product reflect the concentration of sales by product. 
In all of our 8-digit classifications, the largest-selling 100 products account for more than 70 
percent of Uruguayan exports. Changes in concentration are shown both by the evolution of the 
Herfindahl index by product and by the share of the largest-selling products. The calculations 
were carried over for the original and common classifications (Graphs 3.13 and 3.14). In what 
follows, the indexes calculated over current classifications are displayed in a single continuous 
series. 
Calculations based on the current classification may be misguiding due to the change of 
classification in 1993, when the harmonized system was adopted. The data display an increase in   37
concentration at this point, which may arise artificially from changes in statistical classification 
criteria. When the common classification is used, a trend is shown of product concentration 
decreasing during the 1980s and 1990s, and increasing in the 2000s, particularly in the last years. 
In fact, the dramatic rise in the last years is due to the weight of a single 8-digit product (frozen 
boneless bovine meat) that alone accounts for more than 15 percent of total exports. The path of 



























Graph 3.13  - Herfindahl by product and share of 



























Graph 3.14  - Herfindahl by product and share of 
100 largest, common classification
 
 
3.3.8  Entry and Exit of Products 
 
To analyze the persistence of export products, we proceed in a similar fashion as with firms. 
Entry is the presence of a product in the present year but not in the year before; exit is presence in 
the actual year but not in the next. Substantial flows are observed both in the entry and exit. Due   38
to the continuous changes of classification criteria in our data, we work only with our common 
classification for the entire period. 
The data are characterized by the fact that a large proportion of the year-to-year variation 
in the number of exported products is explained by products not present one period before or that 
will not be present in the next period. Graph 3.15 illustrates an insurmountable problem in the 
attempt to make different classifications compatible. Despite the common classification, there are 
spikes in the exit of products in the years prior to, and spikes in entry in the years coincident with, 
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Table 3.3 







1981 415  41.2  74.9 
1982 70  7.0  1.9 
1983 61  6.1  2.6 
1984 49  4.9  0.6 
1985 51  5.1  5.3 
1986 33  3.3  2.4 
1987 32  3.2  2.9 
1988 24  2.4  0.8 
1989 22  2.2  0.2 
1990 16  1.6  2.0 
1991 19  1.9  0.8 
1992 14  1.4  0.0 
1993-
2005 201  20.0  5.6 
Source: Customs records database. 
 
At the classification level we used, a relatively stable structure is observed, in which some 
products explain the bulk of Uruguayan exports. The structure coexists of more volatile 
appearance of a large number of products that have shorter lives in the set of exports. For 2005, 
we present the distribution of exported products by cohort of appearance (Table 3.3). The share of 
more-established or “traditional” products (those appearing in the database since the starting 
period) in sales is larger than their share in the number of products.  
Table 3.4 presents a simple decomposition of the change in export growth between the 
contribution of entering, continuing, and exiting products. Again, the contribution of continuing 
products tracks closely the rate of growth of exports (Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4 
Contributions to Export Growth by Continuing, Entering, 
and Exiting Products (Percent) 
Year  Change Continuing Entry Exit 
1982 -15.8 -14.1 0.9 -2.6 
1983 2.0 1.2 1.4 -0.6 
1984 -11.1 -11.2 1.3 -1.1 
1985 -8.3 -7.1 2.3 -3.4 
1986 27.6 26.4 2.4 -1.2 
1987 9.6 9.5 0.9 -0.9 
1988 17.1 16.9 1.2 -1.0 
1989 14.2 12.1 2.9 -0.8 
1990 6.9 5.7 1.6 -0.4 
1991 -7.6 -6.8 1.1 -1.8 
1992 6.8 7.3 0.6 -1.0 
1993 -4.5 -1.4 5.6 -8.7 
1994 18.4 18.4 0.3 -0.4 
1995 10.7 9.4 1.7 -0.4 
1996 13.9 14.0 0.2 -0.4 
1997 -3.1 -4.4 4.4 -3.0 
1998 18.7 18.5 0.4 -0.2 
1999 -18.8 -18.7 0.3 -0.4 
2000 1.7 1.6 0.6 -0.5 
2001 -10.6 -10.5 0.5 -0.5 
2002 -9.1 -8.0 0.4 -1.5 
2003 19.5 17.5 2.3 -0.3 
2004 33.5 33.5 0.5 -0.5 
2005 15.3 14.9 0.6 -0.3 
Source: BROU and Custom records database. 
 
 
3.3.9 Destination  Markets 
Our data also show an increasing trend toward diversification of export markets. The total 
number of export destinations shows a steady increase, particularly since the 1990s (Graph 3.16). 
The Herfindahl index and the share of sales to the 20 largest export markets measure 
concentration. The trend has been toward greater concentration in the second half of the 1980s 
and the 1990s, and less after 1999 (Graph 3.17).   41
 
Graph 3.16
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Graph 3.17
Herfindahl of destination markets and 
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The concentration indexes track closely the weight of the largest trade partners, particularly 
Argentina and Brazil. Changes in bilateral exchange rates after 2002 led to a reduced share of the 
neighboring economies; hence, the destination structure becomes more diversified. 
 
3.3.10   Firm-level Product and Destination Market Diversification 
There is also diversification at the firm level when new products and new markets are 
incorporated. We present simple data on the evolution of the number of products and markets by 
firm (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). Despite considerable entry of firms, the figures on the number of 
products by firm remain fairly constant. As far as the number of destination markets, after 2000, 
the trend shows a larger share of firms that export only to one market. 





Number of Products Exported  
by Firm 
Year Mean Median Min  Max
1981 3.2  2  1 32 
1982 3  2  1  20 
1983 3  2  1  18 
1984 3  2  1  18 
1985 3.1  2  1 19 
1986 3.1  2  1 24 
1987 3  2  1  28 
1988 3.1  2  1 21 
1989 3.1  2  1 23 
1990 3.1  2  1 23 
1991 3.1  2  1 23 
1992 3  2  1  22 
1993 2.9  2  1 30 
1994 2.9  2  1 36 
1995 3  2  1  24 
1996 3.2  2  1 31 
1997 3.2  2  1 38 
1998 3.4  2  1 41 
1999 3.5  2  1 35 
2000 3.4  2  1 54 
2001 3.4  2  1 36 
2002 3.5  2  1 39 
2003 3.6  2  1 44 
2004 3.4  2  1 62 
2005 3.8  1  1 62 












Number of export destinations by firm 
Year Mean Median Min  Max 
1981 3.9  2  1  39 
1982 3.7  2  1  35 
1983 3.5  2  1  31 
1984 3.4  2  1  31 
1985 3.5  2  1  29 
1986 3.5  2  1  31 
1987 3.6  2  1  33 
1988 3.8  2  1  34 
1989 3.6  2  1  36 
1990 3.7  2  1  35 
1991 3.7  2  1  32 
1992 3.6  2  1  30 
1993 3.4  2  1  35 
1994 3.5  2  1  37 
1995 3.5  2  1  40 
1996 3.5  2  1  39 
1997 3.6  2  1  39 
1998 3.8  2  1  37 
1999 4  2  1  39 
2000 3.6  2  1  39 
2001 3.6  2  1  39 
2002 3.8  2  1  41 
2003 3.7  2  1  40 
2004 4  2  1  50 
2005 4  2  1  49 


















3.3.11 Main Destination and Product Dynamics 
Simple groupings of destinations and product categories can explain part of the firm-level export 
dynamics in Uruguay. We will consider the dichotomy between the region and the rest of the 
world, considering separately Brazil and Argentina as regional partners. The analysis uses broad 
groups of 4-digit product categories to reinterpret the concentration, size, entry, and exit results. 
One of the main basic facts observed in the aggregate is that the share of exports to Argentina and 
Brazil surged after 1992, reaching nearly half of all Uruguayan exports in 1998. This share fell 
after the Brazilian and Argentine devaluations (in 1999 and 2002, respectively) to a low of 20 
percent, comparable only to the share observed in the aftermath of the 1983 crisis. 
At the same time, the composition of Uruguayan exports shifted. We look at the 
composition considering a simple classification of three large groups of products: basic foodstuffs 
including meat, dairy, citrus, fish, rice, malt, and oleaginous products; raw inputs including raw 
wool, wool tops, leather, wood, live animals, and electricity; and other manufactures including 
processed food, beverages, tobacco, and other manufactured goods.
10 The share of raw inputs 
shows, if anything, a very slight upward trend since 1999. The share of manufacturing goods 
tends to decrease after 2000. The evolution of their share is closely mirrored by the increase in 
the export share of basic foodstuffs. This trend speeds up after 2002.  Exports to the region and 
the rest of the world differ in the types of products sold. Exports to the region are characterized 
by a larger weight of manufactured goods, and a more volatile pattern linked to the particular 
conditions of each of the neighboring partners. 
We can identify three types of firms according to their specialization in a given year, i.e., 
selling only to the region, only to destinations outside the region, and to both types of markets. 
We also define four types of firms by their product specialization in a given year: only basic 
foods, only raw inputs, only manufactures, and a mix of two or more of these product categories. 
The results in terms of the number of firms are described in Graphs 3.18 and 3.19. 
 
                                          
10 This classification follows closely—but not exactly—Instituto de Economía (2005).   45
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There is a noticeable change in the composition of the universe of Uruguayan exporting 
firms, particularly after 1999, toward manufacturing firms and firms oriented outside the region. 
Graphs 3.18 and 3.19 are also affected by the changes in statistical registration criteria, because it 
is possible that BROU’s databases were missing part of the exporting firm universe.  
Graphs 3.20 to 3.23 describe some of the results on size, concentration, entry, and exit in 
terms of product and destination specialization. With respect to size, we observe that firms that 
sell both in the region and in the rest of the world have much larger average sales compared with   46
firms that specialize in selling to Uruguay’s neighboring countries (Graph 3.20). At the same 
time, firms that do not specialize in one type of broad product category have on average much 
larger sales than those that do specialize (Graph 3.21). In terms of Cassoni and Vaillant (1993), 
firms that survive in export markets become large exporters and diversify their products and 
destination markets. In general, complete product and destination specialization has a role in 
defining large groups of firms, but does not discriminate clearly among large portions of the total 
value of exports. 
With respect to concentration, the data show a concentrated pattern within groups of firms 
by type of product and destination specialization (Graphs 3.22 and 3.23). Of the categories 
considered, there seems to be less concentration among firms exporting other manufactured 
goods and among those selling both to the region and to the rest of the world. 
 
 
Graph 3.20 - Mean export value by  type 
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Graph 3.21 - Mean export value by  type 
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Graph 3.22 - Share of 20 largest firms 
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Graph 3.23 - Share of 20 largest firms 
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Firms with different types of specialization are very disparately represented in the basic 
entry and exit flows from the export markets. It is natural to observe that firms entering the export 
market do not have a tendency to export both to the region and to the rest of the world; hence, the 
entry flows are explained by firms specialized only in one of these destinations. However, there 
does not seem to be evidence of a sequential process, i.e., first approaching the regional markets 
and then jumping to the rest of the world, since entering firms appear to roughly specialize in 
both types of market. The same occurs with those firms exiting the export markets. There is a 
noticeable change in the share of firms exporting to the rest of the world in entry and exit 
recorded after 2000 (Graphs 3.24 and 3.25).   49
Graph 3.24 -   Entry flows by  type of 
destination specialization 
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Graph 3.25 -   Exit flows by  type of 
destination specialization 
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Both entry and exit flows are mostly explained (in terms of firms) by units specialized in 
other manufactured goods. This is particularly true after 2000, with the usual warning about 
changes in the registration of firms (Graphs 3.26 and 3.27). 
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Graph 3.26 -   Entry flows by  type of 
product specialization 
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Graph 3.27 - Exit flows by  type of 
product specialization 
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3.4  Tracking the Discovery Process 
We tentatively explored the potential of our export databases (containing product, exporter, and 
destination market data) for describing the features of the discovery process. A candidate 
criterion is to establish lower and upper thresholds on export values and a time interval such that   51
export values that pass from below the lower to above the upper threshold indicate the presence 
of a discovery process.  
The investigation uses the common 8-digit classification, based on the Common 
MERCOSUR Classification.
11 Classification changes occurred constantly after short periods of 
time. Categories that in most cases opened up in many new codes in the next classification update 
were all too common and grouping was necessary to keep statistics consistent. This led to a very 
significant loss of product diversity. This is a relevant limitation because Uruguay is a relatively 
small economy, and its export universe is not extremely diversified even at the 8-digit level. As 
Table 3.7 shows, the highest ranked 8-digit exports tend to repeat in Uruguay’s top 20 after 25 
years. 
There is an additional problem, even assuming that the classification is uniform. 
Excessively disaggregated data would show discoveries from an accounting point of view but not 
from an economic point of view. Therefore, Klinger and Lederman (2004) recommend 
considering results at different aggregation levels. Levels of aggregation affect products 
differently, and for some—for instance, agricultural products, where diversification has limits—
the results do not differ sharply at different aggregation levels, although disaggregating leads to a 
larger number of products in manufacturing. 
We must determine an adequate threshold for the increases in export value that 
characterize a discovery. In 2005, Uruguay exported 2,340 different 8-digit NCM products, with 
total exports valued at more than US$3,000 million. The structure is concentrated, and the first 
100 8-digit NCM products explain 86 percent of total exports. The 100th 8-digit product’s export 
value is just above $US4.5 million and the smallest 8-digit product with export value above US$1 
million is ranked 243. That is, the 90th percentile of the distribution is just above US$1 million, 
while the median is below US$12,500. 
                                          
11 The 8-digit data allow tracking homogeneously defined product classes. The last two digits of the 10-digit level 
classification are left for each country to determine and are subject to discretion.   52
 
Table 3.7 
20 largest exports of Uruguay in 1981 and 2005;  1981: NADE 8 digit products;  2005: NCM 2002 8 digit 
products 
Rank  1981 highest selling exports  US$ millions  Share 
(percent) 






1  Frozen bovine meat, with 
bones  49.1 4.0  Frozen bovine meat, 
boneless  563.8 16.5 
2  Chilled  bovine meat, with 
bones  47.5 3.9  Chilled or fresh bovine 
meat, boneless  174.1 5.1 
3  Polished white rice  41.4  3.4  Light petrol oil and 
preparations  144.1 4.2 
4 Wool  tops  33.9  2.8 Polished white rice  130.0  3.8 
5 Whitened  rice  31.2  2.6 Wool  tops  105.4  3.1 
6  Tanned bovine leather, 
undivided  30.5 2.5  Soy  beans  96.8  2.8 
7  Peeled rice without further 
preparation  28.0 2.3  Tanned bovine leather, 
undivided  81.9 2.4 
8  Wool tops, breed II  24.1  2.0  Concentrated milk with no 
sugar addition  80.0 2.3 
9  Wool garment form women, 
children  23.3 1.9  Other bovine leather after 
tanning  78.1 2.3 
10 Bovine  leather  garment  20.6 1.7  Unroasted  malt  74.7  2.2 
11  Ovine leather garment  19.8  1.6  Plastic bottles, jars  66.7  1.9 
12  Malted barley grain  17.8  1.5  Firewood, wood waste  60.2  1.8 
13  Wool tops, breed B  17.5  1.4  Rough wood  57.3  1.7 
14  Knitted wool  16.8  1.4  Other cheese  54.7  1.6 
15  Rough wool  16.2  1.3  Other canned bovine meat  43.8  1.3 
16 Wheat  16.1  1.3  Gold  42.8  1.3 
17  Other frozen bovine meat  15.4  1.3  Tanned bovine leather, 
divided  42.2 1.2 
18 Car  tires  14.4  1.2  Fish fillets, (Merluccius 
spp.)  42.2 1.2 
19  Rough wool breed I Superior 
or Supra  13.6 1.1  Seats  40.1  1.2 
20  Other frozen, chilled or fresh 
fish  12.7 1.0  Sunflower  seeds  34.0  1.0 
  T O T A L  489.9  40.3    2013.1  58.8 
Source: BROU and Customs Office records. 
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In 1981, Uruguay exported only 1,413 different 8-digit NADE products, with total exports 
valued at more than US$1,200 million. The structure was less concentrated, and the first 100 
products accounted for just 75 percent of total exports. The 100th 8-digit product export value 
was just above US$2.5 million, while the smallest 8-digit product selling above US$1 million 
ranked 188. That year, the 90th percentile of the distribution was close to US$1.5 million, while 
the median was just below US$50,000. Therefore, 8-digit thresholds of US$50,000 as a lower 
bound and US$5 million as an upper bound were our starting point. We will not consider exactly 
8-digit products, since our common classification groups some 8-digit products in broader 
classes, but the bounds will be reasonable approximations.  
Finally, a criterion must be supplied as to what time span to consider for describing 
discoveries. We partitioned our panel in a continuous sequence of sub-panels of fixed time length 
with a starting date and an ending date. Each sub-panel can be thought of as a “sliding time 
window” indexed by its starting date. We consider sub-periods of ten years and compare for each 
product the average sales in the first three years and in the last three years to classify the product 
as a discovery case. Klinger and Lederman (2004) also track changes with respect to periods of 
three consecutive years at the start and end of the period under analysis. 
We also needed a criterion to attach the discovery to a particular date. Because the change 
in sales volume might have been sharp, the same product might appear as a discovery in 
subsequent time windows. In such case, we registered the last time window in which the product 
still registered as a discovery. The database yields 10 discovery cases obtained when only 
products that were not exported at all were considered (see the Annex to this chapter).  
  It may also be the case that the product was being exported before starting a growth 
process. Then a second criterion was used, by which the discovery process starts when the 
product satisfied both conditions: passing from below the lower bound to above the upper bound 
between the time window endpoints. We obtained 29 cases under this criterion. Of these, only 
five correspond to products for which a one-to-one classification correspondence could be 
obtained between the different classification systems. The rest were product categories that 
required forward or backward aggregation to construct compatible categories within the common 
classification. 
Summing up, the many changes of classification in short periods of time do not leave a 
significant margin for detecting export discoveries through statistical methods. Some of the cases   54
that will be part of our study are picked up in the data, such as the case of wine and wood 
products, while others, such as vaccines, are missed due to high aggregation.  
 
3.5  Firm Characteristics and Export Performance 
Some recent literature has stressed the link between exporting and productivity. Theoretical 
models, such as Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003), establish relationships between export 
performance and plant productivity, finding that exposure to international trade will affect 
differently firms of different productivity levels, hence conditioning entry to the export market 
and in some cases causing the least productive firms to exit the domestic market.  
There is also an empirical literature on exports and productivity. Girma et al. (2004) 
analyze a panel of firms in the United Kingdom in search of links between productivity and the 
export market. Using propensity score matching and difference-in-differences techniques, they 
find evidence of self-selection, in the sense that entering firms are more productive before they 
enter the export market, but also that exporting further enhances their productivity. Aw, Chen, 
and Roberts (1997) focus on turnover (entry, exit, and survival of firms). They analyze domestic 
and export markets separately, estimating total factor productivity and the contribution of exiting, 
entering, and continuing firms. They find that differences in productivity have an effect in 
turnover patterns, and that exporters are more productive than non-exporters: domestic and export 
markets sort out less and more-productive firms.  
An interesting question is which firms become exporters. The probability of being an 
exporter can be calculated conditional on firm and industry characteristics. Bernard and Wagner 
(1998) study entry and exit by German firms, testing the role of firm characteristics and sunk 
costs. They find evidence of the importance of sunk costs, and that plant success as measured by 
size and productivity increases the likelihood of exporting. Finally, Bernard and Jensen (2001) 
analyze a model of the export decision and find, using U.S. data, evidence on the importance of 
entry costs, while spillovers are small. Export promotion policies have little effect on the decision 
to export, and plant characteristics substantially influence entry decision, as do favorable 
exchange rate shocks.   
Interesting evidence can be obtained by using a panel of Uruguayan firms from the 
Manufacturing Survey from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística for 1988-95. The Manufacturing 
Survey provides detailed data on input use, factor intensity, production, employment, etc. Capital   55
stock values are constructed for the survey years and total factor productivity measures can be 
estimated. Using this database, a wide number of firm variables can be directly correlated with 
measures of the exporting activity. Our primary objective is to investigate whether there is an 
export productivity premium for Uruguayan firms and to estimate its magnitude. 
We estimate the following regression equation: 
ijt t t j j ijt ijt ijt ijt d s Size Age X TFP ε η φ δ γ β α + + + + + + = ∑ ∑  
where  ijt TFP  is total factor productivity of firm i in sector j at time t,  ijt X  is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm exports in year t,  ijt Age  is the number of years since the firm started 
operations,  ijt Size  is a dummy variable if the firm employs more than 100 workers,  j s  and  t d  are 
sector and time dummies, and  ijt ε  is white noise. We are interested in parameterβ , measuring the 




Export productivity premium estimates, Fixed-effects (within) regression 
Dependent variable is ln of total factor productivity (Levinsohn-Petrin estimates) 
Number of groups  655    Number of obs.  4,132     
R-sq:  within  =  0.004    Obs. per group: min  1     
between =  0.0011    avg  6.3     
overall =  0.0005    max  8     
     F(3.3474)  4.63     
Corr (u_i, Xb)  =  -0.1488    Prob > F  0.0031     
  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
exp 0.13  0.04  3.34  0.00  0.05  0,20 
size 0.08  0.05  1.60  0.11  -0.02  0,17 
EDAD 0.00  0.00  -0.22  0.82  -0.01  0,01 
_cons 6.81  0.15  44.19  0.00  6.51  7,12 
sigma_u 0.81           
sigma_e 0.56           
rho  0.68  (fraction of variance due to u_i)     
F test that all u_i=0:    F(654, 3474) =10.7    Prob > F =0   
 
The data show a primary estimate of a 13 percent productivity premium, and there is a significant 
productivity differential between exporting and non-exporting firms. This is not far from the 
results reported for Chile by Alvarez and López (2004), after controlling for size and foreign or 
domestic ownership. In our case, the size variable is significant only at the 11 percent level.   56
3.6 Summary of Findings 
To briefly summarize our results so far, we start by pointing out that there were three clearly 
defined periods regarding the number of exporting firms in Uruguay. Although the number of 
exporters grew steadily in the 1980s, reaching a maximum in 1992, it decreased through the 
1990s. After 2000, a clear growth trend is observed. Toward the end of the 1990s, fewer firms 
made larger sales. After 2000, the number of firms increased but the sales of the largest increased 
more than those of the smaller ones; hence, the median sales by firm fell as the average increased. 
Coincidently, the concentration of firm sales decreased until 1989, and has increased until the 
present. 
Flows of entry into and exit from the Uruguayan export markets are substantial. Entry 
flows show a decreasing trend between 1991 and 1999. Conversely, entry of firms into export 
activity gained new momentum after 2001. Exit flows in the 1990s were high, in the presence of 
low entry. Exit after 2001 was even higher, but the difference is that in the last five years entry 
flows were also very large. Hazard rates for entrants are generally above 30 percent. 
In spite of a significant contribution of entry and exit to the stock of exporting firms, a 
stable structure in terms of export values is observed. The contribution of older and larger firms is 
substantial. Contributions of continuing firms tend to explain the bulk of export growth. 
The number of products shows an increasing trend. Mean sales by product increased over 
time—particularly in the last five years—while median sales fell, which is reflected in larger 
concentration of sales by product. Entry and exit of products were also very large, but there was 
also a stable structure in which very traditional products explained a large proportion of export 
sales. 
The number of destination markets increased, and aggregate concentration indexes by 
destination market show a fall in concentration, tracking the reduction of the share of Argentina 
and Brazil as large trade partners. 
The shifts in destinations and products observed in the aggregate for Uruguayan exports 
translate into changes at the firm level. According to their destination and product specialization, 
recent changes include an increase in the number of firms selling other manufactured goods (not 
including basic foodstuffs or raw inputs) and oriented to sell outside the region. Large firms do 
export both to the region and the rest of the world, and also do not tend to specialize in one of the 
broad groups of products.    57
Firms entering the market tend to be specialized in selling to the rest of the world or to the 
region. Specialization in selling to the rest of the world is largely represented in entry and exit 
flows after 2000. Both entry and exit flows are mostly explained (firm-wise) by producers of 
other manufactured goods. 
After the construction of a homogeneous classification to link four different classifications 
of Uruguayan exports, we are skeptical about the usefulness of statistical databases for tracking 
discoveries because the data are too sensitive to classification changes. 
An exploratory scan of the manufacturing data shows that in the Uruguayan case, there is 
an association between exports and productivity. The explanation for this productivity differential 
remains an interesting topic for future research. 
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Annex: Export Discoveries in Uruguay According to Statistics 
 
Table  A.3.1 
Number of discoveries in Uruguayan exports 
Products previously not exported, ten years sliding time window 






4018383 Fluid milk  1988 1990 1995  1997 
4069083 Cheese, other  1984 1986 1991  1993 
10019083 Wheat, other  1992 1994 1999  2001 
15179083 Mixes of vegetable oil  1991 1993 1998  2000 
29041083 Benzenosulphonic acids  1994 1996 2001  2003 
39041010 Vinyl chloride polymers  1982 1984 1989  1991 
44012200 Lumber, wood in pellets  1983 1985 1990  1992 
51018383 Wool, other   1987 1989 1994  1996 
73064000
Other tubes and hollow 
pieces 1990 1992 1997  1999 
87120083 Bicycles 1991 1993 1998  2000 
Source: BROU and Customs records 
   59
 
Table A.3.2 
Nr. of discoveries in Uruguayan Exports: All products 
Ten year sliding time window 
Compares averages of three starting and ending years 
cod_prod Name 
Starting 
period  Ending Period 
2068383  Bovine meat, other  1994  1996  2001  2003 
3838383 
Other fish, crustacean and 
mollusks 1991  1993  1998  2000 
4018383 Fluid  Milk  1988  1990  1995  1997 
4069083 Cheese,  other  1984  1986  1991  1993 
10019083 Wheat,  other  1992  1994  1999  2001 
12060010 sunflower  seeds  1994  1996  2001  2003 
15179083 
Mixes of vegetable or animal 
oil  1991 1993  1998  2000 
21069083 Other  food  1983  1985  1990  1992 
22048383 Other  wine  1993  1995  2000  2002 
24028383 Other  cigarettes  1988  1990  1995  1997 
29041083 Benzenosulphonic  acids  1994  1996  2001  2003 
39041010 Vinyl  chloride  polymers  1982  1984  1989  1991 
40058383 Synthetic  rubber  1988  1990  1995  1997 
44012200  Lumber, wood in pellets  1985  1987  1992  1994 
44039983 Raw  wood,  other  1990  1992  1997  1999 
44071083  Sawn pine wood  1992  1994  1999  2001 
44838383 
Wood, carbon and wood 
manufactures 1989  1991  1996  1998 
48108383 
Other coated paper and 
cardboard 1991  1993  1998  2000 
49111083 Commercial  catalogs  1990  1992  1997  1999 
51018383 Other  raw  wool  1990  1992  1997  1999 
61142000  Other knitted garment   1982  1984  1989  1991 
71081283  Raw gold, non monetary use  1981  1983  1988  1990 
73064000  Iron tubes and parts  1990  1992  1997  1999 
84798383 Mechanical  machinery  1989  1991  1996  1998 
85118383  Motors or electrical devices  1990  1992  1997  1999 
87038383 Automobiles  1983  1985  1990  1992 
87048383 
Other automobiles for 
transport of goods  1990 1992  1997  1999 
87120083 Bicycles  1992  1994  1999  2001 
94019083  vehicle seats and parts  1995  1997  2002  2004 
Source: BROU and Customs records.   60
4.  Case Studies of New Export Activities 
 
4.1  Selection Criteria for Discoveries and Comparators 
 
Several cases of successful export discoveries were identified from varying sources (export data, 
sector and innovation related studies, success stories, interviews, consultancies, national and 
international seminars, etc.). Two very different sectors called for consideration as export-driven 
development. One is the forestry chain, which is now showing increasing exports as a result of 
long-term investment in forestation. It has a potential structural impact on exports. The second 
sector is the software industry, which developed during the 1990s and experienced booming 
exports earlier than in other software producing nations in Latin America. It is a contrasting case 
with the forestry chain—and Uruguay’s export tendency in general—because the discovery is not 
related to natural resources. Another important difference concerns the public response: a 
forestation process has been highly stimulated by government incentives, while the software 
sector has emerged without specific promotional measures and government support was slow to 
develop. Finally, foreign direct investment (FDI) was very important in the development of the 
forestry chain and mainly irrelevant in the building up of the software industry. In both sectors, a 
pioneer investor could be traced, who also played the first mover role in penetrating foreign 
markets. 
To check the consistency of our forestry analysis with a comparator case, we chose to 
explore another natural resource based sector with less promising export growth: the wine sector. 
Traditionally oriented toward the domestic market, the wine sector experienced a sharp export 
increase during the second half of the 1990s but this trend could not been sustained in the present 
decade. Similarities between the forestry and wine cases include, among others, the following: 
both are traditional activities that used to be tariff protected and experienced drastic restructuring 
in the past decades; the transformation process was based on the assumption of comparative 
advantage deriving from natural resource endowment; their development is highly dependent on 
relatively long biological cycles, especially when high quality raw material is targeted; firms tend 
to be vertically integrated in both sectors (producers frequently own plantations); a pioneer firm 
could be traced in vine growing as in forestry; and both sectors benefited from government 
support in their restructuring process, as well as for foreign market penetration. Is the difficulty of 
sustaining the growth of wine exports due to a failure in evaluating the conditions required to take 
advantage of the commercial opportunity that appeared in the global market in the 1990s? Was   61
the sector unable to overcome local coordination failures? Since FDI was relatively low in the 
wine sector, could this be a confirmation of the importance of FDI as a factor in the forestry 
discovery? The analysis of these issues should contribute to a better understanding of the forestry 
discovery and of the policy lessons to be drawn. 
For the software discovery, we chose as a comparator another high-tech sector: the 
electronics industry. In addition to their similar technological intensity, they both emerged as new 
“sectors” at the end of the 1980s and were driven to exporting due to the limitations of the 
domestic market. The spectacular growth of information and communication technology (ICT) 
opened a window of opportunity for these sectors in countries well below the technology frontier 
but rich in qualified human capital and capable of developing niche strategies. However, 
electronics exports did not develop significantly. 
In order to diversify the dimensions covered by the research and broaden the evidence for 
the lessons to be drawn, we selected two additional discoveries of a different kind. In Uruguay, 
there are a number of cases of first movers exporting successfully a differentiated product but 
with apparently no diffusion process taking place. It is often not clear whether the discovery 
failed to generate imitators or if diffusion is a question of time when uncertainties are complex 
and slow to be solved by the first mover. We chose the case of sturgeon and caviar exports as a 
discovery with no diffusion process yet—but bright prospects for diffusion—and concentrate on 
the analysis of the types of uncertainties to be solved by the first mover. To some extent, this case 
is similar to Chile’s salmon discovery in terms of global commercial opportunities and different 
types of difficulties to be solved before diffusion could begin.  
A comparator, i.e. a case of failed exports, was sought in the aquaculture sector. It 
appeared that frogs started to be exported by Uruguay in 1997 and raised enthusiasm among 
imitators; however, various factors led to the failure of export growth. Similarities between the 
caviar and frog cases include: a global commercial opportunity for a gourmet product from the 
aquaculture sector; technological research to adapt production to local conditions; and no specific 
government support. 
Finally, the fourth discovery was detected through statistical evidence. Animal vaccine 
exports, especially bacterial vaccines, emerged in the mid-1990s and increased significantly in 
the following years. Three producing firms were detected, which all started exporting at the same 
time. Previously, in the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale animal vaccine production in Uruguay had   62
developed mainly to eradicate viral foot-and-mouth disease. And, for once, the domestic market 
could absorb massive production due to the size of the livestock industry (three times the human 
population) and because sanitary conditions were vital for meat exports, an essential sector of the  
Uruguayan economy. An interesting question is thus whether there is any relation between the 
recent emergence of (bacterial) vaccine exports and the skills and knowledge previously 
developed in (viral) vaccine production. Is there a comparative advantage in animal vaccine 
production derived from qualified human resources in the field of biology? In this case, we chose 
as a comparator for the vaccine discovery the new Uruguayan biotechnology-based firms because 
they have not been able to export, or only marginally, in spite of enjoying the same critical public 
goods as vaccine pioneers. 
A synopsis of the distinctive features of the selected discoveries is presented in Table 
4.1.1. 
 
Table 4.1.1 - Distinctive features of the selected export discoveries 


















Export growth  
(US millions) 
4.5 (1993) to 
104 (2005) 
4.7 (1990) to  
141 (2005) 
0.003 (2000) to 
1 (2005) 












Type of products 
or services  Niche related  Mainly 
commodities  Brand related  Commodities 
Specific public 
support 




Yes  No   No 
Foreign direct 
investment  Limited  Very strong  Some interest  
expressed  Strong 
Potential structural 
impact in exports  Moderate  High  Uncertain  Low   63
4.2  Software Discovery 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Software exports are a novel diversification of Uruguayan exports that took place in the 1990s. 
Although some software firms appeared during the 1970s, the sector really emerged in the second 
half of the 1980s when personal computers (PCs) were introduced in the country and spurred the 
demand for programs and IT-related services. A new generation of entrepreneurs appeared, 
several of whom still head some of the most successful software firms. One of these is ARTech, 
the first firm to export a product on a sustained basis. Undoubtedly there are other local pioneers, 
because this discovery involves an activity that includes several types of products and services. 
But ARTech and its flagship product, GeneXus, are an excellent illustration of a first-mover 
strategy that included the promotion of a product diffusion process through setting up what might 
be called a community of practice. 
This chapter focuses on the key elements of this discovery and checks the consistency of 
the analysis through a review of the conditions that prevented a positive outcome in the case of 
the electronics sector. Research carried out in the early 1990s (Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito, 1992) 
showed that both the software and electronics industries were developing in Uruguay and were 
contributing to the build-up of a knowledge-intensive sector in the country. Commercial 
opportunities deriving from the fast expansion of IT could be matched thanks to qualified human 
resources and some research tradition in these fields at the public university. Both sectors had star 
products that were finding their way into foreign markets. However, difficulties of several types 
hindered further growth in electronics and the diffusion process was truncated.  
With respect to the software industry, Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito concluded: “If demand 
for specific or tailor made software increases, existing firms will probably grow and will be 
joined by new firms. However, were this to happen, it is not obvious that this increase will be 
accompanied with the reversal of the aspects that most clearly characterize the present weakness 
of the sector, namely: very low individual turnover in general; limited export capacity; poor 
management of commercial issues, especially marketing; limited sales volume per unit of 
production; etc.” (Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito, 1991, p. 273). Although most of these difficulties   64
still hold true for a great number of the 300 firms that make up the sector,
12 nowadays Uruguay 
sells software products and services to 50 markets. It even became the largest software exporting 
country of Latin America at the turn of the century, a condition that would later vanish. Exports 
grew from practically nothing in 1989 to close to $US80 million in 2001, and reached US$104 
million in 2005 (Graph 4.2.1).
13 In spite of some decrease in 2002 and 2003 due to the regional 
economic and financial crisis, as well as to the drop in the global IT business, the software sector 
performed much better than the total country's exports in the same years (Graph 4.2.2).   
In the present decade, software exports represent an average of 2.3 percent of the 
country’s total goods and services exports,
14 most of which originate from natural resource 
commodities and tourism. Despite this modest share, the software sector contributes to export 
diversification and, more significantly, it is the first time in Uruguay’s history that knowledge 
accumulation at the national level has generated exports that (i) are not based in natural resources; 
(ii) are not anecdotal because they stood firm in a medium-term period; and (iii) are not so 







                                          
12 Roughly half of them are software developers (also providing services related to the applications they develop); the 
rest perform different types of services and consultancies. The sector's total turnover (excluding single-person firms) 
amounted to US$200 million in 2004.  
13 This is based on annual surveys undertaken since 1998 by the Uruguayan Chamber of Information Technologies 
(CUTI). Since 2004, CUTI has been the official software export data provider of the Central Bank of Uruguay, in 
charge of export statistics. 
14 Software exports registered by CUTI are not exactly comparable with exports of goods and services registered by 
the Central Bank, since the latter, according to national accounting criteria, considered as exports only sales coming 
from the national territory. Instead, CUTI figures also include resident factor incomes coming from abroad. 
15 In Ireland, software exports represented 10 percent of total exports in 2000 and in India, 8 percent in 1999-2000 
(Arora, 2003, and Kumar, 2001). In Ireland, Israel, India, Brazil, and China, the software industry accounts for at 
best 2-3 percent of GDP (Arora, 2004). In Argentina, it represents about 1 percent of GDP. In Uruguay, the figure is 
about 1.2 percent (excluding sales of hardware products).    65
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Graph 4.2.2 - Evolution of Software

























Software exports Goods and services total exports
Source: CUTI and BCU.  
 
 
Nevertheless, the average annual growth rate of software exports (6 percent in 1998-2005) 
lags behind the two-digit rate of the international software trade. Software exports and imports of 
the OECD region, for instance, increased at an average annual rate of 17-18 percent in 1999-2002 
(Eurostat data). Software spending at the world level grew 11.4 percent per year between 2001   66
and 2005, on average (WITSA, 2006).
16 It is precisely the dynamism of the demand for software, 
together with the globalization of the IT business, that offers opportunities for Uruguay to find 
market niches and establish agreements with transnational companies, latching onto global value 
chains. As regarding Latin America, some forecasts indicate that it will become the second-
highest increasing region for IT business in the world, behind Eastern Europe (Business News 
America, 2005). 
 
4.2.2 First Mover ARTech 
ARTech Consultores S.R.L. was co-founded in 1988 by two Uruguayan computer engineers. One 
of them previously headed the computer center of the Uruguayan social security institution and 
both had carried out consultancies abroad (in Brazil and the United States) in the field of the 
relatively recent technology of relational data bases. Having found out that it was feasible to 
automate part of the database programming process, they decided to create a software tool that 
would enable consultants to develop their own applications more efficiently. After an 
unsuccessful intent to sell the project to get funds to develop it, they faced the following options:  
 
“Either we abandoned the project and continued with normal consultancy tasks or 
we continued fighting for it. Since we thought our development was useful, we 
decided to create an enterprise to host our GeneXus project. Initially it had quite 
minor objectives, consisting mainly in assisting in the design of a database but 
then, as time passed, we ended up using it to generate applications.” (Valverde et 
al., 2006)  
 
The first version of GeneXus was released at the end of 1989. The first client was a firm 
from the North of the country; a few more clients followed, including the Ministry of Defense 
and De Larroble y Asociados (DL&A), a firm that would become a strategic partner of ARTech 
and a leader in banking software in Uruguay. Abroad, Chile was the first destination of GeneXus, 
followed by Brazil, the “natural” market for ARTech’s partners since they had been working 
extensively there. By 1991, ARTech had sold 350 copies of GeneXus, mostly in the Latin 
                                          
16 The World Information Technology and Services Alliances (WITSA) tracks ICT national spending in 75 countries 
according to four categories: software, computer hardware, services, and telecommunications. Average growth of 
spending in the whole ICT sector was 8.9 percent from 2001 to 2005.   67
American market and by way of direct sales abroad. Foreign revenue represented roughly 
US$250,000 (Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito, 1991), while other exporters were mainly exporting on 
an experimental basis.
17   
In the past 15 years, ARTech evolved from a small company founded by two inquisitive, 
creative computer engineers to a large-scale, prosperous business with worldwide trading of its 
product, which is used by more than 4,500 firms. ARTech does not reveal data on its turnover or 
its exports, but in 1997 it disclosed that GeneXus license sales amounted to US$10 million (with 
2,200 clients) and generated another US$50 million by way of related services: consultancies, 
development of turn-key systems, etc. Exports grew dramatically and now represent 85 percent of 
total sales.  
ARTech’s capital is still entirely national and the founders maintain their position as 
President and Vice President of the company as well as of GeneXus Consulting, a sister firm 
created to provide consultancy services. 
 
Main Uncertainties Faced and Solved by ARTech 
The greatest uncertainties  at the planning stage concerned the technological challenge and 
demand, which was potential but not explicit. Development costs were unknown and assumed as 
sunken costs. It turned out that the development of the first version of GeneXus required about 20 
person-years and cost about US$500,000 (Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito, 1991). Because of the lack 
of initial capital, this investment was indirectly financed by consultancies carried out by 
ARTech’s people. 
Once the product was developed and launched in the local market with a reasonable 
degree of success, uncertainty concerned, in the first place, foreign market penetration. The lack 
of specialized management and marketing skills in the early phase of ARTech made it difficult to 
discover the right export strategy. Furthermore, there was no experience in the country in terms of 
exporting software, a highly intangible good. Although such goods are similar to services, exports 
of services were not much developed at that time in Uruguay (late 1980s). 
                                          
17 There are no official records of software exports in these years. Even today, software exports by firm are not 
available because the Customs Office does not register exports of services.   68
When ARTech aimed to properly export GeneXus instead of selling it directly in foreign 
markets, it clashed with the inadequacy of official procedures for the specificities of software 
products. The following comment illustrates the situation:   
 
“So far we have exported only one package for US$15,000. We had to pack the 
program and fill in a form specifying how much it weighed, what color it was, etc., 
just as if it were about shoes. There is absolutely nothing specific for software. 
And there are no custom duties on it, fortunately… In addition, as a professional 
company, we could not export. It had to be done through a business firm because, 
according to the Banco de la Republica [the state bank in charge of foreign trade], 
a professional company cannot be an exporter. (Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito, 1991, 
p. 260) 
 
This problem vanished as the development and spread of the Internet enabled online 
downloading. However, more generally, some of the obstacles faced by ARTech—and the 
software sector in general—can be ascribed to differences between traditional industry and the 
software business. Laws and regulations in the country tend to be based on the former model, 
which can result in awkward situations in the case of software. For instance, the software industry 
typically works on a project basis and would therefore require flexible employment mechanisms. 
This difficulty at the policy level was only recently tackled by the Uruguayan Chamber of the 
Software Industry (CUTI). 
In the early 1990s, ARTech’s search for new ways of expanding its commercialization 
channels coincided with a change in IBM’s commercial strategy, consisting in opening itself up 
to partners to expand its business. With the launching of its new AS400 platform, IBM needed a 
network of partners to develop applications, and ARTech became one of the partners. IBM’s 
reputation and marketing channels facilitated the diffusion of GeneXus as a product easily used 
for business applications development with this new platform. Later, when Microsoft 
consolidated its position as dominant supplier in the PC world and PC servers became an 
alternative for business applications, ARTech developed a closer relation with Microsoft.  
ARTech opened offices in Chicago (1994), Mexico (2002), and São Paulo and Shanghai 
(2003); in 2004, ARTech participated in a joint venture with Japanese entrepreneurs for the 
distribution of its product. On the whole, ARTech’s distributor network now comprises 28   69
countries. Carefully thought out commercial alliances are a basic part of the firm’s strategy and, 
at times, ARTech hired specialized consultancies to help choose a foreign partner, as was the case 
in Brazil. Results are sometimes slow to appear: ARTech worked for about four years with its 
distributor in China to acquire know-how on business negotiation in China (how to negotiate, 
deal and work with people, gain confidence, develop projects, etc.) before getting a very 
important contract in 2005 to provide “GXHealth,” a comprehensive administration system for 
the WantWant Hospital in the province of Hunan. Moving toward the East also implied moving 
to multi-language versions of the product. 
Summing up, the exporting learning curve included different and successive approaches 
to internationalization: direct sales abroad; taking advantage of IBM’s development strategy; 
establishing a network of distributors and sales agents abroad; selling through the Internet; 
establishing a commercial joint venture; and opting for a multi-language product. As ARTech 
moved from regional to extra-regional markets (the United States, Asia), uncertainty was 
increasingly related to cultural factors and the firm had to dedicate substantial efforts to adapt in 
each case. 
A second source of uncertainty concerned the extent to which profit-eroding diffusion 
could be avoided or postponed. This is a two-fold issue: What should be done in terms of product 
upgrading and which alliances should be created to generate and internalize network economies?  
 
a. Product Strategy  
The GeneXus discovery is a typical case of exploitation of a proprietary knowledge niche that 
was generated and maintained through intensive R&D and a clear, long-term product strategy.
18 
Since its creation, ARTech has been heavily involved in R&D, in the area of relational databases, 
applications development, Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE), and artificial 
intelligence. The R&D team now includes 30 engineers, some of them part-time.
19 The following 
were essential to attain the product objectives that were fixed at an early stage, before technology 
had developed sufficiently at the global level to fully attain them (Gonda and Jodal, 2006): 
                                          
18 GeneXus provides an integrated toolset for developing complex mission-critical applications with large databases. 
A license for the GeneXus development environment costs about US$5,000 and an additional US$2,000 for each 
generator. Maintenance fees in the following years (15 percent of the initial price) give the right to updated versions. 
19 University-level professionals represent 80 percent of the current total of 110 employees (90 in 1998).   70
•  Completion. GeneXus generated not only the user database, but also all the 
application programs so as to allow the automatic maintenance of the whole 
user system with ensuing drastic cost-savings.
20 The goal was achieved in 1992 





•  Universality. This enabled GeneXus to develop applications for any existing 
relevant platform.
21 Applications can now be designed with independence of 
the construction platform. This in turn allows the software developers to reuse 
knowledge bases in different environments, an advantage that increases the 
longer the relation of the software firm with ARTech. High flexibility is one of 
the product’s great strengths. According to one of the ARTech directors, there 
                                          
20 It has been estimated that, in conventional environments, 80 percent of the resources supposedly assigned to 
development are in fact dedicated to the maintenance of applications. 
21 Initially, GeneXus basically generated applications for one platform (IBM AS/400 computer). In the mid-1990s, 
the strong expansion of the client/server architecture led ARTech to release the client/server generators for the most 
relevant database management systems, which substantially increased universality. In the mid-1990s, in response to 
the worldwide spread of the Internet for business purposes, ARTech released its first Web generator that would be 
further refined. GeneXus users also increasingly requested the automated updating of the PC version of the 
programs, which was done in 2001 with the release of GeneXus generators for Java and .NET. In the following 
years, the firm added support to different platforms that became relevant in the market. 
Graph 4.2.3 – GeneXus objectives 
and achievements 
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is no other product on the global market with this multi-platform feature and 
the capacity to capture knowledge at such a level of abstraction. Platform 
compatibility has been a way to widen the network of GeneXus users. 
•  Usability. ARTech has made the tool usable by anyone with a solid general 
background. Up to now, usability has been limited to professional developers. 
Removing this limitation should enable a much greater contribution from non-
IT professionals in the construction of a firm’s system because those are the 
ones with specific knowledge of the business or sector in which they are 
involved. “Knowledge of the problem to be solved will be increasingly more 
important than knowledge of the technology needed to solve it. … in the near 
future, business systems based on accounting, purchases, sales, payroll, stocks 
or ERPs, CRMs, etc. will become a minor part of the applications that users 
need. Where does the knowledge to build the new applications lie? Well, much 
more in the latter than in the professional developers.” (Gonda and Jodal, 
2006)  
•  Productivity. A fivefold increase in productivity—compared with manually 
using common programming languages—was the initial goal and was 
achieved with the 2005 version of GeneXus. A major increase is expected with 
the 2007 version number ten, which was totally rewritten based on the current 
state of knowledge, instead of building on the previous version.  
 
ARTech’s strategy aimed at anticipating upcoming coordination difficulties, on the one 
hand, from rapid changes in computer sciences and, on the other hand, from customers’ 
reluctance to changes that they do not perceive yet as unavoidable. According to ARTech’s 
partners, each of these changes meant a moment of profound crisis for the firm (Valverde et al., 
2006).
22 
b. Alliances to Benefit from Network Economies 
                                          
22 Software tools have a particularly high rate of obsolescence if they do not adapt to changes in operation systems, 
languages, databases, etc. In the words of one of the firm’s partners: “In this industry, to survive you need to ship a 
new version every year, at least… Your product could be great one year, but if it is not better next year, you are 
dead.” (Valverde et al., 2006)   72
As was argued, ARTech has a temporary monopoly that is regularly renovated through improved 
versions of its copyright-protected product, and this operates as a barrier against imitative entry. 
But this is only one part of the story; the other is about what has to be done so that network 
externalities will favor the new technology. Equally important as designing a good product is 
creating a network for it: finding firms that are willing to collaborate, building strategic alliances, 
knowing how to put the network to work, and managing it so as to internalize ensuing 





Graph 4.2.4 – The Genexus Community 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on ARTech interview.   73
Since GeneXus is a tool for software developers (somewhat similar to a capital good in a 
traditional industry), developing close ties with the latter was of the utmost importance. Indeed, 
the diffusion of GeneXus among end-users needed the intermediary link of a strong user-producer 
relationship at the previous level of the chain. The main instrument used to develop this relation-
ship has been ARTech’s Solution Partners Program, which in fact promotes a community of 
practices.
23 Solution Partners are developers of GeneXus-based solutions for their own clients, 
with whom ARTech establishes privileged information channels. The nature of the information 
flows defines the intensity of the links (levels 1 and 2 in Graph 4.2.4). When a developer of 
GeneXus-based applications starts to deal with large clients, he is offered privileged treatment, 
such as special prices and technical support, participation in beta-testing, etc. In exchange, 
feedback information flows toward ARTech on aspects that could be improved, error detection, 
etc. This is the way ARTech internalizes network externalities. There are about 150 Solution 
Partners, of which 100 are in Uruguay and the rest in other countries. All clients of Solution 
Partners have to acquire a GeneXus license for program maintenance, becoming thereby also part 
of the GeneXus Community and increasing network economies. 
With a distinguished group of close to ten Solution Partners, ARTech shares strategic 
knowledge (level 1): engineers of these firms work together with ARTech to increase 
complementary functions of the product on the basis of their own experiences and needs.
24 
Collaboration helps to optimize the product: 
“If a local firm – for example, a GeneXus user specialized in the development of 
distribution and logistics applications – has a problem in Malaysia with its 
beverage distribution system, we send a person, or work in Zonamerica, to solve 
that precise problem. And this helps us to achieve GeneXus product optimization 
because it shows us a shortcoming. Despite our internal tests, with thousands of 
users, unexpected events can appear; this is the market filter.” (Interview with 
one of ARTech’s managers)  
                                          
23 The concept of community of practice refers to the process of social learning that occurs when people who have a 
common interest in some subject or problem collaborate over an extended period to share ideas, find solutions, and 
build innovations. 
24 Firms closest to ARTech usually develop applications in a niche or market segment: banking software (DL&A), 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) solutions (Datalogic, INSIS, Concepto), distribution and logistics (Solur), 
maintenance (BCN), etc. GeneXus is thus put into competition through firms acting in a same market segment.   74
ARTech also implicitly provided technological surveillance service to its partners because the 
latter were confident that ARTech would take care of any technological breakthrough or 
upgrading need. This meant lower R&D investment levels for small and medium partners. For 
ARTech it implies the challenge of maintaining a mainstream position at the world level in the 
future. 
Other members of the GeneXus Community include the network of distributors and 
individual sales agents who sell the product in their country and deliver complementary solutions 
and services, and a great number of software developers (about 1,000) who use GeneXus without 
being Solution Partners. Alliances have also been established with international technology 
providers that set the industry standard at the global level, such as IBM, Microsoft, Hewlett 
Packard, and Oracle. In this case, it is ARTech that operates as a solution partner for the latter.  
The community meets regularly at the national, regional, and international levels to 
review and share the state of the art concerning GeneXus. ARTech also sponsors “collaborative 
projects” aimed at fostering integration and knowledge transfer within the Community.
25 An 
important diffusion channel has been the integration of courses on GeneXus in the curricula of 
informatics education in the public and private universities of the country. This is another way to 
enlarge the network and create positive feedback (strong gets stronger) because it increases the 
dependency of potential software users on GeneXus.  
On the whole, the GeneXus Community is an open network where ARTech differentiates 
among different types of allies and maintains property rights on a key technological component 
of that network. Looking back at the evolution of the pioneer, ARTech showed several of the 
characteristics usually associated with a market leader: substantial domestic market share in its 
segment (software development tools); extensive distribution arrangements; leadership in 
developing a new business model and a new family of products; a forefront position in a new 
technology; and some market power in determining its products prices. 
Summing up, a product strategy and diffusion pattern was set up to avoid profit erosion. 
But was profit eroded by imitators? GeneXus never had a direct rival product in the domestic 
market. At the global level, competition derived less from other products offering the same 
                                          
25 An interesting feature is that university students with basic knowledge of GeneXus can propose and participate in 
collaborative projects, which gives them an opportunity to learn, meet the community members, and demonstrate 
their skills and knowledge.   75
integrated solutions than from the barrier to entry for a small producer from an unknown 
country.
26 But the lack of imitation must be associated with the specific software segment of 
ARTech: there are few players in the software tools world. 
However, GeneXus Consulting, ARTech’s sister firm, carries out joint projects with its 
closest partners and, in calls for tender, competes against other firms also using GeneXus. 
ARTech’s profitability depends to a certain extent on the development of services alongside 
products. 
 
First Mover Externalities 
Information externalities generated for subsequent entrants into the software industry had the 
following characteristics: i) they were market revealing, by establishing a reputation for 
Uruguayan software goods and services in foreign markets (country image); and ii) they had a 
demonstration effect in the domestic market. In the context of a country with no risk-taking 
culture and with scarce entrepreneurship resources, ARTech’s role was important in showing that 
it was possible for Uruguay to export world-scale software technology and to establish 
partnerships with the world’s leading firms in the software industry.  
The GeneXus innovation entered the pool of technological knowledge and thereby 
benefited society as a whole. Examples of how these knowledge spillovers were internalized 
include the framework agreement signed in 2004 between ARTech and the computer research 
center (InCo) of the public university, for collaboration in fields related to software development 
and education. Recently, they implemented together a testing center in Zonamerica, with the 
support of Microsoft. Cooperation has also developed between ARTech and private universities. 
Finally, network externalities have developed through the GeneXus Community. This is a 
clear case of how private bargaining can internalize externalities, resulting in efficient solutions. 
                                          
26 Nowadays, the alternatives to using GeneXus include: i) developing a more traditional database system, which 
requires the use of several tools because no one provides an overall solution; and ii) buying the relatively recent 
Microsoft “Visual Studio Team System,” an integrated development platform for building mission-critical 
applications for businesses. Although the latter is different from GeneXus because it uses a different technology, it 
aims at resolving the same type of problems.   76
Public Support  
In its early stages, the discovery did not benefit from any special public support or incentives. 
However, the public sector was important to the extent that it adopted the product for some of its 
entities. In a later stage, ARTech benefited from the advantages of operating in a technological 
free trade zone, with state of the art infrastructure and services and a package of fiscal benefits. 
Considering that operational costs are high in Zonamerica, an important issue in deciding to move 
there was the expected benefit in terms of ARTech’s image abroad. 
 
4.2.3 Diffusion Process 
It is now clear that ARTech played a first-mover role in the “human resources (H-R) model” 
sense because it revealed to other potential investors the relatively local cost structure and the 
profitability of a new activity at the country level. The basic logic of the self-discovery model 
indicates that once this information becomes known, imitation appears, the pioneer’s gains 
vanish, and a new sector arises. However, in the present case there was no successful imitation of 
GeneXus, a rather normal feature in the software tools segment. How then did an exporting 
software sector emerge and develop in Uruguay? 
We consider the following issues: i) the available public goods for the development of a 
local software sector; ii) a series of conditions that triggered exports and gave rise to different 
internationalization strategies; and iii) the extent to which the community of practice model 
promoted by the first mover was replicated. Then we turn toward some coordination failures and 
the way they have been tackled. Lastly, we comment on the public response to the discovery, 
summing up the impact of the public policies and instruments described throughout this chapter.  
 
Public Goods  
 
a.  Education and Research in IT-Related Fields 
 
The dramatic growth of ICT in the advanced industrial nations had two features that were of great 
importance for follower countries: the decoupling of hardware from software and the pronounced 
human capital intensity of software. This, together with rapid improvements in data 
communication (and communications more generally) and the steady increase of globalization, 
opened a window of opportunity for countries well below the technology frontier, but rich in 
human capital relative to the opportunities for that human capital (Arora et al., 2001). This is the 
great opportunity that has been seized by the three “I’s”—Ireland, India, and Israel – which all   77
exhibited an “excess” supply of human capital in the 1980s and early 1990s and, specifically, an 
excess supply of engineers and technology graduates. Although this last condition does not hold 
in the Uruguayan case, the country fits the model in as far as it had a high share of university 
graduates compared with its level of technological development. There was no wide and 
diversified industrial base demanding these resources. The opportunity cost for professionals to 
work in the software industry was therefore not too significant and the window of opportunity 
that opened in the 1980s for late-coming countries in IT could be seized.  
The initial availability of very qualified human resources was the product of long-term 
investment in education and R&D in that particular field. In Uruguay, the only public university 
(Universidad de la Republica, UDELAR) created graduate studies in computing sciences at its 
Engineering School in 1967, when it also created a research oriented Computer Institute (InCo) 
with the advice or collaboration of foreign researchers. After the dictatorship period (1973-84), 
UDELAR’s Engineering School sent computer engineers to train abroad at the postgraduate level 
as a way to strengthen the dismantled computer center. Computer sciences were also included in 
the post-dictatorship Program for the Development of Basic Sciences (PEDECIBA), which 
among other measures proved highly successful in bringing researchers and teachers back to 
Uruguay.  
In the 1990s, the expansion of private universities, which was particularly noticeable in 
informatics, provided the additional human resources that the software sector growth required. 
The latter’s curriculum tends to be pragmatic, aiming at facilitating the rapid incorporation of 
graduates into  the software industry. In contrast, the sound theoretical base provided at the state 
university is crucial for developing the capacity for resolving complex systems problems and 
generating technological innovations in a field where specific knowledge is particularly prone to 
become rapidly obsolete.  
Education in ICT was thus the result of public and private efforts. During the past 15 
years, there has been a positive response to the supply of graduates. Employment in the IT sector 
grew from around 800 at the beginning of the 1990s to 4,900 in 2004 (González, 2007). An 
additional 1,600 people work individually or are hired on a short-term basis by software firms; 
and hardware related employment absorbs another 2,200 workers (CUTI, 2004).   78
b. Telecommunications Infrastructure 
During the past two decades, the state-owned telecommunications enterprise, ANTEL, developed 
a 100 percent digital telecommunications network covering the whole country, and an extended 
optic fiber network for data transmission. Uruguay has a good relative position in Latin America 
in terms of ICT infrastructure, with some indicators comparing favorably with other emerging 
software nations (Table 4.2.1). However, the recent economic recession deeply affected 
ANTEL’s revenue and investment, and the country also lost the opportunity to hook up to the 
optic fiber loop for Latin America and now has to connect to the Argentine hub, a more 
expensive alternative.  
 


















Uruguay  30.9  18.5  13.3  333.8  21.0 
Average 5 LA 
countries*  23.7  48.2  13.0  149.8  14.8 
Ukraine  25.2  37.0  2.8  27.0  7.8 
Bulgaria  32.1  80.8  5.9  84.7  15.9 
Korea  49.2  79.4  54.5  1,130.1  65.7 
Ireland  49.0  101.5  49.7  421.0  29.6 
*Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Costa Rica.      
Source: Based on data from www.itu.int. 
 
c. Quality of Life 
Although the link between quality of life and software development and exporting may not seem 
evident, the quality of life is important for attracting FDI and making the country attractive as a 
regional software hub, as well as for preventing the relocation of successful national firms in 
more vibrant business environments.
27 Some researchers have found that the type of talent sought 
by multinationals tends to reside in clusters typified by high quality of life standards, i.e., 
locations in which there is: quality of place, a thick labor market, and high levels of 
                                          
27 ARTech’s partners and other successful entrepreneurs have all declined proposals to install their main offices in 
the United States. Although this is a complex issue involving several factors, the quality of life in Uruguay was not 
the least of them.   79
environmental quality (Florida, 2000, in Carmel, 2003). Environmental conditions are excellent 
in Uruguay, a peaceful country with an educated population and no racial problems.
28 The 
country also shows a good ranking in indexes of government stability, democracy, corruption 
level, etc. On the downside, labor and other markets lack dynamism, and air connections are 
sometimes awkward even for some Latin American destinations. 
It was only around the turn of the century, as the software sector consolidated, that a few 




d. Legal and Regulatory Framework 
Until 2003, software products were implicitly copyright protected by the intellectual property law 
of 1937. Law 17.616, issued in that year, now takes specifically into account the informatics 
programs and the developer has the exclusive right to authorize their reproduction, distribution, 
transformation, and communication. 
No other laws or regulations were specifically directed toward the software industry 
during the export take-off period. It was only after exports had experienced a substantial rate of 
growth that a series of fiscal benefits were established. In 1999, this industry was declared “of 
national interest” (Decree 84/999),
30 which provided it with some fiscal benefits, mainly: 
exemption from the 1.5 percent capital tax (Impuesto al Patrimonio); exemption from the value-
added tax (VAT, 23 percent) associated with imported capital goods; and refund of VAT in the 
case of local purchasing of these goods. In 2000, two decrees (No. 387/000 and successive 
renovations, and No. 386/000) exempted the sector from the 30 percent industry and trade income 
tax (IRIC) until December 2006 and from VAT on exports of software and informatics services.
31 
                                          
28 According to a 2005 study by IBRD/IMF/ECLAC, Uruguay is the third country in Latin America in terms of 
population welfare indicators (El País, 05/07/06). 
29 In the software development segment, the Irish multinational Trinchet (2000), which acquired a local firm, is the 
most relevant example. In the consultancy services segment, foreign capital is more important but still not 
preponderant; there are some firms from the region (like Sonda from Chile) and from the United States (Unisys) and 
Europe (Soluziona, Spain). On the whole, the weight of transnational companies in software exports was only 3.7 
percent in 2004, according to a CUTI survey. Firms like Bull and IBM have operated since long back in Uruguay but 
mainly in the domestic market. 
30 Several other sectors benefit from national interest status. See Chapter 1. 
31 Previously, only exported goods benefited from VAT exemptions (as all exported goods do); the decree extended 
the exemption to consultancy services and licenses sold abroad.   80
Finally, in 2002, a decree (No. 144/02) eliminated withholding at source for the income tax when 
importing software. 
Other promotional measures will be analyzed in the section on coordination failures and 
the public response. 
 
Milestones and Comparative Advantage in the Development of Exports 
Lower labor costs than in the developed world are a basic advantage of all software emerging 
nations in the developing world. But in an international comparison, Uruguay lies far from the 
cheap labor countries. Other factors must have combined in the building up of Uruguay’s 
comparative advantage. Similarities in the trajectories of software firms in the early period of the 
discovery appear to be revealing in this regard, besides illustrating some typical features of the 
sector’s development. 
 
a. From Niche Strategy and Customized Solutions to Internationalization Strategies 
From the outset, the perception concerning software demand was that there were some market 
niches of no interest to large IT companies. Indeed, in some areas it was only possible to find 
either standard programs that would perform multiple but not in-depth functions, or highly 
specialized but very expensive applications. A demand thus existed for reasonably priced 
applications that would perform some functions better than the former programs but would 
disregard certain functions of the latter that were useless for the concerned client. 
Therefore, specific market opportunities emerging from IT development were at the origin 
of the local firms. Many of these firms grew from links with related sectors that originated 
demand and became a source of competence (i.e., through the knowledge and skills the latter 
possess, their willingness to experiment, and their ability to engage in an active dialogue). 
Unattended needs were detected in both vertical and horizontal markets. To take advantage of 
these opportunities, firms developed a strong capacity for customized solutions, and the industry 
further evolved from tailor-made applications or solutions to: i) customized adaptations, 
integration, or implementation of standard programs and tools; and ii) products developed as 
open packages that support customized adaptation. Accumulated experience in attending local 
specificities or conditions was a major condition for reaching foreign markets. 
Different business models progressively developed to enable sustained export growth. A 
paradigmatic example is Memory Computación. When software programs started to spread in   81
Uruguay in the mid and late 1980s, few of them took into account the specific characteristics and 
needs of the administration of small firms. Memory targeted the SME segment as a way to avoid 
competition from commercial, standardized programs; it ended up with a packaged program that 
integrated common modules with country specific components. The firm had an early vision that 
accountancy systems would substitute for accountants and that there was a wide market in Latin 
America for this new “commodity.” However, Memory went through several experiments before 
finding the right internationalization strategy: a franchise system (see the Annex to this chapter). 
Other firms developed competencies in a vertical market, which enabled them to latch 
onto a global value chain when the opportunity arose. An example is SOLUR, a firm that started 
building up knowledge in the field of distribution and logistics. At some point on the learning 
curve, its system was noticed by a multinational (Pepsico) in search of a new distribution 
solution. This was SOLUR’s opportunity to develop a strategic alliance with a world player. 
In the service sector, an outstanding example is GRUPO QUANAM, a firm that provides 
specialized consultancy services in information technology to enhance the competitiveness of 
very large companies.
32 In the late 1990s, QUANAM specialized in implementing or adapting 
People Soft packages in different business environments, developing its own methodology 
adapted to the specific needs of the Latin-American market. When People Soft was acquired by 
Oracle (2004), QUANAM organized a team of 400 Latin American consultants in nine Latin 
American countries, all specialized in Oracle’s products. The firm is currently implementing a 
contract with a multinational on the “Fortune 500” list. 
 
b. Compelled to Export 
Although software firms initially used the domestic market as a testing ground for their products 
and services, they rapidly had to look for foreign markets to achieve a better return on their 
investment and reap the benefits of their apprenticeship. The limitations of the domestic market, 
                                          
32 The firm was founded in 1978 by a group of computer engineers who decided to provide technical support to a 
program generating applications for mainframe equipment, at a time when mainframe hardware was sold together 
with the software it would use. For many years, consultancies were carried out to develop IT management systems 
according to the needs of national clients such as the central bank, the public port administration, a main supermarket 
chain, etc. In the late 1990s, Quanam established a formal alliance with People Soft, a leading firm in enterprise 
resource planning and, later, customer relationship management, and specialized in implementing solutions in these 
fields. (See interviews with E. Cotelo and V. Ganón). 
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both in terms of size and sophistication, made it impossible to reach high business levels without 
exporting.
33 
Although Uruguayan exports were growing, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile were still focusing on their own, larger domestic markets and their exports were slower to 
develop. So, for some time, Uruguay benefited from a comparative advantage deriving from its 
insertion in regional markets before hard competition would start from other larger Latin 
American nations. In 2002, Uruguay was exporting more than any other country in the region.
34 
Soon after, the financial crisis in Argentina drastically restricted its investment rate and 
imports, which in the field of software represented 30 percent of Uruguay’s exports. This had the 
effect of compelling Uruguayan firms to diversify their markets to take advantage of the 
competitive price of their software products and services outside MERCOSUR.  
The export propensity of Uruguay was close to 40 percent in 2004, reaching 71 percent 
for the segment of product developers. This share is far from the figures observed for the three 
“I’s” in Table 4.2.2 but is quite high in comparison with other software exporting nations. 
 












Ireland  14,000  13,000  93 
India  12,500  9,500  76 
Israel  4,100  3,000  73 
Uruguay 
(2004)  240  80  39 
Singapore  1,660  476  29 
Argentina  1,100  180  16 
Chile  200  15  8 
China  13,300  700  5 
Korea  7,700  240  < 3 
Brazil  7,700  100  1 
Source: MEP (2004) and CUTI. 
                                          
33 Of the 300 firms, 75 are exporting, but exports are extremely concentrated in a dozen of them. In 2005, 37 firms 
(50 percent) exported less than US$100,000 each and only 13 exported more than US$1 million each (PAC, 2006). 
34 From that year on, the Argentine currency depreciation boosted its software exports, which grew from US$35 
million in 2000 to US$250 million in 2005 (according to data from CESSI, the chamber of the software industry in 
Argentina).    83
c. A Sophisticated First Client 
In contrast with the first-mover case, many start-ups in the diffusion process were spurred by a 
sophisticated first client (often referred to as a “godfather”) that helped to resolve uncertainties 
and reduce the cost of experimentation. In this sense, externalities were generated by clients that 
opted to hire a local firm where there was no recognized national experience.  
A good illustration of this process is provided by the development of software for the 
financial sector. In the 1990s, new software firms took advantage of the presence of multinational 
banks in Montevideo—a dynamic financial place—because of the inadequacy of their 
administration systems to handle specific and complex requirements in Uruguay and Latin 
America in general (e.g., concerning hyperinflation, national taxes, credit procedures, etc.). The 
standardized European or North American systems often did not have the needed flexibility to 
adapt to such needs. Some of these banks assumed the risk of hiring Uruguayan firms to redesign 
their systems. After successful implementation, new opportunities appeared in other foreign 
branches of these banks. The difference in costs between Uruguayan professionals and European 
or North American consultants (that otherwise would have been required by the multinationals to 
adapt their own systems) played a very significant part in the decision to acquire a Uruguayan 
product in ceteris paribus conditions. Nowadays, there are at least 14 firms in Uruguay 
developing software for the financial sector (banking and credit card administration). Some 
examples include DL&A with its product “Bantotal,” implemented in 12 Latin American 
countries and the United States, and Top Systems with its “Topaz” family of products. 
Picking up the right first client was thus essential not only to have a technically proficient 
interlocutor, but also because it could mean a bridge toward markets where Uruguay lacked a 
reputation or a country image. 
 
d. Low Initial Investment and Comparative Advantage in Labor Costs 
Capital requirements are fairly low to develop software applications or provide services, as 
compared with other sectors of the economy (e.g., electronics). This, combined with little 
rewarding employment alternatives (mainly the public sector or working abroad) in the early 
1990s, spurred the creation of start-ups by graduates who “tried their luck.”   84
In the late 1990s it was estimated that wages for IT professionals in Uruguay were about 
65 percent lower than in the United States and 25 percent lower than in Argentina.
35 Significant 
wage increases have not been reported in the past decade. Nowadays, a department manager or 
project coordinator usually does not earn more than US$2,000/month (gross); a senior analyst, 
between US$800 and $1,500/month; and a programmer, between US$400 and $725/month 
(CUTI, 2005). More generally, the labor cost of management is very low in Uruguay compared 
with other Latin American countries (Table 4.2.3). 
 
Table 4.2.3 - Wages of Executive Officers in Firms with Turnover 
Less Than US$50 million (2004)*  










Brazil  14.161  8.076  6.493  6.607  5.589 
Mexico  13.778  9.999  7.931  9.797  10.301 
Chile  8.601  5.126  6.115  5.490  5.368 
Argentina  6.839  3.480  3.558  4.672  4.385 
Uruguay  4.214  1.921  2.306  1.896  1.292 
* Net monthly wages in US $, calculated on the basis of annual wages, including 
bonus. For each category: median or second percentile.  
Source: América Economía (2005), nr. 43, Jun 24-jul 14, based on data from Price 
Water House Coopers and Mercer Human Resources Consulting. 
 
e. Portfolio Diversification to Face Lack of Capital 
Venture capital has always been a scarce resource in Uruguay, even more so in the case of this 
“intangible” sector.
36 So, for many firms, the complementary sale of imported hardware acted as a 
source of financing and insurance against failure in their new endeavor. However, most product 
developers also provided services (related to their products) that contributed substantially to their 
overall turnover. In general, the tendency of the firms to engage simultaneously in different types 
of activities has persisted: they maintain a diversified portfolio for protection against fluctuations 
and to gain maximization strategy. 
                                          
35 These estimations were gathered from interviews at software firms before the industry was surveyed. 
36 As was typically expressed in the early 1990s by entrepreneurs taking part in a software round table: “We all know 
somebody who, in the last five years, said he would be willing to invest some US$200,000 in a business related to 
livestock, banking, or [real estate] in Punta del Este. We don’t know anybody, though, who would agree to invest a 
similar sum in a software project made in Uruguay.” (Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito, 1992, p. 268)   85
Replication of the Community of Practice Model 
In the same way as ARTech became the core of an agglomeration of firms linked together 
through different ties, which would progressively lead to a community of practice, another 
software tool developer emerged intending to develop a similar virtual organization in the 1990s. 
“O3” of Ideasoft is a different product than GeneXus but it belongs to the same “business 
intelligence” category of software products.
37 A third nucleus also exists around ANTEL in the 
field of Internet and data transmission (Graph 4.2.5)
38. Both cases require further inquiry to 
establish whether they effectively became communities of practice.  
However interesting this model might be, it is not the pattern by which the software sector as a 
whole developed in Uruguay. But, in a more general way, these examples show how a final IT 
system applied in a non-IT firm (end-user) is the product of complex, nonlinear relationships 
between different types of agents. At all levels, user-producer relations are a strong ingredient 
and are based on formal or informal agreements. An end-user can even become part of a solution 
that is then supplied to other customers, when this final end-user was heavily involved in the 
building up of his system, as has sometimes occurred. At the same time, it seems clear that the 
search for network externalities and economies of scale stimulated producers to look for product 
diffusion patterns that would also enable complementary benefits for them, such as a greater 
capacity to upgrade products. 
                                          
37 GeneXus and O3 do not compete with each other because both are very specialized. 
38 The figure is based on a knowledge flow diagram from previous research (PNUD, 2005), which surveyed: 38 
innovative software firms and informatics service providers, representing a considerable proportion of the sector’s 




Coordination Failures and Their Solutions 
 
The previous review of several of the sector’s main features leads us to detect a series of market 
failures. 
a. Limited Agglomeration Economies and Synergies 
Is the growth of the software sector related to benefits deriving from the geographical 
concentration of the software firms in Uruguay, as shown on the map? A survey carried out in 
2004 on 97 firms of Montevideo sought to clarify this issue (Kesidou and Romij, 2005). The 
study was based on territorial theories that identify the agglomeration of economic activity as a 
possible generator of benefits related to economies of scale, labor market concentration, and rapid 






Graph 4.2.5 – Nucleus Type of Diffusion in the Software Industry 
 
Source: Adapted from PNUD, 2005.   87
 
 
Three mechanisms by which local knowledge spillovers (LKS, i.e., unpaid-for knowledge 
flows) occur were analyzed: spin-off, labor mobility, and interaction. No significant results were 
obtained concerning spin-off, but the other two mechanisms—LKS through interaction and labor 
mobility—appeared to play a significant role in innovation and learning at the firm level in the 
geographic agglomeration. Their statistical results demonstrate that LKS are an important 
mechanism through which knowledge circulates among actors in the software sector, and that 
they are more important for innovation than other types of knowledge flow (market based). The 
study concludes that the argument—found in theoretical and empirical works in developed 
countries—of LKS fostering innovation in high-tech clusters, holds for the Uruguayan case. 
However, evidence of such agglomeration effects is not clear-cut. Other studies 
emphasize the juxtaposition of firms rather than their organization in clusters to take advantage of 
mutual benefits. A study conducted in 2003 concluded that in the Uruguayan software sector, 
firms depend exclusively on their individual effort to generate the competitive advantages that 
allow them to compete (UCUDAL, 2003). According to another study, software firms are not 
prepared to combine efforts when there is a risk of real competition among them (CAE, 2003). 
Cooperation, which to some extent exists in the software sector, develops mainly when 
complementing capacities does not imply competing for the same market or product.  
Summing up, local knowledge spillovers exist and this market failure could be restraining 
firms from assigning the required resources to develop endogenous efforts in a systematic way   88
because they perceive they will not internalize all the social benefit that their investment will 
generate. This limitation was somehow recognized in the 1990s, when several initiatives to foster 
joint activities were debated but did not materialize.  
It is only now—about two decades after the sector’s birth—that complementary, 
collective actions have begun to produce synergies in the sector. It is noteworthy that public 
involvement (virtually inexistent for the discovery and early diffusion process) is high in the 
present phase. The main undertakings currently under implementation include the following: 
 
•  Actions to strengthen the academy-industry linkages. A couple years ago, a 
software testing center was set up with a European Union grant. CES (Centro 
de Ensayos de Software) is a public-private consortium between the 
Engineering School of the public university and CUTI. It is the only non-
private center of its kind in the region and it is about to become self-funded. It 
provides services and infrastructure to perform testing and platforms for 
software products, as well as a technological observatory.
39 
•  Actions to foster innovation  and quality upgrading. Since 2001, PDT, the 
Technology Development Program headed the Ministry of Education and co-
financed by the IDB, has granted competitive funds for up to 50 percent of the 
cost of projects aimed at developing an innovation or improving quality 
management. The software sector has been by far the most demanding sector, 
usually by way of individual projects, although recently a project aimed at 
international certification was presented and selected for financing. 
•  Actions to spur entrepreneurship by reducing risks inherent to start-ups. The 
incubator Ingenio (2002), a joint undertaking of LATU (a public sector entity 
for the promotion of industrial technology) and ORT (a private university), 
with the financial support of the IDB, does not grant financial support to IT 
start-ups but different types of services. Some of the incubated firms are now 
                                          
39 By contrast, and prior to CES, CAITI (Centro Académico Industrial de Tecnologías de la Información) was created 
in 2004 and integrates all universities (public and private), the software industry through the business association 
CUTI, and the government (Ministry of Industry). It is supposed to work as a round-table (mesa) to establish 
priorities in R&D in fields of common interest. However, CAITI has not shown significant results yet.   89
exporting and Ingenio is starting to incubate projects from other knowledge 
intensive sectors (such as life sciences). 
•  Actions to facilitate internationalization. Grupo Integro (2004), an Economic 
Interest Group was set up by 25 software firms, including many of the most 
important ones, with the objective of creating synergies in their 
internationalization process. This is an entirely private initiative, with the 
support of CUTI (the industry association of software firms). At the same time, 
Ingenio and CUTI (2006) are jointly promoting internationalization through 
public calls for associative projects aimed at foreign market penetration. The 
IDB is supporting this initiative. 
•  Actions to promote clustering. In 2006, the software industry requested that it 
be considered among the sectors that will benefit from a new government 
program, PACC (co-financed by theIDB) aimed at developing the 
competitiveness of local clusters. This program is being implemented in 
parallel with a program co-financed by the European Union, also fostering the 
building-up of clusters but in other sectors. 
 
Most of these initiatives are highly dependent on external financing. They are indicative of 
consistency in the present public support for the software discovery process. They could result in 
the needed public-private coordination to define a coherent long-term vision and a focused 
strategy, a feature that has proved essential in most emerging software exporting nations but that 
is still to be defined in Uruguay. 
 
b. Limited Linkages with Other Sectors 
 
The software industry has only partly benefited from the demand-pull action of other sectors of 
the economy. Tough links have been strong with some sectors (e.g., the financial and 
distribution sectors). It is common knowledge that the national agricultural, livestock, and agro-
industrial sectors have not fully taken advantage of the opportunities offered by IT. When 
observing the fields using IT intensively in the United States, it is striking that in Uruguay most 
of these sectors are low IT users (Table 4.2.4). This coordination failure is due, on the one hand, 
to the small size of the great majority of local firms. Many of them do not count on 
professionals who can properly identify the benefits of investing in IT; and association—which    90
could counteract this tendency—is uncommon.
40 On the other hand, it has been stated that in the 
past: 
“Local software was systematically discriminated by public enterprises that did 
not assume the risks inherent in hiring local development, opting for including 
clauses in tenders that made it impossible for Uruguayan firms to participate. 
Among others, the following examples can be cited: several international banks 
used, both in Uruguay and other countries, software developed locally, but the 
[public] Banco de la Republica acquired a banking system developed by a 
(foreign) multinational; the call for tender for the informatics system of ANTEL 
practically excluded potential local providers and the system was acquired from a 
multinational corporation.” (CARE, 2002) 
 
Table 4.2.4 – Use of IT in USA and Uruguay 
Sectors using intensively IT 
in USA 
Intensity of use in 
Uruguay 
Depository institutions  Intense use 
Business services  Intense use 
Wholesale trade  Intense use 
Petroleum/coal products  Intense use 
Health services  Intense or limited 
use 
Security and commodity 
brokers 
Limited use 
Holding and investment offices  Limited use 
Real estate  Limited use 
Telecommunications  Limited use 
Radio and TV broadcasting  Very limited use 
Motion pictures  Almost no use 
Legal services  Almost no use 
Insurance carriers  Almost no use 
Instruments and related 
products 
Almost no use 
Pipelines, except natural gas  Almost no use 
Chemicals and allied products  Almost no use 
Insurance agents and brokers  Almost no use 
Source: Edelman et al. (2002). 
 
                                          
40 An exception is Scantech for retailers.   91
State actors argue that the main risk in awarding a contract to a local firm was the 
possibility that the firm would disappear once the product or system had been developed, 
thereby creating maintenance problems (UDELAR, 2003). Currently, and mainly as a 
consequence of the reputation acquired by software exporters in the international arena, public 
entities and programs are more prone to take advantage of local capacity in some of their 
undertakings, such as in the recent Program for Animal Products Traceability.  
The fact that public purchases have, in general, not been used as an instrument to foster 
the development of technology intensive sectors in Uruguay has been an effect of these 
industries.
41 A policy proposal is now being prepared by a special commission of CUTI because 
the government has shown interest in using this instrument as part of its strategy to strengthen 
the National Innovation System. 
 
c. Low Connectivity to Global Markets 
Connectivity with the high-tech world is essential but full of obstacles for a developing 
country.
42 Among others, globalization compels investment in certification and cooperation. Yet 
in this regard, the situation of the Uruguayan software industry is not too bright.  
Evidence is provided by data on connectivity from the previously mentioned local survey 
of the 38 most innovative software and informatics service firms.
43 The bulk of these firms (76 
percent) reported that they participated in one or more networks, an instrument that they 
considered of strategic importance. However, less than a quarter of the firms were integrated in 
networks that included companies from developed countries; only 15 percent of them participated 
in MERCOSUR networks; and about 20 percent were integrated with networks in other Latin 
American countries. Considering that the survey concentrated on the most dynamic software 
firms and the main exporters, it can be asserted that, from the 300 firms that make up the sector, 
an extremely low proportion had the capacity to invest in developing connectivity with the high-
                                          
41 In many software emerging nations, public purchases play an important role in promoting the sector. In China, for 
example, “the government has been another big player, with national and regional governments often favoring 
domestic vendors for a variety of PC based software, from the operating system to application software” (Arora et 
al., 2004). 
42 See Brum (1999) for a useful “soapy stick” metaphor describing the relations between the developed and 
underdeveloped world. 
43 This group of firms represented 72 percent of the sector’s turnover in 2002, 85 percent of exports, and 62 percent 
of employment (excluding independent professionals). See PNUD (2005).    92
tech world, in the early years of the present decade. An overwhelming majority of them do not 
have partners from developed countries that better connect to global networks. 
An initial limitation for entering the global market is the small size of most of local 
software firms, in the first place because there is a minimum turnover level to be considered 
reliable and credible. A firm selling at or below US$1 million is easily disregarded for being 
potentially unstable (CARE, 2002) and most Uruguayan firms are below this threshold (Graph 
4.2.6). However, producers increasingly have to meet international standards that are 
continuously renovated and enhanced. The problem for small firms is that the fixed costs of 


























1989 (total firms: 75) 2004 (total firms: 303)
* Excludes firms mainly dedicated to HW/SW marketing and independent 
professionals (1.600 in 2004).  Source: CUTI 2004 survey and Snoeck et al., op. 
it
Graph 4.2.6 - Number of firms by turnover size
 
 
Meeting standards and certification requirements is an essential way of upgrading 
processes (UNIDO, 2001). In this sense, upgrading started only recently in the Uruguayan 
software sector. Of the 38 innovative firms surveyed in 2002, only nine had certified a product or 
a service, and only five of them in a developed nation entity (PNUD, 2005). According to the 
more comprehensive CUTI survey of 2004, 24 firms had an ISO-9001 or similar certification and 
another 13 were working on it. Two firms had achieved CMM level-five certification (one of 
them Tata), the highest industry standard. Very recently eight firms presented a joint project to 
the Technology Development Program aimed at preparing collectively for CMM certification.   93
Summing up, the situation in international networking and certification reflects poor connectivity 
of the software sector as a whole and vulnerable insertion in global markets. 
 
d. Elasticity of Labor Supply 
Several issues are at stake concerning the future supply of human capital for the software 
industry. In the past 15 years, an annual average of 300 students have been graduated in 
informatics (engineers, analysts, programmers, etc.), roughly half of them from private 
universities.
44 This is a very low figure in comparison with other emerging software exporting 
nations: in computer disciplines, there are 3,000 annual graduates in Bangladesh; 2,500 in 
Vietnam; and 5,000 in Indonesia (Carmel, 2003). Furthermore, the share of science, math, and 
engineering students in total tertiary level students is also lower in Uruguay (24 percent) than in 
Argentina (30 percent) and Chile (43 percent) (Rivero, 2004). More generally, the Uruguayan 
tertiary education budget is extremely low compared with what other countries, such as Finland, 
Ireland, and the Bangalore region, invest in education to foster their IT sectors. 
There is another underlying coordination failure that is expressed in the very high dropout 
rate in the first years of engineering studies at the public and some private universities.
45 Dropouts 
and delays in obtaining computer science degrees are attributed to severe deficiencies in math 
education in secondary (public) school, as well as to vocational problems and the hiring of 
advanced students by the software firms. Overcoming the dropout problem should be a priority if 
the country wishes to support actively the diffusion of exports.  
Thus, there have been some concerns on how to increase the provision of software 
professionals if the industry continues to grow. Tata Consulting opted for on-the-job training of 
non-IT graduates when it had to increase employment from 340 to 600 in 2005-06. Were Tata to 
have a demonstration effect of Uruguay’s adequacy for offshore outsourcing, the arrival of new 
multinationals would imply a strong pressure on the labor market.  
In Argentina, an anticipated labor shortage in this field has been tackled through a vast 
promotional campaign coupled with a scholarship program in IT education. This was not the case 
                                          
44 The number of IT graduates each year fluctuates but the trend indicates a very slow rate of increase (Darscht, 
2005). 
45 The dropout rate is very high at the public university as a whole: the official figure is that, from a yearly intake of 
17,000 students, only 4,000 graduate. In basic sciences, the relation is one to 10. At the private ORT University, 
dropout rates of up to 70-80 percent are registered during the first year of the engineering degree (UDELAR, 2006).   94
in Uruguay, but the initiative of “recycling” university graduates from different schools and 
disciplines into software professionals is gaining impetus, especially considering the lack of 
employment opportunities in other science related fields (UdelaR, 2006). A first step in this 
direction again was taken by Tata Consulting, by investing in a regional training center, located in 
the Laboratorio Tecnológico del Uruguay (LATU), that was recently inaugurated (2007). This 
center will cover the needs of local software firms, among others.  
Human capital with entrepreneurship and management skills is a scarce resource in the 
country and is a crucial need for the expansion of the sector and, especially, its insertion in global 
value chains. It was only in 1988 that the first business school was established in Uruguay, by the 
private ORT University. Since then, universities have increased their offerings in business-related 
fields and obtained a good response. However, at the School of Engineering at the state 
university, entrepreneurship and management are still considered “second rate” skills.
46 
Regarding foreign language skills—especially English, which is a must for the 
internationalization of the sector—some shortcomings at the country level became evident when 
Tata Consulting could not find enough bilingual candidates to fill the posts offered.
47 
The intention exists at the policy level to make better use of Uruguay’s important 
“Diaspora,” a factor that has proved relevant in other software exporting countries to help connect 
to foreign markets.  
 
Public Response 
The question of public response has been addressed throughout the study. The software industry 
emerged and developed in Uruguay without a state-defined or collective strategy. In the early 
period, when asked about the role of the government, software entrepreneurs would indicate that 
their main request was no government interference with their business, which had a twofold 
meaning. On the one hand, they proudly distinguished themselves from the typical state-
dependent entrepreneurs of the import-substitution industrialization of earlier decades. On the 
                                          
46 InCo’s director recently expressed: “There are some initiatives at the School of Engineering, such as a 
postgraduate degree in technology management, but it is not considered essential at the “political” level … it does 
not have the hierarchical status of engineering studies or other postgraduate studies. It is a subject … on which there 
is no general consensus. (…) Some people have a manager or a business profile, distinct from the hard scientific 
profile, and we are filtering these people: if they are not good in hard science and technology, we reject them through 
the existing mechanisms. This is an aspect we have to correct.” (Udelar, 2006) 
47 First-mover ARTech also experienced language as a barrier to shifting from Latin American to global markets and 
has found it necessary to systematically generate (and not translate) all technical documentation in English.   95
other hand, the other underlying connotation referred to the fact that “a weak and inefficient 
bureaucratic structure works best when it attempts not to do too much” (Arora et al., 2004). 
At the turn of the century, the remarkable dynamism of Uruguayan software exports and, 
more generally, the need to foster the development of ICT in the country, led to several public 
debates on how to consolidate this area. Some initiatives were launched with varying degrees of 
success. An early initiative, which did not prosper, consisted of the creation of a National 
Committee for the Information Society (Decree 225/2000), with broader purposes than just 
fostering the software industry. But in recent years, a set of fiscal incentives has been decreed and 
the government is backing up programs financed by international agencies.  
Finally, the sector’s competitiveness has been affected by macroeconomic monetary 
policies. Real exchange rate appreciation between 1990 and 1995 affected negatively all 
exporting sectors of the country, just as the 2003 devaluation of the local currency boosted export 
competitiveness outside the region. 
Summing up, in spite of recent measures of a collective nature, there has not been a 
coherent, articulated state policy to promote software development and its insertion at the global 
level. However, as argued by Rivero (2004), assuming that the state played no role during the 
development phase of the IT industry would be a mistake. Indeed, the state had a key role in the 
creation of certain preconditions and public goods that later made the software sector 
achievements possible. The early creation of high-level tertiary education in informatics and good 
public telecommunication infrastructure are the most distinctive of these preconditions.  
 
4.2.4 Comparator Case: The Electronics Sector 
Introduction 
In Uruguay, some segments of the professional electronics industry started to develop in the 
1970s, stimulated by the decreasing price of basic components in the world market and by 
miniaturization, which widened the field for local design and production. Researchers at the 
Electrical Engineering Institute (IIE) of the public university set up some of the firms. They were 
looking for new ways to subsist after the public university intervention during the dictatorship 
period. The sector showed some dynamism throughout the 1980s (40 firms in 1989, mostly small; 
45 types of products), mainly associated with the strong increase in electronic capital goods 
imports (Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito, 1992). Their integration into different economic activities 
required knowledge and skills in the field of electronics in order to adapt to local needs.   96
The  potential market for national electronics consisted of applying these recent 
technologies and goods to specific problems of other productive sectors—at a reasonable cost—
thereby enhancing the productivity and export capacity of the latter. However, Uruguay did not 
have a strong industrial sector, and most firms did not count on expertise to detect upgrading 
options through accessible electronic devices. Real market niches did not emerge abundantly as 
in software and/or were not fully exploited. This and other factors prevented the electronics sector 
from evolving from some local market niches and customization skills toward successful 
internationalization strategies.
48 
In regard to the initial development of the electronics sector in Uruguay, the most decisive 
condition was the availability of highly skilled human resources. The IIE of the public university 
has a long tradition and it started dealing with modern electronic issues such as digital techniques 
in the mid-1960s. As in the case of software, the state takeover of the university in the 1970s had 
a severe disruptive effect on research at the IIE, but strong capacity was rebuilt after the 
dictatorship period. Difficulties in consolidating full-time research and teaching teams (mainly 
due to the very low salaries at the public university) led to the multiplication of agreements and 
contracts between the Engineering School and the private sector, providing extra revenue to 
researchers. This was a general feature of the Engineering School, including the IIE.  
It was also in the 1960s that linkages developed between the Engineering School and 
public entities, mainly ANTEL. The implementation of a telex system in the country by a local 
firm, in 1976, consolidated a relationship that was decisive for the initial development of the 
electronics sector.
49 
It has been estimated that national production of electronics increased roughly from US$10 
million in 1988 to US$30 million in the mid-1990s and developed around four segments (Graph 
4.2.7). No recent data on the sector are available but the number of electronic firms has decreased 
substantially. Currently there are probably no more than 10 firms developing their main 
                                          
48 Interesting enough, interviews with entrepreneurs show that three features identified in software discovery can be 
found in some electronics cases: a) the cost of the first experience was shared among different actors; b) an 
externality was generated by the client who decided to hire a local firm with no recognized national experience; and 
c) the local firm was propelled to foreign markets hand-in-hand with its first client. A good example of this was the 
automation of wool processes in Uruguay, described in Sutz (2000). 
49 This relationship started with the hire of electrical engineers by ANTEL in the 1960s. Previously, ANTEL only 
hired civil engineers, with no skills in electronics and no knowledge of the local capacity in this field.   97
production activity in the field of electronics. Moreover, some electrical engineers migrated 
toward the software industry.  
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Source: J. Sutz (1 997).
 
 
On the whole, the attempt to develop an export sector failed. But two cases are worth 
mentioning as first movers with a late export take-off and no diffusion process. 
 
First Movers 
In the automation and instrumentation segment, in 1973, three engineers created CONTROLES 
S.A.
50 It is a now a medium-size firm (around 40 employees; turnover exceeds US$1 million) 
dedicated to the design, production, and sale of electronic equipment. It developed some niches in 
the domestic market, such as elevator controllers, industrial automatisms, power converters, 
different types of scoreboards and alarm systems, and SCADA systems. Particularly important 
was the de-concentration and de-verticalization process of the elevator controller market in the 
late 1980s, a market previously dominated by OTIS. This provided CONTROLES with a 
technical and commercial opportunity to specialize in this segment, taking advantage of the broad 
range of elevators in Uruguay and Argentina that needed remodeling in order to comply with 
stricter municipal norms. This niche was thus exploited at the domestic and regional levels. 
Exports of different products began tentatively in the early 1990s, attained US$0.4 million at the 
                                          
50 From 1973 to 1979, it developed from a workshop into a small factory with 15 employees. The initial partners are 
each in charge of a specific area.   98
turn of the century, and then experienced a strong decrease during Argentina’s crisis.
51 Export 
dependence on Argentina has been reduced from 79 percent (2000) to 18 percent (2005).  
Although initially there were several other Uruguayan firms operating in the field of 
automation and instrumentation, few survived; the ones who did focus mainly on domestic niches 
(e.g., weighting systems).  
One of the CONTROLES managers described some of the difficulties in penetrating 
foreign markets (Sutz interviews, 1997; and MIEM, 1999): 
 
•  To some extent, exporting electronic goods to MERCOSUR countries was 
slowed down due to procedures related to the Certificate of Origin norm (60 
percent of the good must be of regional origin; see Introduction, section 1.2). 
The norm was designed for unitary products and not for products like 
electronics that integrate dozens of elements. To get the Certificate, each of 
these elements needed to be described, with its code, its specific tariff, etc.; 
this made the overall procedure extremely troublesome and time consuming.
52 
•  The cost of an aggressive export strategy was very high for a single firm and 
there was no adequate support from Uruguay’s representation offices abroad. 
•  The need to possess the right quality certifications to enter foreign markets, 
especially beyond the region, implied not only high costs, but also a series of 
testing that was not provided by LATU, the industrial technology institute.  
•  Some instruments implemented to promote the development of priority sectors 
had contradictory effects on others. Tourism, for instance, was declared “of 
national interest” and different inputs for hotel building could be imported 
duty free, like alarm systems or intelligent door systems, thereby hindering the 
(price) competitiveness of locally designed systems. 
 
It must be stressed that these comments were not complaints from unsuccessful exporters 
but from a firm that was able to overcome the initial export barriers. Almost a decade later, most 
of these coordination failures at the national level are still valid. Although some also applied to 
                                          
51 This is according to data from the Customs Office. 
52 In addition, some inputs for the electronics sector were subject to high tariffs, a fact that tends to lower the price 
competitiveness of Uruguayan products integrating these inputs, with respect to imported goods.    99
the software sector, the latter has been more successful in organizing collective actions to tackle 
them, at least in recent times. In the electronics sector, an early attempt to organize an Economic 
Interest Group did not prosper.  
The other pioneer worth mentioning belongs to the medical electronics segment: Centro 
de Construcción de Cardioestimuladores (CCC), one of the seven largest pacemaker producers in 
the world.
53 CCC, founded in 1969, develops and manufactures real-time systems, including 
active implantable medical devices such as cardiac stimulators, as well as other medical 
electronic devices. Just as ARTech offers a world-class product to develop complex mission-
critical systems, CCC develops world-class safety-critical systems.  
The interesting point, as far as the present study is concerned, is that 30 years after its 
foundation, CCC exports suddenly boomed, from US$126,000 in 2000 to US$2.826 million in 
2005 (Graph 4.2.8). CCC’s production started in the 1970s, in the framework of an import-
substitution strategy. Previously, few implantations were performed in Uruguay because of the 
high costs of imported pacemakers, but the foundation of the Institute for Highly Specialized 
Medicine helped create a domestic market for pacemakers by covering implantation costs for 
anyone who lacked medical coverage. The choice of the pacemaker to be implanted (imported or 
local) was open to the doctors. 
 
                                          
53 In 1960, in Uruguay, Drs. Fiandra and Rubio achieved the first pacemaker effective implant in a human in the 
world, with a device developed in Sweden. The Uruguayan implant operated for nine months, until the patient’s 
death.    100























Pacemakers & parts Others Total




Later, when the electronic sophistication of pacemakers increased and exceeded CCC’s 
capacity, the firm went into partnership with a U.S. company that provided the designs for CCC 
production. Around 1992, a group of engineers providing services to CCC in programming and 
maintenance presented a project to the firm to develop pacemakers completely in Uruguay. The 
project was approved, and the first locally produced pacemaker was implanted in 1994. Since 
then, technology has been constantly updated, with a new generation of pacemakers appearing 
periodically.
54 
Product upgrading was parallel to a no less demanding commercialization strategy. 
Different types of initiatives were launched, with varying levels of success.
55 The 
internationalization strategy was not only directed toward selling pacemakers and related devices, 
but also aimed at finding R&D enterprises demanding engineering services. The relevance of this 
strategy can be appreciated in Graph 4.2.8, which distinguishes between exports of pacemakers 
                                          
54 CCC’s personnel increased from 55 employees in 2002 to 110 in 2006, 40 of whom are engineers. 
55 These are illustrated in Darscht (2005) and in Interviews by Sutz for Uruguay XXI (1997).   101
and of other devices, mainly a variety of electro-diagnostic appliances. The latter embedded 
customized engineering design ordered by clients mainly for clinical testing purposes.
56 
The firm now exports to 20 developed and developing countries. In the global market, 
CCC products compete in the intermediate price range. In the domestic market, CCC provides 
about 35 percent of the implanted pacemakers. 
As was clearly synthesized in a case study of CCC:  
“When CCC history is examined carefully, a constant factor can be identified that 
characterizes each of its development phases: the new phase would not have been 
possible without the capacities generated in the previous ones. Indeed, Dr. Fiandra 
created a small firm to produce pacemakers because he had participated in the 
development of this forefront technology in Sweden; he therefore knew the 
technology and achieved the first successful implantations in humans of these 
devices. CCC could assemble third-party pacemakers because it had knowledge of 
the market for these medical devices and a name in the domestic market. Years 
later, CCC could again design and develop its own devices because the firm had 
remained in the market and maintained its management, production, and 
marketing capacity. Further on, it penetrated the global business of biomedical 
engineering services because its products, designed by its engineering department, 
testified to its recognized experience and quality. Today CCC gains markets in the 
field of pacemakers because it is well known that its engineering capacity has been 
hired by prestigious firms in biomedical research, which in turn entrust it with the 
production of implantable devices designed by CCC itself.” (Darscht, 2005)  
 
CCC developed close ties with the Engineering School. A Micro-electronic Group was 
created within the Electrical Engineering Department in the early 1990s, at a time when future 
demand for local research in this field was highly uncertain. The Group consolidated and was 
hired in the mid-1990s by CCC to develop an ASIC (Application Specific Integration Circuit) for 
a new generation of pacemakers, which was successfully completed. In the field of medicine, 
linkages with the academy developed with an Argentine research center. 
                                          
56 Unembedded services are not included because the Customs Office only registers exports of products.   102
There was no diffusion process following this discovery, as far as we circumscribe the 
analysis to the electronics sector. However, when looking at CCC as a first mover in biomedical 
devices, some firms started to appear in that segment around the time CCC exports took off. 
BIOGENESIS S.R.L., for instance, was created in 2002 and produces temperature sensors 
(probes) for incubators, neonatal open care systems, monitors, etc. Its exports to 20 countries now 
represent 92 percent of its total sales, compared with 30 percent in 2003, and they seem to have 




BIOLOGÍSTICA S.A. recently patented in Uruguay and the United States two blood-
collecting devices, which were developed with the support of the already mentioned Technology 
Development Program. The firm is now looking for strategic alliances to position these devices in 
foreign markets. Finally, MEDICAA—a recently created firm that focuses on R&D in 
neuroscience and neuro-otology—develops products and services for vestibular rehabilitation of 
patients with balance disorders. It was selected for support by the brand-new venture capital fund 
in Uruguay, Prosperitas.
57 There are also two successful catheter producers. 
It could thus be argued that some diffusion is tentatively taking place in biomedical 
devices, and that this process reveals certain recent changes in the environment. Some 
government support for innovation projects tends to reduce experimentation costs, and at least 
one public-private partnership has started providing venture capital to technology intensive start-
                                          
57 Investors in Prosperitas include the MIF, the CAF, Prosperitas’ partners, and private investors 
(www.prosperitascp.com).  
Graph 4.2.9 – Number of sensors sold by Biogenesis, 
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ups. Investing at a very early stage in international certifications is perceived by recent start-ups 
as a requirement to reduce uncertainty in foreign market penetration. To some extent, these firms 
take advantage of externalities from the first mover: a reputation for Uruguayan biomedical 
device exports in foreign markets; and some labor mobility between firms.  
But the question remains: Why was there no diffusion process in the field of electronics?  
 
Differences with the Software Case 
According to a prominent actor in the electronics and software fields, these two sectors faced 
very different market opportunities, which to a large extent determined distinct trajectories.
58 
When looking back at the paradigmatic examples of export take-off in the software sector, no 
similar experiences can be found in the electronics case: 
•  No producer developed an innovative tool for design in electronics in a similar 
way as ARTech. 
•  No producer succeeded in integrating a global value chain through customized 
services, as QUANAM did. There possibly were not many global value chains 
in search of value-added services as in the software field.  
•  Specialization in a vertical market did not become a springboard for alliances 
with multinationals, as in the case of SOLUR. 
•  No one discovered and seized an opportunity to develop a future commodity 
adapted to Latin American market characteristics, like Memory. 
•  A similar experience as the local learning curve in financial software, through 
sophisticated, multinational clients, did not repeat in the electronics sector.   
 
On the supply side, according to the head of the Industrial Electronics Department 
(School of Engineering, IIE), a decisive factor differentiating software and electronics is that the 
orders of magnitude are totally different: investment requirements in microelectronics can be 100 
times larger than in software, while demand can be 100 times less. The high fixed-cost structure 
of electronics operations is a major issue for small-scale firms because industrial scale is needed 
for the business to be profitable. 
                                          
58 Based on an interview with F. Brum (Feb. 05, 2007) and his comments on a draft of this study.   104
A strong barrier to entry thus stems from the combination of the following factors: 
 
•  Demand must be large enough to justify investment. Software firms can start 
from scratch with a very limited investment in physical capital, which is not 
the case in electronics.  
•  The production process in microelectronics is complex and requires several 
stages and inputs. Many of these inputs have to be imported because the size 
of the domestic market and the rapid obsolescence of components make their 
local production unprofitable.
59 Importing components has been plagued with 
difficulties (according to qualified interlocutors) that reflect, among others, a 
serious coordination failure around customs procedures.
60 
•  Seed capital and working capital loans are practically nonexistent in the 
country and it is doubtful that an unknown Uruguayan firm could obtain 
venture capital from foreign sources. There are several cases of failed start-ups 
in electronics (that often emerged as spin-offs from the university), mainly 
because the founder had to dedicate too much of his time to another, 
remunerated job. This difficulty also appears in other technology intensive 
sectors but it is reinforced when combined with the previous factors.  
 
In previous decades, reaching the required quality level entailed accessing technologies 
that were practically out of reach of hardware developers in Uruguay: it was economically 
nonviable to apply technologies like customized integrated circuits or surface mounting due to 
low demand; it was difficult to obtain updated technical information; and design programs were 
very expensive and only ran in workstations (Pérez et al., 1997). In contrast to the software case, 
electronics goods need to meet presentation and robustness standards, which implies the use of 
specific boxes, ironworks, good quality connectors, etc. Again, low volumes of production of 
these components were of little interest to the local industry.  
These difficulties explain why, in spite of relevant antecedents in the country, hardware 
design and implementation by local firms were often discarded as alternatives for solving specific 
                                          
59 Stock costs, in turn, make it unprofitable for local providers to keep components with the required variety, quality, 
and continuity. 
60 Relations with international providers were also difficult because of their lack of interest in a low volume of 
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problems. Public purchases, because of their size and recurrence, could have been a way to 
support long-term projects in electronics, where continuity allows knowledge and capacity to 
develop and update in some specific fields. But public purchases have not been used to promote 
local learning processes. 
In recent times, some of these shortcomings have been overcome. State-of-the-art 
technologies have become more accessible: fixed costs in prototyping and production have 
decreased; CAD stations are now affordable and more powerful; the Internet offers easy access to 
information from providers and manufacturers; components can be acquired in small lots directly 
from international providers (although importing is still cumbersome); foreign producers of 
printed circuits admit prototyping and low-scale production at affordable prices (designs are sent 
via the Internet and the printed circuits are received a few days later); and there are firms in the 
region offering welding services for surface mounting (Pérez et al., 1997). These new trends 
imply renovated opportunities for the development of certain types of applications, like the ones 
that integrate standard and customized products, i.e., the integration of existing electronic devices 
and eventually software into more complex systems. Market niches exist in the fields of industrial 
control, data acquisition, communication, automation, and biomedical engineering. 
In short, comparative advantage did not develop in the Uruguayan electronics industry 
despite of some apparently favorable initial conditions. Because of its complexity, this industry 
would have required a great deal of coordination at different levels of the economy to prosper; 
this did not happen and partial attempts were truncated. Most important, the market did not 
evolve as in the software industry, where different types of windows of opportunity appeared and 
were seized by local producers.   
Naturally, important knowledge and other externalities derived from the local trajectory in 
electronics and have contributed to the development of some critical mass in knowledge-intensive 
sectors in the country. 
 
4.2.5 Conclusions 
Software discovery in Uruguay was based on the existence of qualified human resources, the 
R&D tradition in computer sciences, and good telecommunications infrastructure. These public 
goods proved essential for taking advantage of market opportunities that emerged in the fast 
development of IT in the 1980s and 1990s. Firms took advantage of these opportunities by 
following a niche strategy, focusing on one or a few target markets, small enough to be ignored   106
by the major industry players. In short, this discovery was about: (i) identifying an activity (rather 
than a product) that the country could develop thanks to some preconditions and low capital 
requirements; and (ii) overcoming barriers to entry in foreign markets for a country only known 
for exports based on natural resources. 
The firm ARTech played a first-mover role, although some other pioneers with different 
products also paved the way for followers. ARTech’s partners were savvy investors: they used to 
work as consultants in a more sophisticated context than the Uruguayan environment, and this 
helped them to find a niche beyond the local market. They opted for a highly differentiated 
product, with a well defined and “limited” scope that enabled the high productivity of their 
product. ARTech’s trajectory shows an ability to assume large challenges on the basis of a long-
term vision of the development of IT and globalization trends. 
A major problem faced by the first mover in exporting derives from the inexistence of an 
image of Uruguay as a software producing nation and from the usual distrust in the North of 
technology-based products coming from the South. This was probably the main cost of the 
discovery. Overcoming this barrier to entry (by ARTech but also by other pioneers) resulted in an 
important positive externality for followers. 
ARTech’s growth relied heavily on different types of alliances. By developing the 
GeneXus Community—a network integrating application developers, end users, distributors, and 
technology suppliers—ARTech limited the non-appropriability problem associated with 
knowledge spillovers. It has been a way to diffuse ARTech’s product and to reach network 
economies, while providing a fertile environment to the members to upgrade their knowledge and 
develop activities around the product. 
The extent to which this intra-nucleus type of diffusion led to inter-nucleus imitation is 
not clear. Two core firms have been identified as intending to develop their own “community” 
but how far they succeeded in creating a community of practice remains to be investigated.  
The way firms insert into global value chains is important because it tends to determine 
upgrading opportunities. Empirical evidence shows that chains characterized by “network 
relationships” offer ideal upgrading conditions but are the least likely for developing country 
producers because of the high level of complementary competencies required (Humphrey, 2003). 
The organization set up by the first mover appears to have favored the development of 
complementary competencies. ARTech and its closest software developers represent a (small)   107
cluster with such competencies, which in turn offers greater strength for incorporating into 
foreign markets. 
The diffusion process in the software sector extended well beyond this first-mover pattern, 
since there are presently about 300 firms producing applications and/or services. Difficulties 
observed at the firm level usually related to financial, management, commercial, and scaling-up 
issues. In short, the critical point has been how to make the transition from a “one man in a 
garage” undertaking to an export oriented business through product and marketing upgrading. 
Coordination difficulties in the sector subsisted for a long time and some still do, in part 
due to the inexistence of a national vision concerning the perspectives of the Uruguayan software 
sector. Coordination failures included: 
 
•  Rigidities at the policy level to adapt laws and regulations to the software 
business, which is different in many ways from traditional industrial business. 
•  Failure to experience, so far, significant agglomeration economies from 
geographical concentration. The agglomeration of most of the software firms 
in Montevideo was the result of the usual centralization of productive activities 
in the capital city and its surrounding area, rather than the organization of a 
cluster aimed at taking advantage of mutual benefits. 
•  Limited linkages and synergies between the software industry and other 
sectors of the economy, with the exception of some specific vertical or 
horizontal activities involved in the emergence of the software industry. 
Consequently, spillover effects of the software industry on the economy as a 
whole are more restricted than they could be. 
•  Difficulties in integrating into global networks. The bulk of software exports 
are, more than ever, highly concentrated in a few firms. In 2001, the 10 largest 
exporting firms concentrated 54 percent of total exports (US$80 million); by 
2005, this figure reached 80 percent of the US$104 million exported. Several 
of these exporters were created in the early period, which could be an 
indication of the length of the learning curve.  
•  A too slow rate of increase of IT graduates. In spite of some diversification of 
educational institutions for computer sciences in the past 15 years, there is   108
little flexibility at the university level to respond to further significant export 
growth. For instance, a fivefold export increase (US$500 million) would 
require, roughly, some 2,400 additional graduates in informatics, when the 
yearly average has been around 300 in the past decade. “Recycling” of 
graduates is now considered as an alternative strategy. 
 
Once the software sector demonstrated its export capacity, about a decade after the 
beginning of exports, the convenience of policy measures to promote the development of the 
software industry started to be debated, as recognition of the presumed relevance for the country 
of the development of a high tech and thus high value-added exporting sector. The ensuing 
government intervention thus occurred once a market failure concerning the diffusion of the 
export discovery had been explicitly identified. The most directly impacting measure was the 
exemption of the 30-percent income tax for software firms at the turn of the century. It was 
supposedly a temporary measure aimed at stimulating the growth of the industry and its 
penetration in foreign markets. The foundation of this sector-specific subsidy is now again being 
debated in the context of the present government strategy to strengthen the productive sector. The 
strategy, still mostly in its declarative stage, includes IT as one of five sectors to be given priority 
(agro-industrial systems, biotechnology, cultural industries, tourism, and software and 
information technologies). However, it also has to be stressed that, as the sector developed, 
software entrepreneurs increasingly backed up the Uruguayan Chamber for Information 
Technologies, CUTI. The latter is now very active in promoting collective actions to resolve 
coordination failures. 
Public response has not been restricted to fiscal measures (see Table 3.2.8). External 
financing (grants and loans), channeled through the government, has been allocated to the 
strengthening of this industry. The most recent of these initiatives seeks to foster clustering 
effects. Different public entities also participate in collective actions aimed at developing 
synergies in the sector, often by means of public-private partnerships. However, on the whole, 
collective actions have been slow to develop. 
There are some opportunities for the Uruguayan software industry that have been little 
explored yet. Among others, Uruguay could take advantage of its geographic, linguistic, and 
cultural linkages with Latin America to become a “near-shore” destination, i.e., a variation   109
onoffshore outsourcing with higher value-added services and where geographic and cultural 
proximity between the provider and the buyer are considered important.
61 The free trade zone, 
Zonamerica, could become a gateway to Latin America for multinationals, although there will be 
tough competition in this regard with other software producing countries of the region. In this 
respect, the installation in 2002 by the Indian multinational Tata Consulting Services of an 
operations center in Uruguay to provide services throughout Latin America is a good precedent to 
make known the advantages of the country for outsourcing.  
As far as a comparator for software discovery, the emergence of the local electronics 
sector showed similarities with the software discovery (skilled human resources, research 
capacity, potential market niches, etc.) and there were some successful pioneers in certain market 
segments. However the diffusion process was truncated. As a whole, this industry could not take 
advantage of some local market niches and customization skills to implement successful 
internationalization strategies. There were barriers both on the demand and the supply sides.  
Table 4.2.5 outlines the public goods, market failures, and instruments involved in the 
software discovery process. 
                                          
61 For example, Mexico takes advantage of a geographic linkage to advertise itself as a near-shore destination for 
offshore outsourcing, notably through its software cluster in Monterrey, which is very close to the border with the 
United States. Others software emerging nations use time-zone linkages (Carmel, 2003).   110
 
Table 4.2.5 – Key Factors of the Software Discovery 
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-Fiscal incentives: exemption 
of income tax and of VAT on 
capital goods and exports, 
1999-2000. 
-Free trade technology park: 
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Annex: An Example of a Product and Marketing Upgrade 
toward an Export Business Model 
 
 
In 1985 a university student successfully developed a software program to handle the accounting 
and management needs of a classmate’s family business. He then decided to dedicate himself to 
commercializing that product through a promotional campaign among acquaintances, retail 
companies, and accounting firms, and founded the firm Memory Computación, playing a one-
man orchestra role in the early stage. Tough competition from locally established companies, 
such as IBM, Sun Microsystems, Unisys, and others, caused him to target small firms that were 
not even looking for enterprise resource planning (ERP) technology. To that end he developed a 
strategy to stimulate ERP demand from that business segment. Part of this strategy was to adapt 
the Memory program to the needs of individual accounting consultants (and their way of 
thinking) because they would then convince their clients (SMEs) to acquire the program. 
In 1991 Memory began to explore the Chilean and Argentine markets, looking for 
distributors with technical skills to facilitate product support and integration (value added 
resellers). But foreign sales grew slowly: Memory software was only one among various products 
of the distributors, who lacked the incentives and skills to provide specific support and training as 
had happened in Uruguay. In the mid-1990s, Memory decided to open commercial offices in 
Santiago and Buenos Aires, with weekly trips by its management team to assist local staff in 
developing these markets. By replicating the Uruguayan business model, foreign sales increased 
but did not reach Memory’s goal. Barriers to entry included: different codes and norms in each 
country, lack of knowledge of the local markets, difficulties in penetrating these markets without 
a relationship network, and lack of structure and resources (human and capital) to take advantage 
of business opportunities arising in other geographical areas.   
In the early 2000s, Memory’s product was upgraded to take into account country 
specificities (legal and tax systems, idiosyncrasies, etc.); it now includes common modules and 
country- specific components. Simultaneously, a new commercial strategy was defined to 
overcome barriers to entry into foreign markets. A franchise model was selected, which first 
required the reorganization of Memory’s business according to best practice management. Next, 
an independent business unit was created to transfer Memory’s know-how to franchisees. 
Franchisees contributed with capital and their knowledge of the local market. On the management   112
side, the typical “founder’s dilemma” was faced by creating an advisory board comprising top 
professionals with management experience either in multinational technology businesses or 
franchising models. 
Memory Computación is now a business integrating two types of companies: a network of 
distribution franchisees throughout Latin America (11 in 2005) and “the franchiser,” a company 
that concentrates on finding investors for new franchisees. 
 
Source: Based on the case study by Mordezki (2004). 
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4.3  The Forestry Case 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Forestry has a long tradition in Uruguay. The country has an important area covered by native 
forest (hardwood and shrub) that has been traditionally used as firewood and is now protected by 
law. The first plantations had two main purposes: to protect livestock and to protect sand dunes 
on the coast. For the first purpose, different kinds of eucalyptus species (globulus, tereticornis, 
camaldulensis, saligna, robusta, diversicolor, and cinerea) were planted. For the second purpose, 
pines were the principal species used. 
Until the mid-1950s, these two types of plantations prevailed, both unrelated to large-
scale wood production. In the second half of the 20th century, however, two factors gave a push 
to a different use. First, an important and persistent balance of payments deficit made it necessary 
to substitute national inputs for imported raw materials in the wood and furniture industry. 
Second, the oil crisis in the 1970s led to an increase in the use of wood as an energy source 
(gasified wood fuel). 
In the 1960s, studies prepared by the national Committee for Investment and Economic 
Development (CIDE) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) concluded that the 
development of a forestry sector was viable in Uruguay and that it offered possibilities to make 
rural areas more dynamic. The first forestry law, approved in 1968, aimed at stimulating 
conditions for planting species for industrial use. The tax exemption scheme allowed farmers to 
reinvest the “IMPROME” tax (a tax on some cattle establishments) but, as the main beneficiaries 
were not interested in forestation, the planted area only increased by 1,100 hectares per year. By 
the end of the 1980s, just before a new forestry law would be promulgated, a relatively modest 
total of 31,000 hectares had been planted (17,000 ha. of eucalyptus, 11,000 of pines, and 3,000 of 
other species). The forestry areas were concentrated in four departments in the North and 
Northwest of the country. 
Wood extraction showed more dynamic behavior in the 1980s than in the past. As a 
whole, industrial roundwood production doubled in the second half of that decade, reaching an 
extraction level of 2.4 million tons per year.
62 
                                          
62 From 1980 to 1988, firewood consumption grew from 0.6 to 1.7 million tons, as manufacturing activities 
demanded alternative energy sources. Sawn wood extraction modestly increased from about 220,000 tons at the 
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The activities undertaken within the framework of the first forestry law were not export 
oriented. Those who took advantage of the benefits, such as pension funds (Caja de Jubilaciones 
y Pensiones Bancarias, Caja Notarial) and firms such as Balerio-FYMSA and Industrias 
Forestales Puerto Arazatí built up forests and sawmills mainly for the domestic market. Some 
manufacturing firms developed plantations in the 1980s as a source of energy for their factories, 
like the beer producer, Norteña, and the ceramic producer, Metzen & Sena. FANAPEL produced 
pulp and paper for the country but also for the region. By the end of the 1980s, wood exports 
were extremely limited. Argentina was the destination of most of them, 83 percent of which was 
pulp from FANAPEL, and Uruguay was a net importer of wood products. 
At the world level in the mid-1980s, wood demand was largely unsatisfied in the Northern 
hemisphere and wood was still coming predominantly from natural forests. Half of the rough 
wood production was used in the manufacturing industry and consisted principally of pine wood 
(60 percent). The main producers were the United States and Canada (50 percent) and the 
European Union (23 percent). The other 40 percent of rough wood came mainly from the United 
States (25 percent), Brazil (8 percent), and Malaysia, Cambodia, and the former Soviet Union 
countries (7 percent each).  
Meanwhile, in a context of accelerated deforestation at the global level, policies to 
preserve the natural forest were strengthening in several countries, which resulted in a significant 
decrease of the worldwide wood supply. Some Southern countries with natural conditions for 
forestry and a favorable investment climate emerged as new forestry nations. Such was the case 
of New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, and Chile, where plantations extended in very productive 
land for forestry, especially for fast-growing species (e.g., eucalyptus). In the Northern 
hemisphere, the growing paper industry demanded an increasing amount of cellulose, provoking 
producers to search for new sources of pulpwood supply. 
This was the international context Uruguay entered in the 1990s. In what follows, we will 
analyze how the export discovery took place, from the first-mover experience to the build-up of a 
new exporting sector. 
                                                                                                                                        
beginning of the 1980s to 300,000 tons in 1986. The extraction of wood for pulp as an input for local paper plants 
(FANAPEL, PALMER, CICSA, and IPUSA) was less dynamic (120,000 tons per year).   115
The analysis does not take into account the paper branch of the forestry chain,
63 which has been 
an exporting sector since the beginning of the 1980s (more than US$10 million annually). Paper 
exports have increased fivefold since then and are highly concentrated in one firm (nearly 60 
percent). And the study does not consider such manufactured goods as frames, boxes, wood 
packages, wood tools, and other similar articles for domestic use and furniture. Exports of these 
goods are negligible in Uruguay.  
 
4.3.2 First Mover: Grupo Otegui 
The initial discovery was startling: trees could be planted in Uruguay with a view to exporting 
pulpwood to Europe. It all started in 1988 with a local business group, Otegui, discovering an 
opportunity to export eucalyptus roundwood to Finland for pulp processing. Otegui was until then 
mainly dedicated to wool commercialization and industrialization, in addition to participating in 
other activities (farming, banking, and trading). Otegui used to receive orders from different 
origins and fields through its trading activities and it thereby detected a permanent and steady 
demand for pulpwood in Finland. It then decided to create a wood trading company, TILE S.A., 
which became the first to export significant amounts of roundwood (Table 4.3.1). 
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63 Corresponding to Chapter Nr. 48 of the MERCOSUR Trade Classification.   116
The firm investigated international prices, the possibility of buying roundwood from 
Uruguayan producers, and the logistical costs of exporting it. Once the viability of the business 
was established, two shipments were sent as trials. 
Uncertainty was high and concerned several issues, such as the following: 
•  Montevideo’s port was in no condition to operate such large-volume 
shipments. This new activity at the port required specialized management. This 
matter finally led to a reform of the National Port Administration (ANP) in the 
1990s that allowed the participation of private service providers in the port. 
Some firms then specialized in wood freight movements, in ports in both 
Montevideo and Nueva Palmira. Facilities were also built around the port to 
prepare the shipments (log bindings to move them in bundles). Special 
equipment was required to move these large volumes. 
•  Initially, neither Otegui nor its client had established clearly how the wood 
volume measurement was to be done, at either the origin or the destination. 
Volumes may vary during transportation, with a consequent impact on the 
final unit price. After some time, it was established that measurement would 
take place at the destination, by displacement of water at large ponds. 
•  Otegui had no previous experience in wood harvesting, and there was no 
specialized equipment in the country to manage logs in the field (e.g., elevators 
with clamps). 
 
The discovery thus arose from a window of opportunity in the global market that was 
exploited by a local non-forestry firm on the basis of its commercial ability and experience in 
international trading. However, this would not have been possible without the previous 
development of some local wood supply, because wood shipments imply large volumes. As we 
mentioned, two pension funds and a few other firms had been planting with the benefits of the 
first forestry law and some other incentives related to the substitution of renewable energy 
sources for fossil energy. They had been exporting very small amounts of posts and sawn wood 
to Argentina (Table 4.3.1). For its first exports, TILE thus succeeded in gathering wood from 
local forest owners. 
While Otegui started its export experiment, some other players, including the Spanish 
group ENCE, were analyzing the profitability of investing in forest plantations in the Southern   117
Cone countries. Their interest stemmed from wood scarcity in the Northern hemisphere and the 
favorable forestry conditions offered by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In Chile, 
which had already developed a forestry sector thanks to its favorable investment climate, the 
price of land was higher.  
After the initial trial shipments, Otegui decided to implement a large-scale project 
centered on forest plantations for export. COFUSA (Compañía Forestal Uruguaya S.A.) was 
created to that end in 1988. A joint venture was established with EUFORES, the brand-new forest 
firm of ENCE in Uruguay. Forestation began in the country’s Northeastern (Tacuarembó and 
Rivera) and Western (Litoral) regions. Otegui benefited from ENCE’s long experience in 
forestry. Some years later, this association split and Otegui kept the Northeastern plantations. 
Over time, COFUSA’s planted area grew to 23,000 hectares. The prevailing species is Eucalyptus 
grandis, with a production cycle of 16 to 18 years. COFUSA plantations are certified by the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC),
64 having been granted the environmental quality seal by the 
Qualifor Program (SGS.). 
The skills and abilities of Otegui, prior to the wood discovery, were probably essential to 
the latter. The wool branch of the group, Barraca Otegui, was the leader in Uruguay in purchasing 
wool directly from farmers. It was thus used to deal directly with primary producers as well as 
with a number of brokers all over the country. As a business group also involved in banking, 
Otegui had access to bank loans. 
Otegui additionally had experience in technology management and innovation. Wool 
handling in one of their factories had been completely automated in the 1980s through specific 
technological adaptation by a Uruguayan software engineer allied with a local electronics firm. 
This contributed to generating interest by a French industrial group in Otegui’s factory, which 
was finally sold in 1987 to the French. But management was partially kept in the hands of 
Otegui’s people. Through this experience, Otegui accumulated knowledge in innovation 
processes, technology development and subcontracting, and, not the least, international business 
negotiation.  
                                          
64 FSC promotes the responsible management of the world’s forests, in environmental, social, and economic terms. 
Its standards are based on 10 principles that involve: compliance with laws, tenure and use rights, indigenous 
peoples’ rights, workers’ rights and community relations, benefits from the forest, environmental impact, 
management planning, monitoring and assessment, and maintenance of high conservation value forests 
(www.fsc.org).   118
Otegui’s technological strategy involved setting up a nursery farm to ensure maximum care for 
the genetic material in a similar way as the other large firms in Uruguay. But in fields where 
Otegui had no experience, subcontracting was the solution. This favored the creation of small 
firms to respond to those needs by grouping together existing skilled labor.  
Soon after Otegui started buying land, it began experimenting with simultaneous cattle 
raising in the forested area. This would later develop into a “silvopastoral system”
65 that combines 
on the same farm tree plantations with land for cattle. In a 100-hectare farm, 60 hectares are used 
for forestry and fireguard areas, and the rest for cattle pasture.  
Once Otegui separated from the Spanish group, it started experimenting with the 
production of sawn wood. Producing high-quality sawn wood required (i) planting species (or 
sub-species) adequate for such use, (ii) reducing planting density with respect to pulpwood 
production, (iii) intensifying the silvicultural regime in order to obtain even and straight logs of a 
larger diameter and free of knots, and (iv) assuming longer production cycles.  
This new activity reinforced Otegui’s vertical integration process in forestry: URUFOR 
S.A. was created in 1992 to process sawn wood. Located close to Otegui’s Eucalyptus grandis 
plantations in the Northeast of the country, URUFOR progressively acquired the needed 
knowledge and skills to process eucalyptus wood. It now exports most of its production to Europe 
and Asia through commercial agents.
66  
URUFOR has two registered trademarks. The first (Batovi) applies to basic products for the 
furniture manufacturing market (kiln-dried boards, EGS panels, and FGP panels). The second 
(Eucanova) is for construction materials, such as finger-joint floors, beams, frames, and 
moldings. 
The arrival in Uruguay of the Finnish forest group, Metsä-Botnia, was a new opportunity 
for Otegui Group to evolve. In 2003 Otegui sold half of the TILE stocks to Metsä-Botnia, and in 
2006 the latter totally absorbed the former. This was part of a broader association between both 
groups, aiming at ensuring an adequate supply of raw material for the Metsä-Botnia pulp plant, 
now under construction. Otegui has a 9 percent share in the Finnish group. 
                                          
65 One of the oldest agro-forestry systems used in the temperate regions of the world, where forages and/or livestock 
and trees are cultivated together on the same unit of land. 
66 URUFOR’s sawmill has a processing capacity of 35,000 m
3/year to produce green boards, and a modern 
remanufacturing plant with the latest technology in kilns and equipment, with a production capacity of 6,000 m
3/year 
of dry boards. It employs about 150 people including in-house staff and hired personnel.   119
As a result of the first-mover development, its exports increased from US$2 million to $33 
million in the 1988- 2005 period (Graph 4.3.1). The main markets for roundwood are still 
Norway and Finland, although in the past years exports to Morocco and Vietnam exceeded those 
to Finland. Sawn wood exports are more diversified and now include the United States (70 
























Graph 4.3.1 - Otegui wood exports, 1988-2005
Source: Own elaboration with BROU and Custom 
 
 
4.3.3 Diffusion Process 
The Forestation Process 
Three stages can be clearly distinguished in the forestation process (Graph 4.3.2). In the first 
stage, wood production increased moderately and was absorbed by the domestic market. In this 
phase, some knowledge accumulated in planting techniques and species selection. The second 
Forestry Law (1987) marked the beginning of the second phase, which was characterized by a 










The third phase started in 1998, when the yearly growth rate of hectares planted slowed 
down somewhat, especially in the years following the economic crisis of 2002. At present, 
forested land in Uruguay amounts to 1.6 million hectares, 50 percent of which are artificial 
plantations.
67 These 800,000 hectares represent 5 percent of the country’s total surface and, on 
this basis, it has been estimated that around the years 2010-15 harvesting might reach 20 million 
m
3 of wood, a volume far superior to the present level.  
Indeed, in 2005 the volume of wood extraction was 5.7 million m
3; the average annual 
increase was 4 percent in the past 15 years (Table 4.3.2). Firewood still represents an important 
part of this volume, although its share decreased from 90 percent in 1980 to 65 percent in 1998 
and 34 percent in 2005. Wood extracted for industrial use is mainly pulpwood (83 percent in 
2000, 84 percent in 2005). Production grew from 0.2 million m
3 in 1992 to 3.13 million in 2005.  
 
                                          
67 Eucalyptus is the principal species, covering about 71 percent of the planted area. Eucalyptus globulus (used to 
produce pulp) represents 61 percent of that species and Eucalyptus grandis (used to produce pulp as well as sawn 
wood), 33 percent. Different pine species, used to produce sawn wood, account for 27 percent of the forestry area. 
Forestation can only take place in soils that are not suitable for agriculture; all soils in Uruguay are classified 
according to their exploitation potential. 
Graph 4.3.2 
Uruguay: Forestry Development Phases 




















      Source: MGAP, Forestry Department. 
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Source: MGAP, Forestry Department. 
 
 
A better knowledge of the international scene has led a number of producers to manage 
plantations for high-quality wood to be used in higher-value-added products, a strategy that the 




Ideally, the forestry chain should be considered as an integrated system, from seed production to 
high-value-added manufacture.
68 In Uruguay, the chain development process involved product 
and market diversification, although no such integrated system exists yet. The growth process in 
the sawn wood sector is slow because it needs to start from plant selection and management, 
implying long production cycles, as was already mentioned. Sawn wood of a higher quality is 
                                          
68 This kind of structure would allow, for example, the sawn wood industry to place its by-products in the production 
of energy for the pulp factories, and would determine a loss of competitiveness for sawmills that would not sell their 
by-products.   122
now beginning to become available, so firms that recently invested in building sawmills or 
upgrading existing sawmills can now offer higher-quality products in the international market. 
Secondary transformation is still incipient.  
Some facilities for the production of chips have been recently incorporated. The 
transformation of pulp logs into chips improves transportation efficiency (more tons per 
shipment). It also opens up new markets, because few firms in the world buy logs due to 
logistical difficulties. 
Substantial investments are now assigned to a new sub-sector: paper pulp for export. 
Mëtsa-Botnia is already building a pulp mill, and two others (Stora Enso from Sweden and ENCE 
from Spain) are planning to build cellulose pulp mills. 
 
Exports 
Roundwood exports have grown rapidly since the 1990s (Graph 4.3.3); about half of the 
industrial roundwood production (800,000 tons/year) is sold abroad. Chips appeared in 2003 and 
now exceed roundwood exports.
69 The growth in sawn wood production, especially in the past 
few years, has also implied new export flows that exceeded 100,000 m
3 in 2005 (more than 20 























Roundwood for pulp (eucalyptus) Chips for pulp (eucalyptus)
Sawnwood Others
Graph 4.3.3 - Uruguay: exports of wood products, 
1990-2005 (US$ millions)
Source: Own elaboration with data of Customs and BCU.
 
                                          
69 The first mover in exporting wood chips was a local enterprise (Juan Balerio), followed by a few other firms. But 
in 2003 EUFORES began to export chips, which caused this product to emerge as the dominant one in exports.   123
Although wood board exports are still insignificant, two important forest enterprises are 
developing this sub-sector for export (URUPANEL and Colonvade S.A., an affiliate of 
Weyerhaeuser Forestlands International). 
  Total wood exports (excluding paper) increased from US$4.5 million in 1990 to US$141 
million in 2005. In the same period, their share in Uruguay’s total exports increased from 0.2 to 
4.1 percent. Wood exports are expected to multiply fivefold in the next 5 years (several sources 
estimate that exports will reach between 600 and 750 million dollars a year). A structural change 
in their composition is anticipated after Botnia begins operating. Pulp will substitute part of the 
roundwood exports.     
The presence of foreign enterprises in the sector has helped to diversify markets and 
clients. In addition to the Scandinavian countries, markets now include: other European countries, 
some Asian and African countries, the United States, and the countries of MERCOSUR (see the 
Annex to this chapter). Destinations were less concentrated in 2005 than in 2000. Spain and 
Norway reduced their relative share, while Japan and the United States increased theirs. 
Prices behaved differently according to the product. Wood in rough and sawn wood, in 
particular, has shown a decrease in export prices, which is an incentive to produce more high-
value-added products. 
 
Analysis of Followers 
There were 816 firms with commercial plantations in 2000. Most of them (57.7 percent) had 
plantations of less than 300 hectares, which altogether represented 14.4 percent of the total 
forested area. However, about 55.5 percent of the total forested area was concentrated in units of 
more than 1,000 hectares each (only 9 percent of the total number of farms). High concentration 
of forestry areas thus coexisted with a diffusion process in small and medium-size units. 
The sector’s accumulated investment was estimated at US$900 million in 2004, with the 
following distribution: 42 percent in land, 39 percent in plantations, 13 percent in plants, and 6 
percent in infrastructure. Domestic capital originated about 55 percent of the investment and 
foreign capital, 45 percent. Foreign direct investment thus played a very important role in the 
diffusion process.    124
The structure of capital assets changed drastically in 2006, with the investment of the 
Finnish group Metsä-Botnia in a pulp mill, the acquisition of land and plantations by Stora-Enso 
(a Swedish firm), and other foreign capital.  
In 2005, the main players in the forestry sector were the following (shown in Graph 
4.3.4): 
1.  Domestic enterprises owning forest plantations since before 1988: 
FANAPEL 
Caja de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Bancarias 
Caja Notarial 
Industrias Forestales Puerto Arazatí S.A. 
Juan C. Balerio S.A. (FYMNSA) 
Raíces S.R.L. 
2.  Domestic enterprises emerging during the diffusion process: 
Idalen 
Grupo Mascolo 
Paso Alto, Fondo Forestal and Valle Flor (forestry investment funds) 
3.  Multinational firms: 
ENCE (Spanish) 
Metsä-Botnia (Finish) 
Weyerhaeuser Forestlands International (USA) 
Stora Enso (Swedish) 
Arauco S.A. (Chilean) 
URUPANEL- ex Delamonte (Chilean) 
 
DOMESTIC OWNERSHIP ENTERPRISES 
Domestic enterprises owing forestry plantations before 1988 followed, in general, a process of 
vertical integration. Plants were installed near the forests, particularly sawmills owned by the 
same forest owners (Balerio-FYMNSA, Caja de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Bancarias, Industrias 
Forestales Puerto Arazatí, Raíces S.A) as well as other industrial plants for higher-value-added 
products (board wood).    125
Although at the beginning of the diffusion process a great number of firms emerged as 
new plantation owners, in the past few years a concentration process developed. This was due to 





Some local forestry firms that emerged in the early diffusion phase got into financial 
difficulties. This happened mainly to firms managing forestry investment funds. They ran into 
problems in the planting process several years after starting, mainly due to the use of varieties 
that did not adapt well to the soil and climate of the planted zone. As a consequence, their 
investments were not profitable and they went out of business, selling their venture. 
Some medium and small-size producers associated in order to obtain better results (and a 
larger scale), principally in roundwood commercialization. Producers from the Southern region 
integrated FORESUR and established alliances with other firms to install a chip plant in 
Graph 4.3.4 
Main Firms in the Uruguayan Forestry Sector 
Source: Authors’ compilation.    126
Montevideo. These firms started exporting as a spillover effect of the first mover, taking 
advantage of the opening up of the market by the latter as well as other information externalities. 
FANAPEL is a different case. Founded in 1898, it is the only national firm with a vertical 
integration process in the paper industry. It has its own forestry plantations and produces pulp and 
paper. In 2000, FANAPEL acquired Celulosa Argentina S.A, the largest cellulose plant in 
Argentina. Since the 1980s, FANAPEL has exported pulp to Argentina in the framework of the 
bilateral CAUCE trade agreement, but its main business is in the paper industry. The firm has 
taken advantage of the growth in the forestry sector to undertake a regional expansion strategy. It 




The Uruguayan forestry sector was attractive for foreign investment since the beginning. It was 
previously mentioned that incentives also existed in other countries of the region, but Uruguay 
probably provided a more reliable environment (macroeconomic stability and institutional 
framework). The diffusion process was led by some of the leading multinationals in the forestry 
industry:  
•  ENCE 
ENCE (Spain), through its Uruguayan firm EUFORES, started planting in the country in 1990 
after evaluating locations in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Uruguay. The firm 
stated that Uruguay was selected for its forestry policy and its macroeconomic stability. 
In 2002, the firm bought the Southern Cross Timber saw mill (presently MASERLIT). In 
2003, it inaugurated its logistics terminal M’Bopicuá on the river shore (Litoral), as the first 
private harbor in Uruguay, which it uses to export to Spain. It has a wood chip plant installed 
there, in addition to one in Montevideo. 
ENCE’s strategic plan consists of focusing on the production of eucalyptus cellulose at a 
competitive global cost level. To this end, ENCE plans to install a cellulose pulp mill in the West 
of the country, with a yearly capacity of one million tons. Fifty percent of the raw material will be 
supplied by the firm’s own plantations. Total investment is estimated at 930 million euros.    127
•  Mëtsa-Botnia 
In 2006, this Finnish firm started building a pulp mill in the city of Fray Bentos in Western 
Uruguay (Litoral). The mill will produce high-quality bleached hardwood pulp for export to 
Europe, Asia, and North America. Full capacity will be one million tons/year, which will require 
3.5 million m
3 of pulpwood. Investment will amount to at least US$1,100 million, including a 
very large amount of construction work. 
With this project in mind, in 2003 Mëtsa-Botnia acquired the Royal Dutch/Shell stock in 
Compañía Forestal Oriental S.A. (COFOSA), which had been planting since 1991. It also 
acquired TILE S.A. (Otegui’s wood trading company), which is now in charge of acquiring raw 
material from other forestry firms (including Argentine ones) to feed the pulp mill. 
 
•  Weyerhaeuser Forestlands International 
Colonvade S.A. is an affiliate of Weyerhaeuser Forestlands International from the United States 
and it started planting in 1997. It now owns more than 37,000 planted hectares, principally with 
pines. The firm aims at obtaining a minimum of 2 million m
3 of wood per year. It acquired a total 
area of about 100,000 hectares. It also bought Los Piques, a firm owned by Canadians and 
Uruguayans (27,500 hectares). The firm expects to have facilities in operation by 2008 to 
manufacture appearance-grade solid wood products for export. Plans include the building of five 
to eight different wood factories, with an estimated investment of US$20 million to $130 million 
each.  
•  Stora Enso 
The Swedish firm Stora Enso began buying land and plantations relatively recently. It plans to 
acquire about 100,000 hectares of land to plant Eucalyptus dunii and pine, and to build a pulp 
mill near the Baigorria Dam, with a production capacity of about one million tons per year. 
 
•  Other Players in the Sector 
Service firms have played an important role in the development of the forestry sector. Initially the 
services offered related to tree nurseries, plantation, pruning, transportation, and trading 
activities.  
Later, some medium and small-size firms developed specialized forestry services for the 
different phases of the forestry chain; even the most vertically integrated firms engaged in 
systematic strategies of subcontracting supporting services.   128
Other firms related to pulp processing are setting up. They will supply raw inputs for the 
pulp plants, such as Kemira, which produces sodium chlorate, chlorine dioxide, and oxygen, all 
required for pulp bleaching. It will invest in a new plant in the same town where Metsa-Botnia is 
building the pulp mill, with an estimated investment of 60 million euros. 
 
The Role of Government 
Uruguay has developed and maintained a forestry policy since 1968, when the first forestry law 
was promulgated. Prior to this, in 1964, the National Forestry Department was created in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle Raising, and Fisheries (MGAP), thereby institutionalizing all 
issues related to the forestry system (San Román, n/d). This office is still in charge of forestry 
policy.  
In 1985, the government submitted to the Parliament a project for a new forestry law. Its 
objectives were to preserve natural forests and promote forestation. The first forestry law had 
been derogated in the 1970s during the military dictatorship and a large deficit in wood supply for 
domestic consumption emerged in the 1980s.
70 When the law was under discussion, although 
exports were not regarded as a main objective, the possibility of exporting processed materials—
mainly cellulose pulp from pine—was considered. The law project considered initial financing 
equivalent to the cost of 10,000 hectares of plantations per year. The Parliamentary procedure 
took two years, and in the final report to the Senate, the possibility that Uruguay could become a 
“wood materials exporter” (particularly pulp) appeared as a new explicit objective. 
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which had been advising on 
different forestry-related issues in Uruguay, developed and published a sector study during debate 
on the law.
71 The impact of the study was important in enhancing the credibility of a forestry 
development model among national and foreign investors, as well as with the World Bank, which 
collaborated with in financing for the sector. 
The Law of Forestry Development (No. 15,939) was finally passed in December 1987. It 
established tax exemptions and subsidies for development in zones declared “forestry priority.” It 
                                          
70 In those years, wood production reached 1,300,000 tons/year while domestic consumption was estimated at 
2,011,000 tons: firewood for residential consumption, 1,260,000 tons; firewood for industry, 509,000 tons; wood for 
sawn wood, 129,000 tons; wood for posts, 33,000 tons; and wood for pulp 82,000 tons.  
71 “Informe para el estudio del plan maestro para el establecimiento de plantaciones de árboles y utilización de la 
Madera plantada en la República Oriental del Uruguay.”   129
included national tax exemptions, import tariff exemption for inputs and capital goods, subsidies 
up to 50 percent of the cost of planting, and soft credit to finance investment in forestry. Another 
relevant point was that the law authorized stock companies to own forestry assets and to use them 
as a guarantee when requesting loans. Most important was that the law enhanced the benefits 
established in the first law, allowing the use of the debt capitalization instrument. The first mover, 
among others, used this instrument. Later, other measures were added, such as the establishment 
of export processing zones and private ports (as M’Bopicuá in Fray Bentos). In order to access 
tax and financial benefits, firms must present a management plan for forest operation and renewal 
works. This plan has to be approved by government authorities. The law and its application acted 
as a clear signal to foreign capital of public support of the sector and the continuity of the 
promotional policy. 
At the same time, the Uruguayan government negotiated sector financing with the World 
Bank. In 1989, the World Bank approved a US$65 million loan to finance the Second 
Agricultural Development Project. Around US$27 million were assigned to the forestry sector. 
The purpose was to plant 100,000 hectares of eucalyptus to produce Kraft pulp for export, and 
60,000 hectares of pines to supply raw material for one sawmill and one chemical-thermo-
mechanical pulp plant. The World Bank supported three lines of action: i) financing wood 
product exports; ii) supplying credit for planting, harvesting, and developing small forestry 
industries, with the participation of the Uruguayan public bank, BROU; and iii) assisting the 
government in implementing the financial incentives established in the forestry law (World Bank, 
1989). 
In September 2005, law No. 17905 was passed to eliminate subsidies to forest plantations 
(Table 4.3.3). The law does not seem to have had any negative effects. Since 2004, the sector has 
shown a tendency to recover from the reduced levels of the previous crisis years. 
The specific instruments to promote the forestry sector were complemented with general 
investment incentives defined in Law No. 16.906 passed in 1998 (Investment Law, see Chapter 
2). This law establishes non-discriminatory treatment of foreign with respect to domestic firms. 
The general investment incentives include exemptions from the net worth taxes, the value-added 
tax, and IMESI applied on imports, and the value-added tax on inputs and equipment destined for 
the productive cycle.  
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Table 4.3.3- Forestry 




1990 1,156  161 
1991 3,710  341 
1992 9,493  1,284 
1993 14,826  2,608 
1994 18,315  3,498 
1995 23,783  5,312 
1996 20,070  4,726 
1997 21,984  4,637 
1998 16,460  3,317 
1999 29,416  5,273 
2000 8,769  1,516 
2001 28,744  4,825 
2002 21,277  2,505 
2003 11,866  1,154 
2004 12,117  1,543 




This set of institutional factors caused production and export in the forestry sector to 
increase sharply with an important participation of foreign direct investment. Nowadays, effective 
and projected investment in the sector indicates the prevailing presence of transnational 
corporations. These actors are the main exporters and the ones responsible for new, large-scale 
projects. 
Other tax incentives are related to two special regimes: (i) the import of inputs and 
equipment free of tax, and (ii) export free zones, where income and net worth taxes do not apply, 
and neither will eventual new taxes. In October 2004, the government granted an export free zone 
regime to Metsä-Botnia and ENCE in Rio Negro. The regime applies to the production by these 
firms of pulp, paper, and other cellulose products, the installation of other wood industries, the 
production of inputs for the cellulose plants, electrical energy generation, and port operations. 
Other reforms supporting development of the forestry industry included the port reform which, 
among other measures, enabled the private sector to operate ports in the country. The forestry law 
established a one-third reduction in port tariffs for wood exports.   131
In 1997, the World Bank and the IDB approved new projects to improve public roads, 
bridges, and ports used by the forestry sector. In turn, the government elected in 2004 is 
projecting railway transport and public roads improvements with the participation of the private 
sector. In spite of these measures, infrastructure is still a bottleneck for the development of the 
sector.  
In addition to the National Forestry Department, the National Environmental Department 
(DINAMA) also has some control over the sector because all wood processing projects must be 
submitted to that agency. 
 
4.3.4 Export Triggers and Obstacles 
By the 1970s the possibility of producing cellulose pulp in Uruguay had been studied by FAO, 
ECLAC, and JICA. It was known that the eucalyptus growth rate in Uruguay was upper 25 m
3 
per hectares per year, a very high rate compared with those of Northern countries, although lower 
than the Brazilian one. When the first mover discovered the possibility of exporting pulpwood 
from Uruguay, all the wood available in the country at the time was insufficient to cover the 
client’s demand. Planting yield forests was needed to obtain a sustainable business and, local 
growth rates indicated favorable local conditions.  
However, at the end of the 1980s, there were high barriers to entry in the forestry sector: 
large amounts of resources were required to invest in land and capital; the production cycle (from 
initial investment to revenue) was long; tree nurseries enabling a high increase in planted areas 
were scarce; there was a lack of transportation for getting heavy products to destination markets 
(distance and type of product); and infrastructure to allow the development of the sector was 
poor. Public policy had an important role in lifting some of those restrictions. Subsidies 
represented about two-fifths of the investment needed to develop a plantation, and the forestry 
policy had a remarkable continuity through different governments. 
Other factors that promoted the diffusion process were related to Uruguay’s natural and 
market conditions. At the beginning of the 1990s, land value was low in comparison with 
international prices. There were few profitable alternatives for agricultural and farming business 
investments (the international price for Uruguayan meat was very low in those years). Uruguay 
also has a comparative advantage in forestry according to its natural resource endowment 
(climate—temperature and rain regime—topography, and soils) and population distribution (non-  132
inhabited land availability). Different species, such as pine, eucalyptus, and poplar, have adapted 
successfully to Uruguayan forest soil. 
During the 1990s, various supporting activities developed. First, private tree nurseries 
began to produce and sell great amounts of seedlings, and their cost decreased during the decade. 
Second, a standard technology was adopted in all processes: nursery, forestry management, and 
harvesting. Genetic improvement was undertaken; in particular, clonal seedlings started to be 
used to get trees better adapted to the Uruguayan weather and soil conditions. Third, tree crops 
started to be used in plantations, by sprout management or replanting with high-productivity 
varieties (cloned and selected seed plantations). 
The development of subcontracting in sowing, management, and harvest sustained the 
diffusion process and allowed small and medium firms to be competitive. The forestry chain 
slowly integrated logistics and other service firms, enabling scale and network economies. The 
regulatory reform of the National Port Administration additionally played a significant role in 
reducing logistical costs.  
The development of industrial, higher-value-added processes, like pulp plants and wood 
board factories, is capital intensive. Only with the entrance of foreign firms was it possible to go 
beyond the capital restrictions and integrate forestry production vertically. In Uruguay, private 
enterprises of national capital do not have the capacity to invest 1,000 million dollars, the amount 
that would be required to install an integrated enterprise in the forestry sector. The single national 
enterprise that has an integrated vertical process (FANAPEL) only processes the wood produced 
on 7,000 hectares. 
The entry of foreign capital pushed the sector forward and gave credibility to its growth 
process. There were spillovers because foreign firms defined the technological process in planting 
and this process was imitated by local firms. They also established links with local firms that 
became their suppliers of wood, inputs, and services.  
A market spillover process does not seem to have taken place. In general, foreign firms 
tend to export to their countries of origin, while domestic firms try to open up new market 
destinations, particularly in Asia. The forestry boom showed that there were technological limits 
that, as a consequence of the length of the biological cycle of trees, caused a lag between the 
economic growth of the sector and forestry research.    133
The public institutions related to the sector research are the National Institute of 
Agricultural Research (INIA), which has an experimental facility in Tacuarembo, specialized in 
forestry research; and the School of Agronomics, which has a research department specialized in 
forestry. These institutions develop local R&D jointly with the private sector. Funds allocated by 
INIA to R&D in the wood sector have been scarce, because the institute estimates the R&D 
funding to be allocated to each sector based on its contribution to an export tax that is not applied 
to the wood sector. 
At present INIA is in charge of the National Forestry Program (Programa Nacional 
Forestal), which aims at developing the sector via cutting-edge technologies in the main links in 
the wood product chain, seeking quality, and attempting to overcome the commodity exporting 
stage while respecting natural resource sustainability. The specific objectives of the National 
Forestry Program are to improve in the following areas: genetic improvement of rapid-growth 
species (Eucalyptus and Pinus), silvicultural management of the most-used species, and control 
and assessment of the environmental impact of forestry. 
In recent years, the main research activity has taken place on environmental and sanitary 
issues, seeking to obtain better technologies to transform the wood produced. BROU has also 
financed some research activities and studies in the framework of the PRENADER (a program 
for natural resources and irrigation development). Hence, forestry R&D has been related 
principally to private enterprises, in particular multinational enterprises whose R&D generates 
spillovers for local firms. In the primary sector, small local firms take advantage of technological 
packages while other local firms copy the procedures of foreign firms.  
The curriculum of the School of Agronomics of the public university (UDELAR) has 
included since 1963 the option of specializing in forestry, but the number of graduates with this 
specialization has been limited (maximum 40 per year). Thus, a specific weakness of the sector is 
the deficit of specialized professionals and researchers in the forestry sector.  
Moreover, Coordination among research institutions and enterprises has been weak. 
During the early stages of the diffusion process, some types of eucalyptus globulus were planted 
in zones that were not proved to have adequate conditions (soil and climate). Later, poor tree 
growth was observed in those zones and it was necessary to replant with a more appropriate 
variety.   134
In 2005, seven firms had plantations certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
The total certified area was 133,771 hectares and was owned by: EUFORES (ENCE), COFOSA 
(Metsä-Botnia), COFUSA (Grupo Otegui), FYMNSA (Balerio), Industrias Forestales Puerto 
Arazatí, and two small firms (Guillermo Gómez Platero/Gabriela Carriquiry Bocage and Grupo 
Forestal San Gregorio). However, some environmental organizations have criticized the 
certification on the grounds that it does not take into account key aspects of the effects of forestry 
on water resources and local flora. 
LATU, in association with JICA, researched the quality and properties of wood as well as 
industrial processes for obtaining quality sawn wood products. This institution focused its 
research on the eucalyptus drying process to avoid problems that affect products due to 
eucalyptus fiber movement. 
 
4.3.5 Comparator Case: The Wine Sector 
INTRODUCTION 
Wine is a traditional activity in Uruguay. At present, wine production hovers around 100 million 
liters per year. Due to changes in Uruguay’s economic policies in the mid-1970s, related to 
increased openness, wine firms felt threatened by foreign competition, especially from Argentina. 
This concern, jointly with other factors, caused the sector to adopt strategic changes in order to be 
competitive in the global market. Today some trade protection remains in the domestic market. 
Although initially restructuring of the industry was exclusively private and limited to a few firms, 
the ensuing diffusion of technological changes to a larger part of the sector benefited from strong 
public support. The National Vitivinicultural Institute (INAVI),
72 a public-private support 
organization for the wine sector, played a significant role in the sector’s restructuring and, once 
exports started, contributed to the internationalization process of the sector.  
Restructuring the industry implied progressive reduction in the number of wineries and 
vines, and in vineyard area (Table 4.3.4). Total wine production has varied within a certain range 
since the early 1990s, mainly due to climatic factors (mostly rain), as shown in Graph 4.3.5. 
 
 
                                          
72 INAVI was created by law (No. 15.903, art. 141 to 154) in 1988 to control wine grape production. See 
https://www.inavi.com.uy.   135
Table 4.3.4 – Evolution of 
Wineries, Vines and Vineyard 
Area in Uruguay 
  Vines Area  Wineries
  (plants x 
1,000) (Ha)  (Nr.) 
1992 46,926 12,131 404 
1995 37,063 10,900 353 
2000 31,852 9,146 313 
2005 29,503 8,484 275 
2006 n.a. n.a. 272 


































The wine sector offers a wide set of product options, from table wines (packaged in 10, 5, 3, 1.5, 
and 1-liter bottles, and TetraPack boxes) to fine wines (VCP,
73 0.75-liter bottles). In the past 10 
years, wine packed in 10, 5, and 3-liter bottles represented 80 percent of total consumption, on 
average (Graph 4.3.6). This evolution reflects the importance of cheap wines, mostly associated 
with popular consumption practices: people used to buy “non-packaged” wine, which is sold by 
wineries to retailers in 10-liter bottles; consumers, in turn, provide their own containers  (usually 
                                          
73 Quality wines are labeled “Vino de Calidad Preferente” (VCP) in Uruguay to distinguish them from common or 
table wines.   136
glass bottles) to be refilled by the retail seller. Younger people used to buy TetraPack boxes (table 

























BOX (1 lt) 1.5  &  1 l i t r e
1 0 & 5 & 3 litres
Graph 4.3.6 - Uruguay: wine consumption by 
type of package (million liters)
 
 
  VCP consumption does not fully reflect production capacity. Wineries package wine and 
make production decisions, such as vineyard management and industrial processing, according to 
market segmentation, and this decision can change from one crop to the next. Some wineries 
emphasize volume, while others prefer quality. Total consumption has been on a declining trend 
since 2002, coinciding with the economic crisis. In Uruguay, wineries with an average production 
of 350,000 liters per year are considered very small. Larger enterprises produce about 5 million 
liters, but these scales are indeed very small in the international context. 
World consumption is about 23,520 million liters, and world production is around 28,000 
million liters. It is a mature market, with a declining consumption trend over the past 20 years (-
0.2 percent per year, 1986-2003).The European Union (EU), by far the largest producer, has been 
reducing its vine area and discussing its subsidy policy. Meanwhile, countries in the Southern 
hemisphere have increased their plantations (especially during the 1990s) and their global market 
share. The EU still provides 60 percent of production, with France, Italy, and Spain at the top. 
Outside the EU, the United States, Australia, and Argentina are the countries with a share greater 
than 5 percent of global production.         137
Imports and exports are growing in the global market. This indicates the presence of more 
sophisticated consumers, who wish to try a variety of tastes. Thus, competition is increasing over 
time. 
Chile took advantage of a window of opportunity in the international market and has 
become an important player. Although during 1986-90 Chile only exported 4 percent of its wine 
production, in 2004 exports represented 60 percent of its production, generating US$712 million 
in revenue. Chile is now the fifth world exporter. Currently, 5 of the 11 top exporters are from the 




























Graph 4.3.7 - World exports of wine, 2004
Total = US$ 14.591 




Exports were initiated in the mid-1990s by the few firms that undertook the modernization of 
their vineyards and wineries some 15 years ago. Among these, the first mover can be identified as 
Bodegas Carrau, a family firm with a long and interesting trajectory in vine growing and 
processing. In 1997, this firm was the second in terms of export value (a quarter of total 
exports).
74 Its markets included Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, Holland, and 
Canada. Exports further increased and markets extended to China, Poland, and the United States. 
                                          
74 In fact, the firm developed an export project as soon as 1977, which was declared “of national interest” by the 
government because its purpose was, among others, to export and make Uruguayan wines known in international 
markets. For various reasons, the export project had to be postponed.   138
It is still one of the dominant exporters. Interestingly enough, Bodegas Carrau is one of the few 
private firms in Uruguay carrying out R&D. In 1985, it created an internal R&D laboratory and 
its main researcher—one of the owners of Bodegas Carrau—has since then contributed to the 
research on different aspects of enology at the Chemical School of the public university. 
Bodegas Carrau used to produce 500,000 liters per year when it began to export. When 
the winery was started in 1976, its objective was to produce and export high-quality wine. 
Previously, the Carrau Family was associated with another winery. In 1974-75, Carrau had 
researched vineyard production zones in the South of Brazil with support from the University of 
California. This led Carrau to install its main vineyard in a new zone, close to the Brazilian 
frontier in the Northeast of the country (Rivera). 
The main hurdle was related to the lack of recognition by the world market of Uruguay as a 




Until the end of the 1980s, wine exports from Uruguay were virtually nonexistent. The common 
expectation was that wine production would disappear in the country due to the end of import 
tariff protection: the flood of cheap wine from Argentina would impede the survival of 
Uruguayan viticulture. In fact, important protection of domestic production is still in force: 
imports are forbidden for “non-packaged” or more than one-liter bottles, and domestic taxes are 
higher for imported wines. 
Uruguayan exports started in the mid-1990s (Graph 4.3.8) thanks to some key elements that had 
been brewing over the previous 15 years: a small number of innovating firms restructuring first 
their vineyard and later their wineries, according to world standards, and a supporting 
institutional framework.  
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Several other factors have to be taken into account to explain why exports could start at 
that precise time; most of them are of a local dimension, although some relate to particular global 
conditions. But there is one factor that happens to be particularly important. Uruguay has 
succeeded in developing a VCP from “Tannat cépage,” a variety that has long been cultivated in 
the country. Tannat was known by specialists but was previously only known to exist in a small 
region of France.
75  
After the export peak in 2000, the sector suffered the consequences of the financial and 
economic crisis of the country and the region. Cheap Argentine wines were difficult to compete 
with in the Brazilian market, while the foreign trade strategy to conquer European and other 
markets experienced a drastic reduction in funds. This seems to reflect Uruguay’s difficulties in 
exporting large volumes of wine to countries other than MERCOSUR members. This is 
particularly striking if one takes into account the aggressive market diversification strategy that 
has been followed: Uruguay has been exporting wine to a total of 55 countries in the past decade 
and to 35 countries in 2004 and 2005. Its wines have earned awards in a variety of worldwide 
competitions. 
                                          
75 In fact, Tannat vine stocks have always been grown in the country, but used to bear the name of the person who 
imported it at the end of the 19th century, Pascual Harriague. Over time, the origin of the stock was lost and its 
identity was rediscovered in the 1970s through laboratory analyses in France.  
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In the very competitive and traditional world wine markets, it is extremely difficult to 
compete with well-established varieties. Although Uruguay is producing and exporting several 
types of wines, it is through the Tannat variety that it was able to “make a name” for itself. This 
by no means has been a panacea but rather the starting point of a complex R&D path in order to 
build the sector’s future, partly based on this opportunity. And it has not been the only or main 
determinant in making wine exports feasible; but it shows a particular match between local and 
global conditions.  
Uruguayan exports are 90 percent red wines, and a third of them are Tannat. Wineries 
introduced in the markets by Tannat as a symbol can show and sell other varieties (mixed or not 
with Tannat). In 2005, 30 firms were exporting to 35 countries. Four wineries accounted for more 
than 50 percent of exports (Carrau, Castillo Viejo, Juanicó, and Pisano). The amounts have not 
been sizeable: US$690,000 is the total value of exports of these top firms.  
 
Export Triggers and Hurdles 
After the early phase led by a handful of “elite” wineries, institutional support actively promoted 
diffusion: subsidized credits for vineyards and winery restructuring; INAVI support to the setting 
up of the country’s wine image; and research projects financed through public programs. Public 
institutions intervened to deal with two typical market failures derived from the public good 
nature of both research and country image (associated with wines).  
Before the wine industry was restructured, a number of firms used to participate in non-
governmental groupings of agricultural producers (CREA
76) that shared their experiences and 
problems as well as hired part-time consultants to help find solutions. This was an important 
channel for getting in touch with foreign specialists in viticulture, starting a program to rejuvenate 
viticulture (with the passing of time, grapevines had become subject to viral infections), and 
moving on to an investment and innovation process in wineries. Had these selected wineries not 
started the move toward higher-quality grapevines in the 1970s, it is unlikely that the sector 
would have resisted trade liberalization in the 1990s because of the long biological times implied 
in vine growing. 
                                          
76 Centros Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola.   141
INAVI played a coordination role in the diffusion process, including the promotion of 
Uruguayan wines in wine and export shows. When exports started, there was a window of 
opportunity for Uruguayan wines due to foreign retailers being attracted by the introduction of a 
new country of origin. This opportunity was open while “wine of Uruguay” was news. From the 
moment the news is acknowledged by the most active consumers, Uruguay is just another 
competitor in the market. 
Uruguayan firms are small in the global market. Thus, none of them was able to compete 
far from a boutique-winery position, and INAVI’s role in promoting the Tannat “concept,” plus 
some coordination of wineries was required for success.  At different stages, some wineries 
learned to cooperate, acting as a group in the export market, after some failed experiences. In the 
local market, rivalry has always been difficult. Thus, collaboration among firms is fragile. 
The domestic market, for its part, has evolved favorably toward more sophisticated demand by 
consumers with higher standards. Ten years ago, Carrau created a Wine Club (Cava Privada) with 
the intention to promote the “Wine Ritual.” Nowadays it is common to hear wine conversations 
among “non-professional” consumers or to see wine accessories bought as gifts. New restaurants 
within a gourmet culture contribute to this trend. This is used by wineries creating Wine Routes, 
including reception facilities for winery visitors (tourists can take a tour including a “winery walk 
and taste” from Montevideo Harbor for a small fee). 
The wine sector is still threatened by foreign competition. Wines produced in Argentina 
or Chile by firms that are many times larger than the Uruguayan ones can produce “good wines” 
at lower cost (grape production, packaging, and labels). The Uruguayan vineyards are still 
changing and reducing in size. Traditional table-wine varieties are diminishing while modern 
“market value” varieties are growing (Table 4.3.5). A net reduction of 1 million vine plants from 
2002 to 2005 hides growth of 2 million plants in red wine varieties such as Tannat, Cabernet, and 
Merlot. 
The sector’s transformation in recent decades clearly improved its competitiveness. 
However, wine exports did not grow as expected, and they are only remarkable in the Tannat 
niche.    142
 
Table 4.3.5 - Uruguay: Number of Plants by Variety, 
2002–2005  
VARIETY        2002 2005  Difference 
Moscatel Hamburgo 
(wine)  5,067,0414,834,032 -233,009 




Red hybrids  4,266,2263,092,396
-
1,173,830 
Other decreasing red 
varieties   340,563 161,806 -178,757 
Sub total       
-
2,836,865 
Tannat (Harriague)  5,003,2925,421,532 418,240 
Merlot 2,179,5842,573,964 394,380 
Cabernet Franc  789,917 969,178 179,261 
Cabernet Sauvignon  1,723,2482,223,056 499,808 
Red blending  100,321 349,850 249,529 
Others (“tintas de vino”)  16,740 184,316 167,576 
Other increasing red 
varieties  406,430 529,454 123,024 
Sub total    2,031,818 
TOTAL RED 
VARIETIES        -805,047 
Riesling  140,801 49,342 -91,459 
Semillon  324,150 177,674 -146,476 
White hybrids  2,600,1122,306,895 -293,217 
Other decreasing white 
varieties  881,807 692,562 -189,245 
Sub total        -720,397 
Chardonnay 371,792 392,252 20,460 
Ugni blanc  1,771,4712,093,192 321,721 
Other increasing white 
varieties  116,855 165,967 49,112 
Sub total     391,293 
TOTAL WHITE 
VARIETIES        -329,104 
TOTAL*       
-
1,134,151 
* 362 hectares reduction.             
 Source: INAVI. 
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Comparison with the Forestry Case 
The wine sector, like the forestry sector, has a long tradition in the country; it is a primary inputs 
processing industry and it has a long time-span between planting the vineyards and completed 
production of quality wine (eight years). The firms are also commonly vertically integrated and 
have their own plantations. Similar to the forestry sector, wineries had government support for 
undertaking the restructuring process and maintaining sales in the internal market.  
In the wine sector, exports have not grown as expected, and domestic market protection 
has been sizeable. There was fear of imports from Argentina (basic quality wine, cheaper than 
Uruguayan wines due to better climate, large firms, scale economies, and clustering and 
networking of suppliers). The situation in the older forestry sector was not very different. Cheap 
wood imports came from Brazil and Paraguay, with long-established forestry sectors in both 
sawn wood and paper.  
In both the wine and forestry sectors, a worldwide reallocation of production has taken 
place toward countries in the South. This has been based on relatively more freely functioning of 
world markets, because comparative advantage is present in those countries. European countries 
continue to provide subsidies for vineyards. The opportunity created by the move toward the 
South has been seized by the wood sector in Uruguay; in wine this has not happened to a similar 
extent. By contrast, first Chile and then Argentina have profited from this opportunity for their 
wines. 
Differences between the two sectors include the following:  
•  Wine is a differentiated product. Origin is important and might be even more 
important than brand; this is not the case for wood. Uruguayan wine was 
previously unknown and this implies a strong disadvantage when competing 
with Chilean or Argentine wines. This might also influence the location of 
FDI. 
•  Climate in Uruguay is not ideal. It is adequate, but it lacks the extremely dry 
summers of Mendoza or Chile (where water supply to the vineyards can be 
totally programmed by irrigation). 
•  Land prices (low in Uruguay) are not significant in wine production because 
relatively less land is required than in the case of forestry.    144
•  The wine sector is still protected (in Uruguay as well as in other countries); the 
forestry sector had a relatively “fresh start” that involved modern solutions in 
many fields. 
•  In the wine sector, the domestic market (protected) is important for the firms. 
Thus, domestic orientation is strategically attractive and enhances profitability, 
which could reduce export competitiveness. 
•  The world demand in the wine market is less dynamic than it is in the wood 
market, and there is no clearly determined and significant unsatisfied demand. 
•  Firm size and profitability are important for accessing technology updates, 
which is dynamic in the wine sector as a differentiation generator.  
•  Uruguay could however identify a market niche with the Tannat variety, which 
may possibly keep growing. 
•  Because foreign direct investment has not come forward in the wine sector (as 
it did in Chile and Argentina), spillover effects of the type observed for 
forestry were not observed.  
•  As Brazil was the relevant export destination and Argentina the main 
competitor, the wine sector has suffered more from the regional macro 




The beginning of Uruguay’s forestry sector renewal is identified with the first Forestry Law 
(1968), which generated an increase in the planted area. This experience was relevant to show the 
capacity to produce wood in the country, but it did not establish an export flow. However, some 
enterprises that started planting in those years are now important actors in the sector.   
The Otegui Group, previously known for its participation in wool commercialization and 
manufacturing, identified and took a commercial opportunity to provide wood to the European 
cellulose-paper industry. It was the first firm to export a non-negligible amount of roundwood to 
Europe, in 1988. To reach an exportable volume, Otegui bought roundwood from farmers 
established under the first Forestry Law.   145
When the second Forestry Law was approved (1988), the Otegui Group, in association 
with the Spanish forestry group ENCE, pioneered massive forest planting in Uruguay. After these 
first moves, Otegui decided that sawn wood would be a more promising business, then split from 
the Spanish firm and started specializing in sawn wood. Nowadays, Otegui is a most relevant 
player in the forestry industry: it owns two enterprises and has a strategic association with Metsä-
Botnia (a pulp mill).  
For its part, ENCE, after analyzing the viability of producing wood in the region as an 
input for its Spanish mills, decided that Uruguay would be the most convenient location. Once 
the decision was taken, the firm chose to associate with Otegui. This process seems to indicate 
that the Spanish firm would have invested in forestry in Uruguay even without Otegui’s first 
move. 
A strong diffusion process took place, first at the planting stage. In this process, Uruguay 
benefited from the situation of the global forestry resources in the 1990s: a contraction of the 
industrial forest surface in North America, an unsustainable felling level of tropical wood in the 
Pacific Asia region, and a growing preoccupation with protecting natural forests. This caused the 
forestry chain to de-localize its first links toward regions where land was cheap and high-growth 
species adapted well. Uruguay showed higher growth rates than the world average, indicating a 
comparative advantage.  
Uruguay has been more successful than other countries in the region in capturing forestry 
investments due to a clear promotional policy that was given continuity over the past 20 years, 
and also because of relative macroeconomic stability. The promotional benefits granted by this 
policy, however important, were nonetheless similar to those observed in other countries; hence 
they must not be regarded as the only explanation for the sector’ success. Nowadays the sector 
continues developing in spite of the recent elimination of planting subsidies.  
Another factor that made Uruguay attractive for forestry was the relatively low cost of 
land and the lack of profitable investment alternatives at the time the sector started its 
development. The presence of multinational firms in the Uruguayan forestry sector is at the same 
time an indicator of its success and one of its causes. 
At least three stages may be recognized in the diffusion process. In the first stage (1990-
2003), the most important element was the forestation of 650,000 hectares (around 4 percent of 
all rural land); firms’ revenue was scarce or nil, and exports were at a minimum.    146
The second stage, corresponding to recent years, was characterized by the development of 
primary wood processing once massive harvesting started. When transportation costs were 
reduced, wood manufacturing became profitable and exports grew.  
In the third and present stage, it is expected that the sector will gain in strength and 
competitiveness through optimization of the various sub-systems and their interrelations: 
products and sub-products would be exploited in their best alternative uses and optimized for 
each market segment; resource allocation and use would be improved; and unsolved coordination 
failures would be tackled. It has been estimated that this stage would be completed about 15 years 
from now. 
Products presently sold are commodities and reflect the current development stage. 
Initially, high-density pulp wood plantations were targeted, entailing low-cost silviculture 
management and higher yields. But later on, sawn wood started to gain importance and this 
implied more demanding management systems (weeding, breeching, etc.) and longer growth 
cycles. Costs increased in the forestation phase but higher prices are obtained for the processed 
products. In this second stage, although the sector still moves in commodity markets, new 
products have appeared, such as wood boards on the one hand and pulp on the other. It is only in 
the third phase that high-value-added products, possibly differentiated, will be processed. 
Development of the sector was spurred by the presence of multinational firms that 
incorporated capital and knowledge. Together with significant public support, this contributed to 
solve uncertainties and lift some barriers to entry. Among others, it became obvious that an 
export market existed, the technological package was evident, and service firms emerged. This 
led to a number of local imitators entering the sector. About 40 percent of the plantations were 
the outcome of local small and medium-size projects.  
The largest firms, especially multinationals, followed a vertical integration strategy, 
installing plants for primary and/or secondary wood processing (pulp mills, sawmills) near their 
plantations. From the start, these enterprises developed subcontracting, thereby stimulating the 
diffusion process. Agglomeration economies started to appear from this practice. 
Once the plantations reached maturity, exports increased rapidly (reaching a 4 percent share in 
the country’s total exports in 2005). On the basis of the expected wood volumes for the coming 
years, this share should be growing and impact significantly the structure of Uruguayan exports. 
The significance of the forestry sector in the economy is already noticeable in the use of land,   147
transport and port infrastructure, regional development, and social impact. Forest plantations have 
changed the landscape in several regions of the country and issues related to the sector are 
debated daily. A “forestry culture” is also developing in the plantation zones.  
Naturally, a learning process took place along this evolution. The series of operations 
involved in planting – tree nursery, soil preparation, planting, plague control, branching, thinning, 
felling, etc. – improved and caused the real cost per hectare of planting to diminish. Knowledge 
accumulated on the varieties and species that better adapt to each location, type of soil, or 
topographical location. Another important factor was the strengthening of a “silvopastoral” 
regime that allows joint wood and meat production (cattle breeding) in a same area. In short, the 
sector’s productivity increased and higher prices can now be faced for the new areas to be 
planted.  
Productivity in the transportation system also improved. Transport is one of the most 
important elements in production costs. Internal transportation improved significantly; basic 
equipment did not even exist previously. Some measures applied by the government had a 
significant impact on the sector’s operations, such as regulatory changes in ports, road 
maintenance, and railroad improvements. However, in the present second stage of development, 
the new processed products mean lower volumes to transport (chips or pulp instead of logs), 
which results in a more efficient transportation system in the sector as a whole.   
Different visions of the social and environmental effects of forestry coexist. Although 
“green” certification was obtained for a significant portion of the main plantations, some groups 
have denounced their inadequacy and insist on the negative impact of eucalyptus on soils and 
water supply. Recently, a similar controversy has arisen concerning the installation of some 
industrial facilities.  
Some plantations (including some of the largest firms) have suffered reduced productivity 
due to the inadequate selection of varieties at some locations, particularly Eucalyptus globulus in 
the Northern and Northwest areas. Such difficulties might be attributed to a lack of coordination 
between development of the sector and research requirements. The fast diffusion process has 
meant that public and private research has lagged, particularly given the context of scarce 
research resources and long production cycles.  
The public sector played a key role in the discovery. To a certain extent, government 
agencies pioneered changes prior to the pioneer’s first steps. The first forestry laws and some   148
limited public research were starting points even if they were not outward oriented and rather 
modest. Afterward, the state kept a clear and continuous policy through different government 
administrations, maintaining the necessary stability for the installation of large firms. 
In the forestry sector as well as in the wine sector, public intervention was strong, aiming at 
restructuring of the sector in each case. Its impact was limited in terms of achieving a sustained 
growth path in wine exports. Some relevant features that might explain the different export paths 
in forestry and wine include: the dependence on domestic and regional markets (wine), the grade 
of product differentiation (origin and brand), and the presence of FDI (negligible in the wine 
sector). FDI in the wine sector probably could have contributed to its international insertion. 
A conclusion appears to be that it is not enough to have a natural comparative advantage 
with respect to the destination markets. Competitive advantage is also relevant, particularly in the 
case of differentiated products. And the previous existence of a domestic market might not 
always be an advantage. 
Finally, Table 4.3.6 outlines the main market failures, public goods, and incentives 
associated with the forestry discovery. 
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Table  4.3.6 
Market Failures, Public Goods and Incentives in the Forestry Discovery 
Market Failures  Public Goods 
Externalities Coordination  Failures 
Public & Private Instruments 
(and starting date) 
Impact 
- Natural conditions 
(PRE)* 
- Macroeconomic stability 
(PRE) 
- Agronomy Faculty 
research and specialized 
professionals (PRE) 
-Knowledge from previous 
forestry (PRE) 
- Infrastructure (roads, port, 
railways)  
- Reform of the National 
Port Administration 
- INIA research 















-Limited infrastructure (roads) 
- Deficit of specialized professionals 
and researchers 
- Week coordination among research 
institutions and the enterprises 
- Scarcity of long-term financial 
resources  
 
- Second Forestry Law, 1988 (subsidies and 
tax exemptions). 
- Forestry General Direction,  
-Forestry policies continuity 
- PACPYMES, wood industry cluster, 2006 
-Specific benefits to cellulose pulp mills, 2004 
(free trade regime) 
- PRENADER 
- Different studies and advisories about sector 
development, 1963 
-IO’ support, 1989 (BROU loans) 
- LATU-JICA’s research on forestry products 
and industrial process, 1996  
-PPP** National Port Administration reform, 
1991 (specialized port operators) 
- Vertical integration, 1990 
- Forest R&D by MNCs, 1990s 
- Suppliers network development (sowing, 
management, harvest and logistic), 1990 




















* Pre = available at pre-discovery stage.    ** PPP: Public-Private Partnership 
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Annex – Export Destination by Country and Firm 
 
Table A.4.1- Uruguayan Wood Exports by Country 
(US$ thousand) 
  1990 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  RAW LUMBER 
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-  Japan 
-  Viet Nam 

































Latin America and Caribbean 

















Export  Free  Zones  0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 
TOTAL  RAW  LUMBER  3,460 35,870 40,174 40,666 43,615 60,462    87,177  118,112 
  SAWN WOOD 
European Union 
 
210 2,893 1,465  884  1,657  1,768  1,933  1,765 
NAFTA 
















Asia and Africa    849 1,605 1,774 2,395 2,375 3,133 2,102 
Latin America and Caribbean 
















Export Free Zones    0 1 1  214 0  18  80 
TOTAL SAWN WOOD  210  10,109   7,697   7 ,230  9,609  12,831  18,313  23,270 
Source: Customs export data. 
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Table A.4.2- Uruguayan Wood Exports by Firm 
(thousands of dollars) 
  1990 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  RAW LUMBER 
Balerio    53 340 680 127 683 479 526 
Foresur   8,729 8,799 2,899 2,063 2,141 3,048 9,916 
Grupo Forestal   - - - - -  2,032  8,801 
Grupo Otegui  1,634 10,711  9,548  7,784 10,493 14,958 24,370 25,214 
ENCE   12,850 17,329 20,264 20,572 26,943 32,417 42,532 
Metsä-Botnia        15,094  24,533  29,177 
Other  1,826 3,526 4,158 9,039  10,360  643  298 1,946 
TOTAL  WOOD  IN  ROUGH  3,460 35,870 40,174 40,666 43,615 60,462    87,177  118,112 
  SAWN WOOD 
Balerio   5,454 4,200 3,879 4,158 4,991 6,959 6,617 
Industrias Forestales Arazatí   285 153 267 711 755 854 594 
Grupo  Otegui  210  26 2,116 1,956 3,517 4,258 6,308 9,131 
ENCE   3,514  79  16  50  710 1,794 3,901 
Other    830 1,149 1,112 1,173 2,117 2,398 3,027 
TOTAL SAWN WOOD  210  10,109   7,697   7 ,230  9,609  12,831  18,313  23,270 
Source: Customs export data. 
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4.4  The Caviar and Sturgeon Case 
4.4.1 Introduction  
Sturgeon farming is a new activity in Uruguay. Black River Sturgeons S.A. proudly claims to be 
the only farm producing legitimate Osetra Malossol Caviar and sturgeon meat in the southern 
hemisphere. Created in 1995, the firm is now growing fast and developing a new project that is 
expected to increase tenfold the firm’s present production level. At least another two firms are 
waiting for the authorization of the governmental agency for agricultural resources (Dirección 
Nacional de Recursos Acuáticos, DINARA) to start their own farms. 
The main processed product from sturgeon fishery is caviar.
77 The other important proc-
essed product is sturgeon meat (smoked, frozen, or marinated). The evolution of the world catch 
volume of sturgeon and paddlefish (from fisheries and aquaculture) has shown a constant and 
remarkable decrease since 1978 (Graph 4.4.1). 
 
 
                                          
77 Caviar is the processed salted roe of various species of fish, most notably sturgeon. It is sold throughout the world 
as a delicacy. The name “caviar” comes from the Persian word “Khāg-āvar,” which means “the roe-generator.” In 
Persian this name means both the sturgeon and its product, the roe. Today, the best caviar comes from sturgeon 
fished from the Caspian Sea by Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia. The highest prices are paid for the Beluga, Osetra, and 
Sevruga varieties. The Russian word “malossol” on the label (“little salt”) indicates that it has been processed with a 
minimum amount of salt. Caviar contains typically 4–8 percent salt, and less in the best varieties 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caviar). 
Graph  4.4.1
World Catch of Sturgeon and Paddlefish, 1960-2002 
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Many years of river pollution and overfishing have caused the sturgeon to become an 
endangered species. Since 1997 this species has been protected and export quotas have been set 
in the framework of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). 
The main caviar producers in the world are four states bordering the Caspian Sea: Russia, Iran, 




Sturgeon are farmed mainly in Russia, Iran, the United States, France, Italy, and China, and there 
are at least 12 farms worldwide. Production is rising by substitution of farm-raised for fished 
sturgeon. 
Total world imports of caviar increased from 243 metric tons (MT), representing a value 
of some US$13.8 million in 1976, to 488 MT (US$80.95 million) in 2000 (FAO, no date). The 
main importing countries in 2000 were: 
•  United States, with 90 MT (US$22.1 million) 
•  France, with 36 MT (US$15.9 million) 
•  Germany, with 34 MT (US$15.7 million). 
Graph  4.4.2 
Export of Caviar by Main Countries, 1999-2002 
(US$ thousand) 
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There are differences between global production and import records, mostly due to non-reported 
fisheries. Some reports indicate non-reported captures to be about five times  those officially 
reported.  
In spite of large increases in imports, caviar demand exceeds supply and scarcity has 
caused prices to rise. Prices also differ according to the type and quality of species (Table 4.4.1). 
Today, the market has incorporated yet another parameter that takes into account whether the 
caviar comes from captured or farmed fish. 
 
 
Table  4.4.1 
Caviar Prices in 2004,  



















Hackleback S. platorynchus  11-38 




Salmon   2-14 
Whitefish   2-10 
Trout   4-16 
Bowfin   17 
Source: Pikich et al. (2005). 
 
 
Uruguay is rich in fresh water resources such as rivers and lagoons, many of which are 
used for agriculture. A non-polluted environment with a temperate climate also contributes to a 
favorable scenario for aquaculture. There have been several government resolutions to promote 
aquaculture as a productive activity and some public research has also been undertaken in this 
field. Nevertheless, this sector is not yet well known or attractive to local entrepreneurs.    155
Uruguayan agricultural firms are conservative in many ways. New kinds of businesses 
and innovations are not always welcome, and a long demonstration period is often required. 
Traditional activities are mostly of an extensive nature and involve low-skilled labor. In contrast, 
aquaculture is capital intensive and requires specific technologies and skills, and the return on 
investment is to be expected in the long run. 
In 1975, the National Fisheries Institute (INAPE) was created (law 14.484
78); it was later 
reformed as DINARA, a department of the Ministry of Cattle, Agriculture, and Fisheries 
(MGAP). Among other objectives, INAPE was expected to study and promote all forms of 
aquaculture. The law stated that fisheries should comply with health and quality regulations, both 
in products and processes. Aquaculture, including all kinds of related activities and species, was 
decreed to be “of national interest” in 1996, a condition that provides investment projects with a 
series of tax exemptions (see Investment Promotion, Section 2.4). Any firm with a commercial 
purpose must present a detailed project to DINARA for evaluation. 
DINARA owns two aquaculture facilities where it researches and breeds some species as 
a way to promote this activity:  
•  “Centro de Investigaciones Pesqueras y Piscicultura” in Villa Constitución in 
Salto  
•  “Estación de piscicultura de Laguna del Sauce” in Maldonado.  
 
The bred species, which are sold to private firms, include: Catfish (Rhamdia quelen), Carp 
(Cyprinus carpio and Ctenopharyngodon idella), Pejerrey (Odonthestes bonariensis), “Madrecita 
de agua” (Cnesterodon decenmaculatus), Yacare (Caiman latirostris), and Australian blue lobster 
(Cherax cuadricarinatus). 
The Veterinary School of the public university (UDELAR) also has a fishery research 
center (Instituto de Investigaciones Pesqueras, IIP) that hosts an aquaculture area. Breeding, 
reproduction, and farming processes of selected species are studied, as well as products and 
production methods. Some work on sturgeon reproduction and sturgeon meat industrialization 
has been done, the results of which were published after the first mover had started production. 
                                          
78 See http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/Leyes/Ley14484.htm.   156
4.4.2 First-Mover Black River Sturgeons 
Esturiones del Río Negro S.A. (trademark: Black River Sturgeons, BRS) began its activity in 
1992 on behalf of Mr. Walter Alcalde (1933–2003). At present, his four sons manage the 
company. The Alcalde family also owns another company, Marplatense S.A, which is located in 
the Port of Montevideo and has been operating for about 40 years. In addition to selling sea 
products, this company used to provide catering to the Russian fishing fleet and take care of their 
scientific boats while they were in Montevideo. One day, at the end of the 1980s, an officer of 
one of these boats told Mr. Alcalde that a satellite study undertaken by Russian scientists showed 
that Uruguay was the best location in the world outside Russia for sturgeon breeding. The 
relevant characteristics in support of this result were latitude, water temperatures, climate, and, 
mainly, water quality.  
Mr. Alcalde, motivated by this opportunity and the coincidence of several favorable 
factors, started to look for possible locations in the country as well as for Russian breeding 
technology. He found Baygorria, on the Rio Negro River, to be the best place in Uruguay to 
locate a sturgeon farm. He then hired Russian professional advisers and opted for breeding the 
Siberian Sturgeon (acipenser baerii). Experimentation started in 1990. 
The selected location gave the project an almost perfect environment for sturgeon 
breeding, with the following key elements: 
•  Water came from Baygorria’s Dam, with basaltic ground, free of all kinds of 
contamination and pollution. 
•  Water flowed with no energy requirement. Sturgeon need well oxygenated 
(flowing) water and a farm needs a significant water flow. If that flow were 
energy-consuming, costs would be too high. 
•  BRS’s water consumption was marginal compared with the river flow. 
 
In the words of Mr. Alcalde’s son: “After the fall of the Soviet Union, the KGB-controlled 
technology for producing caviar finally emerged from Russia in the early 1990s” 
(http://www.caviaruruguay.com.uy). This, together with the natural resource endowment and the 
initial satellite information, were the key factors that opened a window of opportunity for the 
discovery.    157
There were also some reinforcing elements, such as:  
•  The former Soviet Union countries offered by that time assets and materials at 
prices more affordable than ever. 
•  The availability of experienced technicians.    
 
BRS imported sturgeon farm equipment from Russia. The complete equipment for 
breeding sturgeon, from the egg to the adult phase, was bought from a former Russian 
aquaculture farm. The farm was finally set up in 1995 with the assistance of technicians from a 
Russian laboratory in Astrakhan. The Alcaldes learned almost all there was to know about 
sturgeon farming, including their dietary habits and how biopsies determine the best time to 
extract the roe. 
Commercial caviar production began in 2001, and exports have grown rapidly since then 
(Table 4.4.2). DINARA reported 12-month production of 180 kg of caviar in 2000-01, while in 
2002 production reached 1,200 kg for the whole year. 
 
Table 4.4.2 - Evolution of BRS Exports  
   2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005 
Caviar-roes US$ 0  6,000  154,892  117,038  516,489  907,133 
Meat US$  3,150  6,900  6,115  10,193  0  3,850 
Caviar-roes  Kg  0  13  343  236  999  1,621 
Meat  Kg  300  850  555  1,312  0  500 
Caviar-roes 
US$/
Kg  - 461.5  451.6  495.9  516.8  559.3 
Meat 
US$/
Kg  10.5 8.1  11.0  7.8  -  7.7 
Source: Processed data from Customs (DNA) – Uruguay. 
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Main Uncertainties Faced and Solved by BRS 
Despite these favorable conditions, the pioneer firm faced a number of problems and risks in 
project implementation. Uncertainty and experimentation costs were significant. BRS progressed 
step by step, finding a solution for each problem that emerged: 
 
•  The initial investment had to be undertaken without any prior sturgeon farming 
experience because all the farm equipment had to be properly installed before 
the arrival of the first eggs. 
•  Sturgeon females were expected to need 12 or 15 years to mature in terms of 
reproductive capacity to produce roe. This was a long waiting period, 
especially considering that it involved handling a breed that was completely 
new, not just to the Alcalde family but to all of the Southern hemisphere. 
Walter Alcalde decided to face that risk. Later, it turned out that female 
Siberian sturgeon in the Uruguayan environment were able to produce caviar 
at a younger age than their counterparts in the Caspian Sea. Five-years-old 
females now reach 8-10 kg, which means about a kilo of caviar.  
•  Equipment imported from Russia was not initially fully functional in the 
Uruguayan environment (due to weather conditions, local predators, etc.). An 
adaptation period (and investment) was required. 
•  There was no local provider of food of a guaranteed quality level for the 
sturgeon. To lower the risks associated with feeding requirements and 
specifications, BRS decided to build its own mill, located in Durazno, the 
closest medium-size city to the farm. Of course, this increased the complexity 
of the project, the capital needs, and thus the risk assumed. 
•  All alevins (i.e., young fishes) obtained from the first eggs imported died 
because of air micro-bubbles in the water. These bubbles caused the alevins to 
float, preventing them from feeding themselves. This problem needed to be 
properly understood and solved before new imports could be ordered. A 
solution was found from an inexpensive Canadian method.  
•  Sturgeon must be managed with care; stress can kill them. It is also necessary 
to classify them regularly by size to give slower-growing sturgeon the   159
opportunity to eat. This required a learning period, as well as motivated and 
trained people. 
•  Early sturgeon classification by sex is also very important. Males are only used 
for their meat, while females will produce caviar and meat as a by-product. 
Mature females will produce caviar that represents about 10 percent of their 
live weight.  
•  A critical problem was that sturgeon did not reproduce in Uruguay’s natural 
environment. Research was needed to find the hormonal supply, which finally 
succeeded. 
 
Finally, the sturgeon species was new to DINARA, and its introduction to the Uruguayan 
waters was seen as entailing a potential risk. The first step taken by DINARA when evaluating 
the project was to consult with other regional authorities. Initially the result was not favorable for 
BRS and the authorization was thus delayed. Finally, DINARA approved the importation of 
sturgeon eggs. Subsequent authorizations were time-consuming as well. For example, the request 
for industrial and commercial activities was submitted by BSR in August 2000 and was resolved 
by DINARA only in July 2002 (http:// www.presidencia.gub.uy/resoluciones/2002071904.htm). 
 
BRS’s Strategy 
Mr. Alcalde’s determination was strong, and he pursued an aggressive strategy (Graph 4.4.3). 
BRS, his dream, would not only be an experiment to reproduce a fish or produce any kind of 
caviar: it was created to produce top-level caviar in a high-quality, sustainable environment. And 
indeed, BRS proved to be a great success. Demanding caviar consumers and retailers consider 
Uruguayan caviar an excellent product. However, by the early 1990s, total investment—before  
any commercial result was obtained—had already climbed to some US$3 million. 




The pioneer had to make decisions and undertake a number of activities and procedures to 
develop a high-quality product. It was decided to harvest caviar by killing the fish (instead of by 
caesarian) to ensure top-quality roe, while selling the sturgeon meat as a by-product. To the same 
end, BRS does not store caviar but produces it according to demand. BRS’s production process 
standards have been approved by the U.S. government (HACCP), the European Union (PP-34), 
DIPOA in Brazil, SENASA in Argentina, and authorities from Chile, Japan, and other regions, 
including DINARA (C-34) in Uruguay. All BRS exports comply with the CITES control 
standards. 
BRS also defined an unusual marketing strategy in the Uruguayan context, because it was 
based on establishing a brand of its own. The product would be distributed by top-line caviar 
sellers. According to Alcalde’s son: “Getting the American market to accept caviar made in 
Uruguay took a while, but now it’s considered the world’s best farmed caviar.” A milestone was 
when the prestigious firm Petrossian was unable to distinguish BRS from the best Russian caviar 
in a blind taste test. 
The Internet is used extensively to promote and sell the Uruguayan caviar. There are 
several Web pages offering BRS caviar in the United States and Europe; most of them stress the 
quality and sustainability of BRS production (Graph 4.4.4). Prices are similar to the best farmed 
osetra caviar. 
 
Graph 4.4.3  
BRS project development 
 
     2006 new 10 Tons  project 
    2003  Management improves 
   2001  First caviar exports 
  1998-2000 International promotional campaign 
  1995  Creation of BRS and farm 
1990-1994  Feasibility study, extensive learning in  
       Russia and hiring of Russian experts   161
 
 
Graph 4.4.4 -  Selected Examples of BRS Commercial Offers on 
the Web 
 
This magnificent Caviar has a fresh nutty taste, 
medium roe size, and color ranging from light to 
dark brown.  Black River Sturgeon Farms produces 
this natural Osetra Caviar under strict 
environmental quality control.  Utilizing the 
expertise of famed Russian Caviar masters, Black 
River Sturgeon Farms yields an Osetra Malossol 
Caviar just right in fit, finish, and taste so find that 




Farmed Osetra Black River (Uruguay) 
This caviar is produced by farmed Siberian Osetra 
Baerii. This unique sturgeon farm (Esturiones Del 
Rio Negro) is tucked away in Uruguay in the 
middle of a perfect eco-system, about a two and a 
half hour drive from the capital of Montevideo. The 
excellent environment and strict control during 
production give this caviar unique freshness and 
unparalleled quality. The caviar is hand 
selected/graded for its medium to large grain size, 
dark to light brown color and fresh nutty flavor. 
This graded Caviar is the closest thing to Wild 
Caspian Osetra, a credit to this family-run farm that 
embodies pride and passion. 
http://www.plazadecaviar.com/farmed/index.html 
price: 1 oz. USD 70 
 
Baerii Caviar (Uruguay) or "Esturiones Del Rio 
Negro" is a Siberian sturgeon caviar that has been 
farmed in Uruguay, and is both beautiful and 
flavorful. This caviar is part of the Osetra caviar 
family, but is slightly smaller in size. Being farm 





price: 1 oz. USD 72,50 
 
 
BRS defined a growth strategy that required facing new investment and managerial needs. 
In 2003, the firm established a strategic alliance with a Swiss investor, Mr. Jacques Olle, who 
entered the business as a minority associate (20 percent). The management structure was also   162
reinforced with a professional and experienced general manager, who was entrusted with 
coordinating the functional/operational managers, Alcalde’s sons.  
At present, BRS is implementing a project to renew the breeding technology and 
significantly increase production capacity. Caviar production is expected to increase to about 
3,000 kg in 2007 and 7,000 kg in 2008, and to continue growing until it reaches 12,000 kg/year. 
The project will turn BRS into the world’s largest sturgeon farm. The pioneer firm does not 
anticipate that selling such large quantities of caviar in the future might be a problem, considering 
that demand is increasing. 
The enlargement project, with an estimated investment of US$600,000, was declared “of 
national interest” in 2006. It includes the building of 40 raceways
79 that are fed by water pipes 
from the dam lake with a siphon system. A new breed will also be incorporated: the Caspian 
sturgeon, which is larger than the Siberian sturgeon. 
BRS knows that some costs need to be reduced through improved performance in fields 
such as plant control, food-to-meat conversion rates, and energy utilization. An area to be 
developed is sturgeon meat processing, particularly the lines of smoked and packaged meat to 
reach demanding markets. Nowadays, BRS sells the meat mainly in the domestic market (30,000 
kilos/year), but smoking technologies are being tested in a joint project with the Veterinary 
School of the public University with a view to exporting.  
The company’s future includes both challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, BRS 
faces a growing demand with a unique product. Up to now, the company had the resources to 
successfully position itself in the global market. On the other hand, a growing number of farms 
are being established in different countries and will compete in the future with BRS.  
Has BRS built enough strength to face such competition? Its partners see the future with 
optimism. They consider that a next step in their growth strategy is technology franchising in the 
breeding stage, while caviar production technology, quality control, branding, and marketing will 
remain in their hands. 
                                          
79 Raceways are a series of tanks or ponds through which water flows continuously without being recycled. Most 
freshwater fish cultures employ some type of raceway.   163
 
4.4.3 Followers 
In view of the success of BRS in sturgeon farming and caviar commercialization, other firms are 
now becoming interested in this activity. Externalities from the first-mover experience include the 
spread of information on the favorable environmental conditions in Uruguay for aquaculture, and 
the existence of a proven technology. Particularly important is the Uruguayan origin now 
associated with a quality product. Followers will be able to take advantage of these public goods, 
but they also will have to take care of them. Part of the technology (caviar production in itself) 
stays outside the public dominion and this could delay the diffusion process. 
It is clear that a diffusion process has not yet occurred. In 2002, DINARA reported the 
existence of one single commercial aquaculture firm (BRS) that coexisted with other non-fully-
commercial experiences, including some research activities. But there are signals indicating that 
the demonstration effect of BRS will soon lead to imitation. 
There was one failed experiment in 2003, when another entrepreneur imported sturgeon in 
order to investigate the potential for breeding and reproducing the species in Uruguay’s climatic 
conditions. Located in Maldonado, he made an agreement with a researcher from the School of 
Sciences of UDELAR to experiment with sturgeon reproduction. They succeeded almost at the 
same time as BRS did, by using a similar hormonal methodology, but some coordination failures 
among parties led to the sturgeon’s death and put an end to the experiment. 
When looking at emerging projects, there are three cases of sturgeon farming. Two of 
them are waiting for DINARA’s approval. Apparently, their key issue is finding a location with 
flowing freshwater. As was mentioned, an optimal location will have pure flowing water 
provided by gravity force. The newly presented projects should be located in places that ensure 
such supply. 
One of these projects is meant to be even larger than BRS. The proposal comes from 
experienced Iranian entrepreneurs, who plan to breed sturgeon in Uruguay because of the climatic 
and water conditions. Their idea is to nurse a sturgeon variety with a longer maturity period 
(Beluga).
80 At least 10 years will be required before commercial caviar will be produced.  
                                          
80 There exist 27 sturgeon species in the world, many of them farmed in countries with longer breeding experience 
than Uruguay.   164
The other two projects are somehow related to BRS. One of them is promoted by an ex-
BRS employee. The other is backed by Swiss capital through a partner of BRS. The latter’s idea 
is to install a farm near BRS, use the BRS breeding technology, buy BRS supplies, and process 
caviar in BRS’s plant. The farm will obtain pure flowing water by pump. 
How do these diffusion expectations affect BRS? BRS is willing to collaborate and 
transfer technology to other entrepreneurs in Uruguay so as to preserve the quality associated 
with Uruguayan caviar. Alcalde’s idea is “to join forces in order to maintain a country image 
associated with quality.” However, BRS is not willing to transfer the caviar production know-
how. 
In the broader field of aquaculture, two species are soon to be commercially bred in the 
country:  
•  The Australian blue lobster (Cherax cuadricarinatus). There are two projects 
in an early stage of implementation. One of them is located in Montevideo and 
intends to breed this lobster in waters that are warmed with energy supplied by 
ceramic oven cooling. The other project, Acuicultura Punta Negra (APN) in 
Maldonado (Piriapolis), obtained a US$50,000 subsidy (50 percent of the 
project cost) from the Technology Development Program (PDT) to develop an 
intensive system to breed this tropical lobster in Uruguayan climatic 
conditions.
81 APN’s current production (1 metric ton/year) is being consumed 
in the restaurant of one of APN’s owners. But the objective is to increase 
production in order to commercialize lobsters. Exporting know-how is among 
their objectives: Brazil has been seeking their advice and there is demand for 
alevins and breeders in Latin America because no farm has been authorized yet 
in the region to export this fish.       
                                          
81 APN’s partners are a biologist who specializes in hydrobiology, and a gastronome who is the owner of a well 
known restaurant in Piriapolis. In 2000, they started looking for an aquaculture species with commercial potential in 
Uruguay and the region, as an alternative to emigrating from Uruguay in view of the unfavorable economic 
conditions. A friend told them about a TV documentary that showed a breeding farm of the Australian Blue Lobster 
somewhere in the region. It happened to be in Cordoba, Argentina. In the next two years, they studied the local 
conditions, identified a location for a pilot project, got through the legal procedures, and built the first facilities. At 
the end of 2002, the first breeders were imported from Miami and experimentation began with different farming 
methods. This entailed the adaptation and building of the required equipment because there are no suppliers of 
aquaculture equipment in Uruguay, and importing it is costly. APN’s facilities include: 24 outdoor ponds for 
breeding lobsters; 300 m
2 of hothouse with sinks for lobster reproduction; a water quality analysis lab; and a small 
mill for producing food. See MEC/DICYT/PDT (2006).    165
•  Tilapia, a tropical species that is bred for its meat. Industrias Serranas is 
investigating the viability of producing this low-cost, hardy and productive 
species. Alevins are imported from Brazil. The reproduction of Tilapia will 
soon begin as a first stage toward commercial breeding.  
 
Perspectives for diffusion were adequately summarized by APN’s biologist:  
“Non-polluted waters are abundant, as well as soils that are not suited for 
agriculture but adequate for aquaculture. However, the country lacks the necessary 
technological knowledge to take advantage of these conditions. Aquaculture is an 
incipient activity in Uruguay and the extent of its economic potential has not been 
seen yet. There are no advanced academic activities in this field. As a 
consequence, the local state of the art is precarious.” 
 
4.4.4 Public Response 
The caviar discovery was essentially a private undertaking. However, the pioneer benefited from 
the general investment promotion law that provides some tax benefits for projects considered of 
national interest. Although most sound projects can request that status in Uruguay, it is probably 
easier when the sector as a whole has been declared of national interest, as in the case of 
aquaculture. 
The public response to the BRS project, if not exactly pro-active, was at least “enabling.” 
Indeed, implementation of the project depended critically on DINARA’s approval, and use of the 
Baygorria Dam water supply required authorization from the state-owned energy enterprise 
(UTE, the owner of the dam). The government acknowledged the importance of BRS’s 
undertaking for the country by having the Vice President inaugurate the plant. 
Professional advice from DINARA was also useful in the project’s early days. DINARA 
is responsible for most of the research on the new species to be introduced and it is now 
evaluating the growth pattern of Tilapia in a natural thermal water environment in the North of 
the country (Salto). DINARA is thus expected to be a relevant actor in the diffusion process. 
However, it is a fact that DINARA had been promoting aquaculture production for a long time 
and it was only after the success of BRS that new commercial projects have been presented to this 
government agency.     166
IIP, the research center of the Veterinary School, has carried out some applied research 
directly related to the caviar discovery, specifically concerning the process of smoked sturgeon 
meat. This should enhance BRS’s capacity to introduce this high-valued, gourmet product in 
export markets. Meanwhile, the School of Sciences has been involved in biological issues, 
namely sturgeon reproduction in Uruguayan conditions. This shows some research capacities in 
this field, even if BRS finally solved this uncertainty on its own.  
Finally, the environmental authorities are in charge of protecting the quality of Uruguayan 
waters. All projects with a potential environmental impact must be evaluated and eventually 
approved by national and local authorities. At the national level, the Environmental Department 
(DINAMA) of the Ministry of Housing, Public Works, and Environment (MVOPT) is the one in 
charge. This is essential at the country level, but also specifically to protect BRS’s undertaking 
because a pulp mill project has been proposed for the shore of the Black River; in this case, the 
location will be downriver from BRS’s farm with no impact on it. 
 
4.4.5 Comparator Case in Aquaculture: The Frog Experience 
Frog legs, considered a delicacy, are consumed mainly in France, Canada and the United States.  
By the end of the 1980s, environmental restrictions caused wild frog capture to decrease, 
especially in Southern Asia, the traditional capture zone. Prices thus increased and farming was 
seen as a business opportunity. Commercial farming of the bullfrog species
82 was undertaken in 
Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Ecuador, Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia, while experimental farms were set up in the United States, Cuba, and 
Puerto Rico.
83  
In Brazil, bullfrog farming gained popularity in the mid-1970s, when many small ventures 
emerged. Academic groups became involved in research in the late 1980s and developed a range 
of alternatives for breeding facilities and techniques.
84 These techniques were also applied in 
small ventures in Argentina in the 1980s, but without giving due consideration to the need to 
                                          
82 This is the species bred in Uruguay (rana catesbeiana). 
83 This introduction is partly based on the FAO Web site (http://www.fao.org/fi/website/FIRetrieveAction.do?dom= 
culturespecies&xml=Rana_catesbeiana.xml#tcN110076). 
84 Feeding was one of the main difficulties to be tackled in breeding farms because frogs instinctively hunt insects 
and do not feed from immovable objects, which becomes a problem when commercial volumes of production are 
considered. The use of flooded places with floating food supplies has now been acknowledged as the best breeding 
system: floating pellets move, so frogs are attracted to eat them. Supplies must have a 33 percent protein content and 
their origin and quality must be strictly controlled.   167
adapt them to the temperate climate of the Buenos Aires province where most of the farms were 
installed. There was no specialized agency to support these new investors, and technical advisors 
were not specifically educated in frog farming. By the mid-1990s, many of these small farms had 
disappeared. In 2005, there were six large-scale producers, with production systems that had been 
adapted to the specific climatic conditions through water heating equipment and air conditioning 
facilities. 
In Mexico between 1991 and 2001, a research center (CINVESTAV) carried out a 
comprehensive applied research program for frog cultivation, which resulted in significant 
advances in reproductive physiology, nutrition, pathology, and ecophysiology. This led to the 
development of an inundated-type culture system that is currently in commercial use in a number 
of regions in Mexico and Central America. 
Meanwhile, a strong frog industry developed in Asia: Indonesia and Taiwan (China) are 
the largest suppliers in the world (both in capture and aquaculture).
85 Brazil (200 metric tons/year) 
and Mexico are also among the main producers. Production in Argentina amounted to 50 metric 
tons in 2000, while in Uruguay it was only two metric tons. The international market is about 
10,000 metric tons/year. 
In Uruguay, frog breeding started in 1986, when INAPE (later DINARA) initiated studies 
to establish the viability of such breeding in the country. A specific project, jointly undertaken 
with the IIP of the Veterinary School (UDELAR), showed that frog breeding in template climate 
regions was technically feasible (Mazzoni & Carnevia, 1989).  
 
First Mover 
On the basis of the results obtained from the above-mentioned project, in the late 1980s a local 
entrepreneur decided to breed frogs and process the meat. He believed he could take advantage of 
exclusive technology and knowledge to grant franchises to frog breeders while he himself would 
concentrate on the industrialization and commercialization part of the business. Franchisees 
would be frog meat suppliers (with reduced bargaining power).  
A farm was installed in the Northeast of Montevideo (Manga), where small amounts of 
frog meat (2,000 kg/year) were produced and sold in the domestic market and, to some extent, to 
                                          
85 In 2002, 15 percent of the global frog market was supplied by aquaculture as compared with 3 percent in 1980, 
although market statistics are reportedly scarce and unreliable.   168
Argentina. The producer owned two or three freezers in supermarkets and, at this low-scale 
production level, he was rather successful. However, he lacked the financial resources to develop 
his whole plan.  The story eventually ended when contaminated supplies killed all the frogs. The 
pioneer sued the supplier for the damage and decided to retire from this business. 
Similar to the sturgeon case, this pioneer had been running another firm, which gave him 
business experience and some financial means. But in this case, the pioneer did not solve the 
main uncertainties related to frog breeding and meat processing, namely: 
 
•  The non-existence of off-the-shelf technology 
•  The unavailability of specific inputs  
•  No frog slaughterhouse was set up yet 
•  There were no tanning capacities to process frog skins as by-products 
•  The production scale was very limited 
•  The pioneer could not franchise the breeding technology because followers 
could not catch up with the first mover. 
 
Perhaps it was too early to develop the frog industry in the specific climatic conditions of 
Uruguay, at least without the support of technological research focusing on adapting existing 
technology to the domestic conditions. Perhaps the pioneer not only lacked capital, but also 
lacked a strategy to face and solve uncertainties. But it is a fact that the caviar pioneer faced at 
least the same number and type of difficulties, which he succeeded in solving, step by step. He 
could count on substantial family capital but when he “ran out of it,” he looked for, and found, a 
foreign partner.  
 
Analysis of the Followers 
 
In spite of the meager results of the first mover, a diffusion process developed during the 1990s.  
Twenty-three frog farms were authorized by DINARA, and two slaughterhouses were built, one 
of them with the required authorization to export products. While exports from that firm to 
Argentina began in 1997,
86 most of Uruguay’s frog failed during the 1999-2003 period. The 
                                          
86 Argentina had a similar price level as Uruguay in 2001, although the Argentine crisis of 2002 surely changed these 
conditions.   169
followers were similar to the first mover: small-scale firms using the same technology and 
targeting the domestic/regional market.  
A first problem was climate. Bred frogs ideally grow at constant 25º to 28º temperature. 
Uruguayan natural conditions, with relatively cold winters, are quite different. More recent farms 
solved that problem by incorporating heating equipment. 
Other problems faced by the first frog producers were pinpointed by DINARA in the Frog 
Farming Investment Guide it published in 2001. In the first place, it was stated that frog breeding 
was still a new activity with no common knowledge yet of the production system: 
“Though accumulated experience from the last ten years has generated abundant 
knowledge and proven results have been achieved at large scale and in different 
productive situations, the available technology has been little spread and only a 
very limited number of professionals know it and are able to apply it [in the 
country]. These difficulties are worsened due to the lack of local support services, 
adapted to the needs of an industrial breeding activity that implies the handling of 
aquatic organisms.” 
 
 Specific problems included the following:  
•  Lack of capital to install farms of a viable production capacity. Most farms 
started with the minimum investment needed to acquire some experience in 
frog handling. After this initial phase, they had no capital to grow. And small 
size implies an improper balance between fixed costs and incomes.   
•  Lack of initial investment in a quality water supply and heating system, and 
underestimation of the annual operating costs. 
•  Underestimation of the technology and know-how needed. Frog breeding 
includes two very different cycles (tadpoles and frogs), each with its own 
complexities and risks.  
•  Lack of qualified human resources and underestimation of the man-hours 
needed. Firms also frequently recruited people with little motivation and 
without training. 
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In short, frog breeding was often considered as a handicraft business when, in fact, its 
specificities and requirements restrict success to undertakings based on relatively high 
investment
87 (and production scale), demanding technology and in-depth knowledge of the 
business.  
In addition, the currency depreciation in Brazil in 1999 reduced production costs in 
dollars to one-third in that country, diminishing dramatically the competitiveness of the 
Uruguayan product. So, in 2001, while production costs in Uruguay were estimated at about 
US$9/kg for frog carcass with a selling price of about 14 US$14/kg, the Brazilian price was only 
US$5/kg.  
At the same time, increased production in Asia caused international prices of frog legs to 
fall from US$10-12/kg to $5-6/kg. The Asian product also reached a high quality level, making it 
even more difficult for Uruguayan exports to compete. International demand existed but with 
certain conditions: supply must be of an excellent quality, including good packaging, sanitary 
compliance, certification, cold chain handling, and supply continuity. These were difficult 
barriers to entry to overcome for small enterprises. 
Nowadays there are only six or seven frog farms in Uruguay. They produced 4 metric tons 
of bullfrog in 2003 and 2 metric tons in 2004, according to FAO records. In spite of this low 
production level and the remaining barriers to entry in foreign markets, DINARA reported a 
somewhat improved or healthier situation than in the early 2000s: 
“… as time passed and experience built up, frog farms installed at the end of the 
1990s have been luckier than the previous ones. Several animal food importers 
have registered requests for frog food and there is one food producing plant in the 
Department of Durazno that could eventually process food for frogs. From the 
technological point of view, the updating of breeding systems that were developed 
at the pilot level, as well as the production experience acquired in the first decade 
of frog breeding in the country, have been helpful for those that recently integrated 
this activity. Frog breeders also achieved a reasonable level of coordination and 
                                          
87 In Mexico, where frog breeding developed successfully, fixed investment costs for a 36 MT/year bullfrog farm 
have been estimated at US$130,000 (land: US$20,000; infrastructure: US$90,000; equipment: US$16,000; and initial 
brood stock US$4,000); and annual operating costs, at US$67,500 (41 percent food, 31 percent labor).    171
cooperation, both in the productive and commercial areas, which represents a very 




The public sector played a relevant role in promoting this activity. DINARA and the Veterinary 
School have researched breeding system requirements and other issues. In spite of this, frog 
production has not yet demonstrated economic viability. 
 
4.4.6 Conclusions 
The first mover in caviar production and export found an attractive opportunity by obtaining 
information about the ideal conditions in Uruguay for breeding sturgeon. Walter Alcalde worked 
many years and invested heavily in developing a sturgeon and caviar business. Risks were 
assumed and a flexible and creative attitude was adopted to solve problems. Walter Alcalde’s 
background and entrepreneurship were critical in starting up the firm. 
Professional management, including strategic planning, was acknowledged as a priority to 
sustain growth and develop marketing. The first mover developed a growth strategy and built up 
an image for BRS. It uses SWOT analysis
88 and has an “image of the future” guiding it. Walter 
Alcalde, the firm’s founder, was a leader with managerial skills developed on the basis of his 
previous experience. People working in BRS are motivated and dedicated. 
BRS bought the best available technology and services. But it also had to adapt and 
develop specific procedures to breed sturgeon in Uruguay’s climate conditions.  BRS selected an 
optimal location. The state played an important role conceding land and use of the Baygorria 
Dam’s water. 
BRS is a company with family equity; but when it needed additional funding to grow at a 
pace to match its strategy, it did not hesitate to build up a strategic alliance. BRS is successful in 
exporting, but its financial surplus is not yet clear when comparing export incomes and 
accumulated investment during 16 years. Although the firm’s investment needs were not 
insurmountable, they were a severe and critical condition for the pioneer’s undertaking to be 
successful. The alliance with a foreign partner was therefore very important, providing both 
financial resources and market experience. 
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Caviar is a much differentiated product with strong marketing requirements. BRS owns its 
brand and has pursued an independent marketing strategy, with quality and origin as 
differentiation features. It probably would have been easier for BRS “to make the first move” 
through distributor brands, but its future would then not look so promising. BRS succeeded in 
penetrating the U.S. caviar market, one of the largest and most important in the world, and 
Uruguayan osetra is now well recognized. 
BRS demonstrated that sturgeon can be bred in Uruguay with notable commercial 
success. The resolution of a great number of uncertainties paved the way for diffusion, which was 
expected to materialize in 2007. Of the three other sturgeon projects, one is directly associated 
with BRS and will benefit from its experience and solutions, buying specific inputs from the 
pioneer. However, it will take about six years or more for these new caviar projects to reach the 
market, due to the long breeding cycle of sturgeon. Other aquaculture species (Australian Blue 
Lobster and Tilapia) recently started to be bred in the country, but neither has reached the 
commercial stage yet. 
The main triggers for the caviar discovery were Uruguay’s climate and water quality. 
World caviar demand is in short supply because the capture of sturgeon was regulated. This 
provided the commercial opportunity for the discovery. The main hurdle derived from the long 
cycle before the market could be reached. In other aquaculture projects, the risk was in 
introducing foreign species, due to the need to research better breeding conditions and protect the 
natural environment from invasion. At this stage of the diffusion process, vertically integrated 
projects with know-how of their own are required.  
The state did not play a pro-active role, but neither did it become an obstacle to the 
discovery. DINARA and the Veterinary School contributed with technical assistance and specific 
research. 
Frog and caviar farming in Uruguay presented or faced a number of similar conditions: a 
new activity at the country level; a gourmet food; global market scarcity largely due to 
environmental restrictions; some technological research and other public goods (water supply, 
specialized government agency, and some research); and some investment incentives. But when 
at the end of the 1980s a window of opportunity opened for exporting frog meat to the global 
market, local producers failed to make the most of it. Among the reasons for this failure are the 
following:    173
•  Lack of resources, at least for a first mover facing many uncertainties. 
•  Poor management and labor skills. 
•  Insufficient technological research to adapt existing technologies. 
•  Prevalent high costs, probably due to low productivity and small-scale 
production, which redounded in high market prices. Production should have 
been allocated in zones with more favorable climatic conditions. 
•  A marketing strategy that made frog farms dependant on domestic and regional 
markets. The severe contraction of the domestic and Argentine markets in the 
1999-2003 crises, and the pronounced decline of Brazilian frog meat prices 
after the 1999 devaluation showed the limits of this strategy.  
•  No brands were established, no associated services, and no differentiation. 
•  International trends did not validate the perception of long-term scarcity. 
Asia’s response almost closed the opportunity window, at least on the 
dimension it was expected to have. 
 
The comparator case shows that enterprises must have minimum capacities related to production 
and technology, firm organization, and marketing in order to be able to take advantage of 
emerging opportunities for self-discovery. 
Finally, the following table summarizes the market failures, public goods, and incentives 




Public Goods, Market Failures and Incentives in the Caviar Discovery 
Market failures  Public goods 
Externalities Coordination 
failures 
Public and Private Instruments 




-DINARA (and DINAMA) 
regulations 
-Some research capacity in 
aquaculture and industrial 
processing (DINARA and 





-Demonstration effect  
-Limited linkage with 
other sectors 





-Aquaculture sector status of "National 
interest," 1996 
- Environmental regulations, 1990 
-Public-private partnership for 
research, 2004-2006 
-Public concession of land and water 
use, 1994 
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4.5 Biotechnology Applied to Animal Health: The Vaccines Case 
 
One of the most significant drivers of value in the vaccine market has been the development and 
commercialization of biotechnology advances applied to animal health, particularly, to vaccines. 
This has been critical in the development of new animal vaccines and in the improvement of 
current ones, and it still holds great potential (Wesley, 2005).
89  
In the present decade, sales of veterinary vaccines have grown at a higher rate than that of the 
whole market of animal health products. In 2004, sales of veterinary vaccines represented 20 
percent (US$3.2 billion) of the sector’s revenue. The largest national markets are the United 
States (US$935 million), Japan (US$236 million), France (US$220 million), and Brazil (US$221 
million). The Brazilian vaccine market is dominated by foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) products, 
which account for 40 percent (Wesley, 2005).  
International trade of animal vaccines amounted to US$1.26 million in 2004 and has risen 
by 13 percent per year since 2000. The largest importers are Europe (54 percent) and Asia (15 
percent). NAFTA countries (7 percent) and Latin America (6 percent) are next, while Africa (2 
percent) is far behind. Exporters are concentrated in developed countries: Europe accounts for 73 
percent of global sales and the United States, 19 percent (International Trade Center (ITC) of 
UNCTAD/WTO).  
Sales are also highly concentrated at the firm level: six companies account for more than 
70 percent of the market. The leader is Intervet, with sales of almost US$600 million in 2004. 
Trends in ownership of the global veterinary vaccine market indicate a rapid consolidation of 
manufacturers over the past 10 years. That trend has been driven partly by corporate restructuring 
                                          
89 “Vaccines developed using traditional approaches have had a major impact on the control of foot-and-mouth 
disease, rinderpest, and other epidemia viral diseases that affect livestock. But there are many other important 
diseases, notably parasitic diseases, for which attempts to develop vaccines have been unsuccessful. Rapid advances 
in biotechnology and immunology over the past two decades have created new opportunities to develop vaccines for 
parasitic diseases. Initial optimism in the early 1980s that vaccine products would quickly emerge from applications 
of recombinant DNA technology has not been fully realized. Subsequent experience has demonstrated that, unlike 
traditional approaches to vaccine development, effective exploitation of recombinant DNA technology requires 
knowledge of the target pathogens and the immune responses they induce, and an understanding of how immune 
responses can be manipulated. Since the early 1980s, a series of fundamental discoveries in immunology have led to 
a detailed understanding of how the immune system processes and recognizes pathogenic organisms, and the 
different ways that immune responses control infections. These advances, coupled with further developments in the 
application of DNA technology, now provide a strong conceptual framework for the rational development of new 
vaccines.” (Morrison, 1999)   175
and, significantly, by the rising costs associated with the development and commercialization of 
new immunological technologies (Wesley, 2005). 
Bright global prospects have been forecasted for the second half of the current decade, 
with sales growing at a compound annual rate of 4.8 percent between 2004 and 2009, when they 
are expected to exceed US$4 billion. A double-digit growth rate is anticipated for Brazil, the 
strongest rate among the seven major markets, while in Germany, for example, sales are expected 
to rise only by 1 percent (Wesley, 2005).  
It is in the context of this dynamic global market for animal vaccines that a new successful 
activity emerged in Uruguay: the export of bacterial vaccines. The determinants of this discovery 
will be analyzed in what follows. We will first describe the evolution of exports and justify why 
we consider them a discovery (4.5.1); second, we will focus on the unsettled issue of who has 
been the pioneer and which uncertainties had to be solved in order to initiate exports (4.5.2.); we 
will then focus on the preconditions for this discovery and the public goods used (4.5.3), as well 
as the barriers to enter global markets (4.5.4). Finally, we will examine the coordination failures 
not yet overcome and the extent to which these might explain the absence of a diffusion process 
(4.5.5). A comparator in the form of “new biotechnological firms” will further allow checking the 
consistency of some of our discovery findings (4.5.6). And last, conclusions will be drawn 
(4.5.7). 
 
4.5.1 A Uruguayan Export Discovery: Bacterial Vaccines  
Uruguay’s specific needs in animal health, namely against foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), have 
been an incentive to produce vaccines as early as the 1950s. The accumulation of local scientific 
and technical capacities in animal health and the presence in Uruguay of two of the largest 
multinationals in this field generated the conditions under which this demand for vaccines could 
be met. Although some limited exports took place in the 1970s and 1980s,
90 as long as domestic 
demand existed for FMD vaccines, there were no real incentives to export. Indeed, in a country 
with 10 million heads of cattle to be vaccinated regularly, FMD represented a huge and safe 
market, providing very high returns on capital. It is probably one of the few cases in which the 
Uruguayan domestic market was not limited in size. Furthermore, the absence of exports can be 
                                          
90 Some exports of FMD vaccines musts have taken place in the 1970s because Chile used, for its eradication 
campaign, “an aqueous vaccine of guaranteed quality, mainly produced in Uruguay” (Sutmoller et al., 2003).     176
related to the multinational strategies at the time—a subsidiary for each domestic market—and  to 
the untimeliness of an export-oriented investment of a local company as will be further explained. 
In 1996 Uruguay was declared “free of FMD without vaccination” by the International 
Organization for Animal Health, a very important label in the global meat markets. In order to 
obtain this status, the government had decided two years earlier to discontinue vaccination. 
Simultaneously, handling the disease’s live virus was prohibited for security reasons,
91 which 
meant the end of FMD vaccine production in the country. 
These events contributed to a turning point in the mid-1990s in the shaping of the present 
Uruguayan vaccine sector, as can be observed from the evolution of exports in Graph 4.5.1. On 
the one hand, multinationals lost interest in Uruguay with the disappearance of the domestic FMD 
market. However, the closing down of multinational subsidiaries in the country was not an 
isolated fact in the vaccine sector. It was rather in line with the strategy applied by the 
pharmaceutical multinationals in a period in which MERCOSUR had changed some of the rules 
of the game:  
“Around the end of the 1980s and the mid-1990s, the macroeconomic situation 
brought about a change in the multinational companies’ strategy. The increasing 
openness of the markets and the need to undertake technology investments, in 
addition to the limited size of the national market, led to the relocation of 
production plants at the regional level. Transnational firms closed down their 
plants in the local market and limited their operations in the country to selling 
products that were imported from neighboring markets (Argentina and Brazil).” 
(Bértola et al., 2004, p. A-20) 
 
                                          
91 The decision followed an international technical assessment of the existing bio-safe conditions in the country for 
handling the FMD virus.          177
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On the other hand, projects to produce other animal vaccines took shape and led to an 
“export discovery.” Between 1995 and 2006, exports grew at a cumulative annual rate of 9 
percent, reaching US$5.5 million, mainly including bacterial vaccines (Graph 4.5.1). These 
booming exports show how the country took advantage of technological, productive, and 
commercial capacities to respond to a negative demand shock (caused by the suspension of FMD 
vaccination) by seizing opportunities in a related field, although with different technological 
features and markets. 
Market opportunities in different developing regions—Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and 
Latin America and the Caribbean—were an essential export trigger. These opportunities were 
strongly related to the lower price of Uruguayan vaccines in comparison with more-developed-
country vaccines. Considering that regulations (norms, product trials) in the importing countries 
supposedly guarantee the effectiveness of the product, lower production costs mean a substantial 
advantage for Uruguayan producers, at least when exporting to those countries that cannot afford 
the prices fixed by multinationals.  
Only three firms located in Uruguay have produced and exported bacterial vaccines in the 
past ten years: a branch of a multinational firm and two local companies (Graph 4.5.2). One of 
them is Laboratorios Santa Elena. It was created in 1957 by a small group of researchers of the 
Veterinary School of the public university, to produce animal health products, including vaccines. 
In spite of poor managerial skills, this family enterprise quickly found its way in a market with   178
little competition at the time. Its clients were veterinarians, cattle breeders, and traders from the 
countryside.
92 Although primarily focused on the domestic market, the firm developed its first 
export project in the mid-1980s. But it is from 1995 to the present that exports intensified. 
Bacterial vaccines, namely against anthrax and clostridia diseases, and viral vaccines (against 
rabies and eye diseases among illnesses) were exported to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Bacterial vaccines now account for the main share of Santa Elena’s vaccines exports, which 
reached US$720,000 in 2006. Since 2004, small amounts of them are sold to Middle Eastern 
markets. Santa Elena recently invested US$2 million to recycle an earlier “FMD laboratory” with 
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The other local firm is Prondil. It was created in 1992 by a group of former employers of 
the local subsidiary of the world leader in animal health multinationals, Coopers, which withdrew 
from the Uruguayan market in 1991. Prondil’s capital is entirely national and totally independent 
of the multinational. The firm immediately targeted the global market, knowing that the national 
market could not on its own justify production. FMD vaccine production, the previous bulk of 
Coopers’ production, was no longer an alternative. Initially, Prondil built on earlier marginal 
                                          
92 Santa Elena’s history is related in Snoeck, Sutz, and Vigorito (1991). 
93 The firm’s annual turnover exceeds US$3 million (US$3.4 million in 2002) and biological products now represent 
about 60 percent of it.   179
businesses of Coopers in South Africa and maintained some commercial relations with Coopers’ 
head office. But the firm quickly developed new products so as to generate an independent 
business. A strategic decision was made to specialize in two lines of bacterial vaccines (clostridia 
and anthrax vaccines) on which it would focus its technological and commercial efforts. Total 
vaccine exports reached US$2.2 million in 2006 and represent around 85-90 percent of Prondil’s 
sales. Destinations include the Latin American and Caribbean region as well as African markets 
(82 and 68 percent of total exports in 2003 and 2005, respectively
94).  There are, as well, 
additional prospects for development of export markets.  
The third producer is Merial-Uruguay (formerly Interifa).
95 Atypically, this multinational 
subsidiary survived the wave of closures of most of the regional branches of multinationals in the 
1990s. In 2006, its vaccine exports amounted to US$2.8 million, about 50 percent of the firm’s 
turnover. Export destination often responds to inter-company agreements. Latin America (mainly 
Brazil) is the main market, but Africa has also been targeted. Merial-Uruguay has been exporting 
for several years to Botswana and is now ready to enter the North African market and some Asian 
countries. The increasing external demand for the firm’s vaccines led to a recent US$2 million 
investment to expand production capacity (up to 50 million hexavalent doses per year). The 
export share in the firm’s turnover is expected to increase from 50 to 60 percent in the near 
future. 
These domestic perspectives of increasing exports seem to line up with the global 
situation of the vaccine sector. The literature points out that, in the future, many vaccines are 
likely to be produced in developing countries, or at least will be region-specific, which will in 
turn impact decisions on capacity and market size. The vaccine industry is changing, moving 
from consolidated global manufacturers to a new breed of developing country manufacturers that 
reach high standards of excellence (Milstein and Candries, 2001). 
                                          
94 Although the firm exports to six African countries (South Africa, Morocco, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and 
Rwanda), its main market is South Africa. The latter represented 54 percent of total exports in 2003-05, and Prondil 
has a majority market share in this country for the type of vaccines it produces. 
95 Merial-Uruguay, created in 1962, is a subsidiary of the French animal health multinational of the same name.  In 
the early 1960s, attracted by the potential FMD vaccine market in this cattle raising part of the world, the 
multinational Rhône Merieux (later Merial) decided to be present in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. From the 11 
FMD vaccine producers in the country in the 1960s, only four survived in the 1970s and 1980s, all subsidiaries of 
foreign companies. Merial was one of them.   180
Summing up, the new bacterial vaccine exports of Uruguay are a “discovery” because 
they represent a successful export activity that recently emerged and experienced strong growth, 
going from basically zero to becoming significant for the country, considering that figures are 
observed at the 6-digit classification. The key reason for targeting these exports arose from the 
need and low opportunity cost to replace FMD vaccines when local production of these vaccines 
was prohibited. The choice of this new export activity was made easier by the prior technological, 
productive, and commercial knowledge about animal vaccines accumulated by the former FMD 
vaccine manufacturers. Uncertainties concerning local production costs were thus considerably 
reduced and, as we will see in the next section, this heritage played an important role in the 
success of the new activity; however, it did not spare firms from facing other ex-ante 
uncertainties regarding the profitability of exporting bacterial vaccines.  
In more general terms, what the country discovered was the capacity to continue 
exploiting a comparative advantage indirectly related to the important livestock of the country. 
Indeed, comparative advantage in FMD vaccine production was closely linked to Uruguay’s 
competitive meat production, and bacterial vaccine production internalized the benefits from the 
learning trajectory of the former.          
 
4.5.2 The Pioneer Issue and Uncertainties to Be Solved 
 
According to Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), the discovery process for new export activities 
requires a “…pioneer investor who signals to other investors the profitability of these new 
activities.” The present case is not a typical discovery of that kind because there was not a single 
firm that discovered the underlying cost structure of the new activity. Instead, three firms 
discovered simultaneously the profitability of producing bacterial vaccines for export. Indeed, the 
vaccine exports of Merial, Santa Elena, and Prondil started at the same time, i.e., in 1996 (see 
Graph 4.5.2), and the products belonged to the same production line, namely, bacterial vaccines. 
However, the destination markets were different: the first two exported mainly to countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and the latter additionally to South Africa.   
In this case, the pioneers were not savvy investors looking for broad opportunities but 
rather prudential discoverers looking to exploit close and accessible opportunities. Discovery thus 
entailed low-cost activities, as firms jumped from one product to another with no need for a 
knowledge breakthrough at the firm level. However, even if bacterial vaccines were not new   181
developments, their production and export involved a degree of uncertainty. What uncertainties 
were resolved in the discovery process? Did each firm accomplish the discovery separately? Or 
was it the result of synergy and collaboration between firms? To answer these questions, it is 
necessary to inquire into the individual responses to the negative demand shock associated with 
FMD eradication.  
Until 1995, Merial-Uruguay focused on the domestic market, but things changed 
drastically with the prohibition on producing FMD vaccines in the country: 
“When production had to be stopped, we experienced the same as any company 
that would lose its ‘battle horse’: production had to be completely restructured 
since we had no product, neither biological nor chemical, with the same weight as 
the FMD vaccine. At that critical moment, we laid a wager on our professional 
background in biology and bacteriology. We had some experience in the 
production of bacterial vaccines, but it was still of a craft industry type. So we 
asked for financial and technological resources from Merial’s headquarters to shift 
to the industrial production of bacterial vaccines. Quality was the factor that 
helped us gain the confidence of headquarters. The (quality) control system we use 
led us to become important not only in Uruguay, but also in the regional market. 
Merial closed its biological production plants in Argentina and Chile and only kept 
the Brazilian and Uruguayan plants, the latter one to produce for the whole 
region.” (Interview with Merial-Uruguay’s manager, July 25, 2006) 
 
Bacterial vaccine production was not totally new to the firm at that critical moment. A former 
manager of Merial-Uruguay, now retired,
96 stressed the knowledge accumulated by the firm in 
that field since the 1980s:  
“In the mid-1980s, we sent a vet of the firm (the present manager) to study biology 
in France. After his master’s degree in biology in Lyon and in the Pasteur Institute, 
I told him that we had to deepen our knowledge about bacterial vaccines. So he 
prolonged his stay in Pasteur and then spent some time in Merial’s laboratory in 
                                          
96 A veterinarian with a profound vocation for biology, who studied in the 1950s in the laboratories of the precursors 
in FMD vaccines, like Frenkel in Holland and Merieux in France, and in 1962 founded Interifa (a Merial subsidiary) 
in Uruguay. He developed FMD vaccines according to the French tradition.    182
Toulouse where he acquired know-how on anaerobic vaccine production. We 
thought these vaccines were commercially profitable because they attended many 
disseminated diseases and were very difficult to produce.” (Interview, September 
20, 2006) 
 
This was particularly relevant considering that the risk involved in biological production 
entails a long process of knowledge build-up: 
 
“Biological training is a much more complicated issue than chemical or 
pharmaceutical training. Several years of specialized training after the basic 
university education are required before one can claim to be biologically trained. 
This is because of the high uncertainty associated with working with living 
beings.” (Interview with Merial-Uruguay’s present manager, September 20, 2006) 
 
Four main elements guided Merial’s parent company in the decision to restructure the 
local firm toward the production of bacterial vaccines (mainly against anthrax diseases): regional 
commercial opportunities for anthrax vaccines; the good quality level of the Uruguayan local 
anthrax vaccine compared with the Argentine and Brazilian ones; the adequate conditions offered 
by the Uruguayan subsidiary to upgrade technical and productive procedures so as to replicate the 
French anthrax vaccine; and the thrust established between the parent company and its 
Uruguayan subsidiary, based on long-term relationships, technical exchanges, cultural affinities, 
etc.  
In short, signals on bacterial vaccine profitability were provided by the parent company as 
well as the physical and financial resources needed to restructure Merial-Uruguay. But also 
important was the accumulated local knowledge that allowed the quick implementation of the 
new line of production once FMD vaccine production ceased. 
In the case of Prondil, its director clearly referred to Coopers’ legacy when asked about 
the initial strengths of the firm:  
“In the first place, Prondil has a solid educational base, which derives from 
integrating professionals who had worked with Coopers, a highly renowned 
leading enterprise in animal vaccines. The British were pioneers in this field and 
Prondil succeeded in capitalizing on Coopers’ legacy through its founders who   183
had been working for a long time with the multinational. In addition to the human 
resources strength, the inherited technology also was important in the first stage. 
Although some of Coopers’ technology still remains in the laboratory, Prondil has 
gone much further and has developed many things that did not exist in Coopers’ 
time. Local developments took place, some internally and others with the 
assistance of external resources, like some projects carried out with the 
Biotechnology Department (School of Medicine of the public university). (…) On 
the commercial side, Prondil took advantage of having been closely related to 
Coopers’ trajectory. This opened doors to some of Coopers’ clients who already 
knew people at Prondil, because they were the same ones who carried out 
Coopers’ businesses. These were the first steps, the most difficult ones.” 
(Interview with Prondil’s director) 
 
As in the case of Merial, bacterial vaccine production was not totally new to Prondil. A 
retired veterinarian and former technical manager of Coopers
97 pointed out that in the late 1950s, 
Coopers-Uruguay hired a researcher, who was a professor in microbiology of the Veterinary 
School and technical assistant in the state owned Laboratorios Rubino, to develop bacterial 
vaccines. In the following years, the latter led a team that carried out important technological 
developments in bacterial vaccines; however, in the 1960s the main business of Coopers-Uruguay 
was related to the FMD vaccine, which represented 70 percent of total sales. When Coopers 
closed its Uruguayan subsidiary, two junior members of the “bacterial research team” participated 
in Prondil’s creation and helped transfer the accumulated knowledge from one firm to another.              
Hence, to a large extent, Prondil’s discovery was based on signals it received from the 
multinational from which it was created. Coopers provided information on the profitability of the 
vaccine business and the new firm inherited the laboratory, tacit and codified technology, and 
some clients.
98 The main barrier to entry that Prondil initially faced in foreign markets was the 
                                          
97 He was a researcher who had been experimenting since 1946 in FMD vaccine development in the state-owned 
Laboratorios Rubino. He was hired in 1952 by Coopers-Uruguay to further develop this vaccine. He adopted 
Frenkel’s FMD technology and developed the vaccine according to the English tradition. In 1954, the first FMD 
vaccine of this type was registered in Uruguay. The local branch of Coopers became in the next 15 years the main 
laboratory of the multinational’s experiments on the vaccine’s performance. (Interview, November 10, 2006) 
98 During a few years after Prondil’s creation, some products (including FMD vaccines) were manufactured for 
Coopers and thus commercialized with Coopers’ label.   184
lack of image and reputation. This meant hard and sustained work to promote the products 
(traveling to different countries) but, once the firm achieved quality and service records in several 
markets, doors started to open more easily. The formal registration of Prondil’s vaccines in its 
destination markets was a very relevant factor, since it then acted as a reference to penetrate other 
markets.
99  
Regarding Santa Elena, in the early 1990s the firm had invested in a brand new laboratory 
for large-scale manufacture of first-class FMD vaccines, and it was at the verge of becoming a 
large exporter of these when production was prohibited.
100 The firm found a way out of the 
ensuing crisis by focusing on bacterial and other vaccines that were until then marginal for the 
firm. Investments in large-scale vaccine production are flexible enough to allow shifting from one 
product to another, and variable costs are not too large:  
“The large size of the fermentation tanks is what allows production on a large 
scale and the concomitant scale economies. Different types of vaccines cannot be 
produced simultaneously, but they can be produced successively in time. Between 
the different batches of vaccines, the tanks must be cleaned and sterilized and 
small technical changes must be implemented so as to ensure that there will be no 
contaminants from one vaccine to another.” (Interview with a regional consultant 
in biotechnology) 
 
Santa Elena thus received signals about the profitability of exporting bacterial vaccines 
from its own business, in a somewhat different way than the other two firms. They were vaccines 
that the firm had previously developed and produced in small quantities. Uncertainty concerned 
commercial issues rather than technological or productive activities. Even so, the former must not 
have been too important considering that the product was initially sold in the same markets where 
Santa Elena exported FMD vaccines in the past (Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay). From 2000 onward, 
destinations included new regional markets (Colombia and Brazil). 
It can thus be stated that the three exporting firms found simultaneously but separately 
positive signals to invest in bacterial vaccines: Merial received them mainly from its parent 
                                          
99 Vaccines must first be registered in the producing country and then in each destination country. 
100 Since 1992, Santa Elena has exported FMD vaccines to Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay, and there were talks 
underway with the government of Bolivia on a possible collaboration for the eradication of FMD disease. The former 
can be observed in Graph 4.5.2 as Santa Elena’s exports grew between 1992 and 1994.   185
company; Prondil, from the multinational from which it emerged; and Santa Elena, from its in-
house and outside previous trials. This is not really surprising because the information on 
commercial opportunities and technological features of bacterial vaccines appertained to the 
industry’s “common sense” at the time, according to a regional biotechnological consultant 
(Interview, 17/10/2006). And each firm counted on different assets to solve uncertainties related 
to the concrete trading possibilities: Merial was fully integrated in a global value chain as a 
subsidiary of a multinational; Prondil partially participated in one since its main market 
intermediary was the multinational Intervet (former Coopers); and Santa Elena had established 
connections through its recent market prospecting for FMD vaccines.     
In conclusion, several factors combined at the precise moment as veterinary vaccine firms 
lost their safe FMD domestic markets in the middle of the 1990s: commercial opportunities 
existed for bacterial vaccines and exporting costs were accessible because the targeted markets 
had relatively lax regulations; there were local technological and productive capacities to seize 
these opportunities; and, last but not least, there were people in the local industry willing to 
continue making their “way of living” from producing vaccines in Uruguay. In terms of the “H-R 
model,” these combined factors provided information on expected profits being large enough to 
have some pioneers experimenting right away. Apparently the possibility of waiting for an 
information externality from other experimenting firms was disregarded. As we will see in 
Sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.5, these simultaneous investments, associated with individual trajectories, 
did not help to resolve a number of coordination failures that precluded diffusion and limited the 
development of the animal vaccine export sector. But we will first discuss the pre-conditions and 
the public goods that enabled the discovery. 
 
4.5.3 Preconditions and Public Goods 
Important preconditions existed for the development of the discovery, including the provision by 
the state of some critical public goods. These issues will be dealt with in this section.  
 
Common Origin in Biological Production  
Historically, Uruguay has been part of a very important stockbreeding region in the world. This 
spurred the local development of veterinarian products and services. In previous periods, the 
decentralization strategy pursued by multinationals led them to install subsidiaries in this part of 
the world, so as to take advantage of the animal health market that was developing rapidly and of   186
the availability of human and other resources, like diagnosis services, national laboratories, 
trained human resources, etc. Within this framework, the production of FMD vaccines proved to 
be a particularly profitable and highly secure business. The domestic market for this vaccine was 
so large in countries like Argentina and Uruguay that export strategies were not developed or 
were marginal.  
Once FMD was eradicated in Uruguay (1993), a natural course of events would have been 
to use the installed capacity to produce vaccines for countries still facing the disease. But the 
prohibition on handling the FMD virus in Uruguay made this impossible and production was 
suspended.
101 At that moment, it seemed that the local vaccine industry would be driven to 
extinction. What were the factors that reversed the expected evolution and triggered this new 
export phase? 
A first factor was the legacy of this historical period, in terms of learning economies in the 
field of animal vaccines. The second one relates to the trigger that the prohibition of FMD 
vaccine production meant for the development of a new vaccine sector, this time geared toward 
exports. 
As previously stated, the three producers of animal vaccines share a common background: 
the huge market that the FMD eradication policies meant for the animal health sector in the 
second half of the 20th century, particularly in the River Plate Basin, one of the main cattle-
raising regions in the world.
102  
Most of the multinationals that developed animal health products entered the country, and 
the regional market as a whole, by acquiring a national laboratory. They thereby took advantage 
of substantial local experience that had been developing in this field. Indeed, livestock breeding 
was the main agricultural activity in the River Plate Basin, and meat exports were the mainstay of 
area economies. It thus comes as no surprise that related services had been developing quite 
substantially, through education and research in veterinary sciences and the creation of national 
                                          
101 In recent years, FMD reappeared in the country and vaccination had to be reestablished urgently with no local 
production capacity. This coordination failure has, in other terms, been pointed out for the whole region by 
Panaftosa’s experts, because the risk taken when suspending vaccination was not compensated by mitigating 
measures (like building up an FMD vaccine bank, as other countries do). Similar coordination failures have occurred 
with vaccines for other diseases such as brucellosis.  
102 Introduced in the Americas from Europe around 1870, FMD has affected the entire American continent at some 
time, with the exception of Central America. In the United States, the disease was eradicated in 1929.    187
laboratories offering products and services against the main livestock threat: infectious and 
parasitic diseases. In the words of the son of a prominent veterinarian of that time: 
“In animal health—in the field of biology and less so of chemistry—a world-level 
development focus arose in the Southern Cone in the 1950s. Looking at the history 
of Argentina, Uruguay, and Southern Brazil, one can find in each case about seven 
to eight national laboratories that were created in the 1950s and 1960s, within the 
framework of the import-substitution strategy. Somehow they were a kind of 
annex of the universities' Veterinary Departments. The technical experience of the 
teaching vets stimulated them to create private enterprises to develop products 
related to their teaching and research. Their education level was very good and 
there was very little difference between a national laboratory and a European or 
North American one. So, firms like Bayer and Hoechst—typically with a chemical 
base but little biological knowledge—started their biological activities in the 
region, acquiring one of these national laboratories. Coopers Welcome was the 
only one of all the multinationals coming to this region that did not start by buying 
a local laboratory.” (Interview with one of Santa Elena’s partners, July 24, 2006)  
 
FMD became an early and indirect trigger of the vaccine export discovery in Uruguay. 
Although it triggered production for the domestic market, this activity gave rise to learning 
economies in the broader animal vaccine field through the development of abilities in research, 
diagnosis, industrial production, technical training, etc., related to disease eradication. 
 
Institutional Build-up and Regulations for FMD Vaccines 
Since the 1930s, the country has been fighting FMD. State laboratories were created to 
experiment in new animal vaccines and regulations were created. In 1946, domestic private 
laboratories were authorized by the government to produce FMD vaccines, but it was only around 
1954 that these activities started effectively to take place. In 1967, regulations to start a national 
campaign against the disease were approved. In 1968, the campaign included the whole country 
and a governmental FMD institution (DILFA) was created to control the quality of all FMD 
vaccine production.  
This new institutional framework contributed to the displacement from the market of 
several laboratories at the end of the 1960s. Of the 11 FMD vaccine producers in the country,   188
only four survived, all subsidiaries of foreign companies, and they would share the domestic 
market throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1974, the Ministry of Agriculture estimated that these 
four firms were producing all FMD doses that were consumed in the country (Astori, 1979).  
The commercial regime for FMD vaccines was quite exceptional given the import-
substitution regime of the time. In 1968, the government decreed tax exemption for all imports 
destined to prevent and fight cattle diseases.
103 Consequently, the non-existence of imports cannot 
be explained by high import tariffs to FMD vaccines but was more likely due to the adequate 
quality and quantity of local production.
104 
A relatively extensive scientific base of human resources dedicated to R&D was available 
for the development of this local industry at that time. The state laboratory, Laboratorios Rubino, 
and DILFA were in charge of transferring to private firms the researchers’ technological 
developments. The Veterinary School of the public university was in charge of veterinary 
education but had very little intervention in R&D in this field. 
More recently, the industry-government relation takes place mainly through the vaccine 
registration process at the Agricultural Department of Veterinary Laboratories (DILAVE). This 
department is also in charge of controlling the activity of the laboratories. Control is applied 
through vaccine sampling and might include the request of documentary evidence of the firm’s 
internal controls.
105  
    
Scientific Base and Technological Capacities 
Presently, Uruguay stands out not only for the quality of its scientists, but also for the quality of 
the technicians working at the laboratories. The Uruguayan biotechnology sector was analyzed in 
previous research (PNUD, 2005). It was based on a survey including 68 laboratories that 
undertake R&D in biotechnology applied to human and animal health as well as to plant and 
animal genetic improvements. As shown in Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, the data from the survey 
indicate the existence of a critical mass of biotechnology scientists and technicians (the present 
research field in vaccines), and that almost all laboratories undertake research in applied 
biotechnology. 
                                          
103 This exemption also applied to inputs for local production. 
104 This disqualifies in part the infant industry protection argument for explaining FMD domestic production. 
105 The only case in which all batches were systematically controlled in Uruguay was the FMD vaccine, a practice 
that was part of the eradication policy in the region and that is still in force in the producing countries.    189
 
Table 4.5.1-   
Number and Educational Level of Researchers and 













professionals   780 427  161  158  25 
Number of 
technicians  377       






     Table 4.5.2 - R&D Activities of 68 Biotechnology 
                   Laboratories in Uruguay 
R&D activity  Number of 
laboratories 
Fundamental Research  42 
Applied Research  65 
Development research  49 
Source: PNUD, 2005. 
 
 
Educational Base and Its Cost  
The often mentioned good basic education level of Uruguayans has made it relatively easy to 
train non-specialized people in vaccine production techniques and to obtain satisfactory results 
from both the employer and employee perspectives.
106 In contrast, as will be further discussed, 
specialized human resources in specific areas of vaccine production are difficult to find in the 
country due to the small size of the vaccine industry.  
Vaccine production costs are substantially lower in Uruguay than in more-developed 
countries. This is partially due to the comparatively lower salaries in Uruguay, especially for very 
qualified people. It is also relatively easy and affordable to carry out tests on animals in the 
                                          
106 For example, most of Prondil’s non-professional employees entered the firm at a young age, after secondary 
school, and were trained in the laboratory, where they acquired adequate skills.    190
country, a relevant advantage considering that this is a very expensive issue in industrialized 
countries.  
 
4.5.4 Barriers to Entry in Global Markets  
High barriers to entry characterize vaccine production because it entails high investments in 
R&D, production facilities, quality control, quality assurance and product registration, as well as 
special arrangements (like partnerships) for selling and distribution. In addition, it rests on the 
difficulty of acquiring know-how so that technology transfer often requires a strong cooperative 
relationship between partners (like joint ventures). Once the fixed costs are covered, unit costs 
can be reduced significantly through gains in productivity (the “learning curve”) and scale 
economies. These barriers, together with the limited world vaccine market (less than 2 percent of 
the pharmaceutical market), explain the relatively low number of vaccine producers in the world 
as compared with other classes of pharmaceuticals (GAVI, no date).  
In the following paragraphs, we will examine how Uruguay’s pioneers have surmounted 
the various barriers to entry in global markets, including R&D, production know-how, scale 
economies, quality control systems, upstream and downstream production, and distribution 
economies, and vaccine registration in foreign countries.  
The three Uruguayan firms mainly produce “traditional” vaccines by using available 
public knowledge. But the process of mastering, adapting, and improving this knowledge is not 
easy and smooth. It involves R&D and other knowledge creating activities, distinct from the 
production process, which have different degrees of complexity depending on the “tacitness”
107 of 
the adopted technology. It is now fully accepted in the literature that, because much technology is 
tacit, even when production techniques in the public domain and transparent to outsiders, their 
adoption requires significant knowledge creation and application with uncertain degrees of 
success (Lall, 2003).             
In fact, the vaccine industry in Uruguay is highly related to specific research. Prondil and 
Santa Elena both have strong partnerships with local academic groups, and the Department of 
Biotechnology at the Instituto de Higiene (School of Medicine of the public university) is a very 
relevant actor. The academic teams, although very limited in number, include scientists trained in 
                                          
107 Tacitness means that a technology or product cannot be easily codified into a blueprint that would allow for easy 
application (Nelson and Winter, 1982).    191
some of the best academic institutions in developed countries. The teams maintain strong links 
with their academic partners in developed countries and therefore have access to state of the art 
scientific equipment and methodologies. Thus, they provide the needed research infrastructure to 
local firms.
108 
Since its start, but more intensively since 1987, Santa Elena has been very closely related 
to local and regional academic institutions. It has signed research contracts, mainly for molecular 
biology and genetic engineering projects, with the public biological research institute, Clemente 
Estable. It also has carried out research projects with different departments of the public 
university, such as the Chemical School, the Virology Department of the Sciences School, the 
Immunology Department of the Veterinary School, and the Biotechnology Department of the 
School of Medicine. Research projects have also been carried out with Argentine and Brazilian 
universities.  
According to Santa Elena’s manager, the firm focuses on diseases affecting cattle and 
cattle breeding because these are of little interest to multinationals:  
“We specialize in analyzing what the region needs. When the stockbreeders and 
the vets face a problem, they have no access to the R&D leaders of large 
companies, so they go to the local laboratories, and the same happens in 
Argentina. The problems we face in the region have nothing to do with Europe or 
North America. We have a pastoral system, concentrated or extensive but an 
outdoor system. The Europeans have a confinement system; their cattle practically 
do not eat grass and do not walk. So, diseases are totally different in the two 
systems. Our first task is to identify our problems … Then we identify the people 
at the university who can solve these problems, we support their R&D up to the 
point that they reach the development of an antigen. That is when Santa Elena 
takes over to develop the product at the industrial level … Industrial R&D at the 
laboratory never stops. The biggest investment is made inside the laboratory, and 
                                          
108 This research-industry complementarity is an essential base to build up strong national systems of innovation. As 
Chabalgoity (2005) points out, “There are plenty of strong academic teams spread across developing countries, were 
scientists are already conducing R&D in new vaccines of regional and global importance. (…) these groups are often 
struggling with the lack of proper funding in their own countries and therefore the relationship with the industry 
could be a source of fresh funds, working as a way to improve the research-building capacity in developing 
countries, as has traditionally been the case in industrialized nations.”   192
each time we get better results with lower costs, with faster and safer processes.” 
(Interview with one of Santa Elena’s partners, July 24, 2006) 
 
Since 2001, Prondil has called on the R&D capacity of the Department of Biotechnology 
(Medical School of the public university) to solve some of its problems. This happens when the 
firm does not have the required expertise and/or equipment: 
“Prondil has no intention of financing basic research. What it needs is to solve 
practical problems, to generate knowledge on how to solve problems that Prondil 
is already facing, like production problems, control issues, better performance or 
cost reduction needs, etc. Researchers make an important contribution. They do 
not always find these issues very attractive, but they certainly are interested in 
establishing links with the industry, in part because it is a financing source for 
their laboratories and the critical mass that is needed in the sector. Prondil has 
developed a fruitful relationship with the Instituto de Higiene and, earlier, with the 
university’s Veterinary Department. (…) Sometimes the academic environment is 
somewhat slow but the industrial sector has no room for dreaming. When we have 
a need, it is concrete, urgent and we have to solve it.” (Interview with Prondil’s 
director, July 26, 2006) 
 
A good example of collaboration with the Instituto de Hygiene is an ongoing project for a 
new cell culture, the industrial aspects of which are being carried out by Prondil with equipment 
from the Institute, which in turn is in charge of applying all control techniques to the product.  
Because Merial’s technology comes from its parent company, relations with the national R&D 
environment are limited. Its closest tie is with the Veterinary School of the public university, 
which has an almost exclusively clinical orientation. Merial promotes technical talks by 
specialists in different biological areas, aims to foster better knowledge of the animal health 
productive sector, and finances one scholarship per year. 
The patent system does not play a crucial role in impeding the diffusion process. Vaccines 
can be relatively easily copied if the required skills and knowledge exist, although the processes 
are not totally standardized as there are important issues related to the mix of the adjuvant and the 
pathogen agent to obtain the most effective vaccine. These issues are secrets of production know-
how that act as important barriers to the entry of new firms.   193
In regard to quality control and assurance as well as scale economies, two recent local 
investments are directed at solving these fundamental issues. It is a well known fact that the 
quality of a product is becoming an increasingly relevant factor. As and when better control 
capacity develops at the government level of producing or importing countries, the smaller 
laboratories of emerging suppliers with no updated internal control systems will tend to 
disappear.
109  
One of these investments (US$2 million) concerns Santa Elena.
110 The firm completely 
renovated its previous “FMD laboratory” with a view toward improving the technology and 
quality of its products and processes, and to produce in biosafe conditions so as to respond to the 
most recent bio-safety regulations. The vaccines will be of a new generation and the production 
capacity has been designed to respond to the increasing biological demand. Santa Elena considers 
the application of good manufacturing practices (GMP) as the main barrier to entry used by 
developed countries to protect themselves.  
Also with a recent US$2 million investment in a new plant for bacterial vaccines, Merial-
Uruguay seeks to increase scale economies (doubling the production capacity), update the 
technology, and improve the quality system. The local director stresses that the parent company 
decided to locate this investment in Uruguay mainly because of the excellent clostridial vaccine 
performance attained by Merial-Uruguay.
111 
Upstream links create significant economies for the local firms. In the case of Prondil, for 
example, animal trials are outsourced to two veterinarians who are also cattle producers and can 
thus easily test new vaccines. As concerning Santa Elena, the firm is highly related with different 
actors of the animal health sector: diagnosis firms, local veterinarians, and cattle and other animal 
breeders. 
Another important upstream link relates to input supplies. Prondil established a user-
producer association with its two plastic bottle providers. So, while quality was inadequate and 
unstable initially, it was subsequently leveled through an intense learning process. Another very 
                                          
109 A similar condition could happen as with FMD, when technological progress and government regulations forced 
seven of the 11 laboratories to close in Uruguay. In the present case, the situation would not so much apply at the 
national as at the regional and global level. 
110 The firm obtained a US$1 million loan from the state development bank and the project has been declared to be of 
“national interest,” which provides it with different tax exemptions. 
111 Interview, Diario El País (Montevideo), July 8, 2006.   194
relevant national input for Prondil production is horse meat, which is used to obtain the protein 
concentrates needed for antigen production. It is a tough process and Prondil is the only vaccine 
producer to start the production chain from this early stage. But the firm found it rewarding in 
terms of quality and costs as compared with the alternative of importing the protein concentrates, 
and despite the fact that it is a price taker in the local horse meat market, which is entirely geared 
toward exporting.  
A downstream production barrier to entry derives from transportation costs. Vaccines are 
usually transported by plane and must be surrounded by ice, which inflates the weight.
112 Long 
distances to developing regions, like Africa, mean high transportation costs, which can end up 
being higher than the FOB price. So, large-scale shipments must compensate these costs. 
A main barrier to enter export markets relates to the norms in force in the importing 
countries. Different countries apply different norms for biological products, and in developed 
nations these have become non-tariff barriers. Prondil’s director explained this issue as follows. 
The firm registers its vaccines using the United States’ standards; as a consequence, its vaccines 
fulfill these norms. But exporting to the United States or Europe also implies submitting the 
vaccines to very complex laboratory tests in order to prove the above-mentioned fulfillments. 
Complying with all the required tests and trials to export to these markets would require a very 
superior technical structure than the existing one, which in turn would imply huge investments.
113 
Instead, the firm can use its cost advantages to export to countries that cannot afford to pay the 
price of vaccines produced in developed countries.
114 The firm’s vaccines are registered with 
Prondil’s trademark and these registers are the main capital of Prondil: the firm is the owner of 
the sanitary registers of its products in its export markets (Interview with Prondil's director, July 
26, 2006). 
Cost advantages are also used by Merial—within its overall multinational strategy—to  
sell vaccines made in Uruguay in markets that Merial-France cannot access due to its higher 
production costs. However, according to the firm’s manager, lower production costs are not the 
main factor in Merial’s decision regarding its subsidiaries. Much more important is the security, 
                                          
112 Only in some instances do volumes and other conditions make sea transportation possible.  
113 Naturally, this does not imply that the firm does not comply with the international control techniques, since they 
have to achieve the established standards to register their products locally and abroad. 
114 Some products can be made with the same performance and effectiveness as their equivalents in Europe, at up to 
one-tenth of the latter’s prices.   195
from quality control and assurance, that the subsidiary will not damage the multinational image 
and reputation.     
Finally, selling and distribution barriers to enter export markets were solved in different 
ways by the pioneers. Merial is fully integrated in a global value chain as a regional provider of a 
multinational; Prondil is still, in its main markets, closely linked for selling and distribution to the 
multinational Intervet; and Santa Elena has established regional joint-ventures to sell and 
distribute its products.  
In conclusion, the three pioneers have overcome several barriers to entry in global markets. 
But during this process, some coordination failures were not resolved and, as we will see in the 
next section, this restrained the emergence of other local exporters. 
 
4.5.5 A Truncated Diffusion Process  
As Hausmann, Rodrik, and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) observe:  
“…the self-discovery process is rife with information externalities because the 
cost information discovered by an entrepreneur cannot be kept private. If the 
pioneer is profitable, this can be readily observable by others. Imitative entry then 
follows, the incumbent’s rents are dissipated, and a new sector takes off. If, on the 
other hand, the pioneer firm goes bankrupt, the losses are borne in full by the 
entrepreneur. Hence entrepreneurship of this kind is not a very rewarding 
economic activity: the losses are private while the gains are socialized. 
Consequently markets under-provide entrepreneurship in new activities.”  
 
In this case, the three pioneers developed a profitable business, but this did not give rise to an 
imitation process by other firms. Why did these opportunities not diffuse? Answering this 
question requires understanding the channels through which the pioneers captured monopoly 
rents, because different channels have distinct implications for diffusion. Two channels were 
found: firms internalized an ex-ante productivity advantage acquired from prior bacterial and 
FMD vaccine production; and they introduced new barriers to entry.  
We know from previous sections that when the three pioneers launched the bacterial 
vaccine discovery they were already producing the FMD vaccines with strong economies of scale 
and they had already developed and internalized production secrets. They thus took as a starting 
point prior knowledge from vaccine production and sales, which they had accumulated on their   196
own or inherited from a former firm. This accumulated knowledge makes up a manufacturer’s 
secret that gives rise to proprietary knowledge, which in turn precludes externalities from spilling 
over, unless researchers, technicians, or other qualified workers move from one firm to another or 
create a new company. In this case, no flows of skilled workers can be observed; therefore, we 
might presume that the first channel to capture monopoly rent by the incumbent firms is an 
important explanation for the absence of diffusion. 
We also know that the three pioneers surmounted several barriers to entry in global 
markets, which paved the way for imitation. But each firm developed its production environment 
in isolation from the others (including upstream and downstream arrangements in addition to 
substantial investment in R&D, infrastructure, distribution, etc.) and no common interest was 
identified that would give rise to collective actions. Neither was there any effective institutional 
arrangement in the broader biotechnology field.
115 In this way, coordination failures were not 
solved and no collective goods were created. These factors constitute a second channel for 
pioneers to capture monopoly rents, and contribute to explain why other animal vaccine 
companies did not appear in Uruguay. 
The coordination failures restraining investment in activities that are crucial for the 
sector’s expansion involve mainly the lack of agglomeration economies that, in other countries or 
environments, arise from: a thick labor market, a scientific and entrepreneurial infrastructure for 
emerging projects, and a network of specialized input providers. 
The absence of thick labor externalities in this case was set out by a regional consultant in 
biotechnology in these simple terms: Uruguay does not have the required professionals in order to 
set up new vaccine plants (Interview, October 17, 2006). The inadequacy of the university 
curricula to serve that purpose and the inexistence of certain specializations at the graduate or 
postgraduate level are part of the explanation. For example, biological engineers, among others, 
to scale up processes in a vaccine plant are not available. Clearly, a coordination failure here 
arises because of the complementarities implied: creating a specialization might not be reasonable 
in the absence of firms demanding such human resources, but firms will not invest in fields where 
it is difficult to find specialized professionals. 
                                          
115 For example, unlike local software firms, the various attempts of the business organization Asociación Uruguaya 
de Empresas de Biotecnología (AUDEBIO) to coordinate the resolution of common problems has been fruitless until 
now.       197
In regard to the entrepreneurial infrastructure for emerging projects, its shortfall for the 
diffusion phase derives from the evolution of the biotechnology-related business. The three 
pioneers emerged as “traditional” firms that were then compelled to restructure as technological 
breakthroughs in biotechnology imposed new conditions to reach competitive advantages in the 
vaccine industry. In contrast, new vaccine businesses have to be created from scratch as 
biotechnology-based firms, with a very different profile in terms of technology requirements and 
business model.
116 And, of course, new firms would not inherit the signals that each pioneer 
received from its predecessor and/or its previous activity. 
Finally, the nonexistence of a network of specialized input providers is of first importance 
in slowing down diffusion, because “a biotechnological endeavor in Uruguay implies the 
generation of the entire chain of production and distribution” (Interview with a biomedical 
exporter, December 13, 2006)
117. The limited volume of biotechnological exports explains the 
absence of such specialized providers, and indicates once more a problem of complementarities.      
Summing up, the truncated diffusion process in the veterinary vaccine sector is explained 
by two main elements: the accumulated knowledge transformed in manufacturers’ secrets by 
pioneers and the process by which these firms got through the barriers to entry in global markets 
without resolving the basic coordination failures of the industry.    
 
4.5.6 Comparator: New Biotechnology-based Firms 
We chose as a comparator for the vaccine discovery the new Uruguayan biotechnology-based 
firms because they have not been able to export, or do so only marginally, in spite of enjoying the 
same critical public goods as vaccine pioneers.    
The previously mentioned analysis of the Uruguayan biotechnology sector (PNUD, 2005) 
included a survey of 24 firms that apply biotechnology to services and products of human and 
animal health as well as to plant and animal genetic improvements, and the 68 laboratories 
                                          
116 Some ways in which diffusion could take place in the future would be: 
- Spin-offs from the public university: technological developments in vaccines could lead for example to a joint 
venture with a local or foreign investor or even to a consortium with one of the existing firms. 
- The acquisition of a local laboratory, taking advantage of accumulated know-how, with a view toward investing in 
it to increase its production capacity.  
- The creation of a firm from scratch by an investor with the help of consultants specialized in setting up this sort of 
business. 
117 For example, there is only one firm in the country that produces dry ice and the only producer of foam insulated 
boxes does not offer products suitable for the international transportation of biomedical products.   198
mentioned above, which undertake biotechnology R&D. The survey results show that exports are 
highly concentrated in a few firms (besides the three vaccine producers previously analyzed):
118 
there are three Rhisobium leguminosarum producers, two plant micro-propagation companies, 
two human vaccine laboratories, a molecular biology firm, and an exporter of animal genetic 
improvements. Exports of the first three groups of firms are relatively important, while the last 
two firms only export sporadically.   
Consistent with our previous analysis, the major biotechnology exporters share with the 
three animal vaccine firms a restructuring process from a traditional business to a biotechnology-
based one. However, the minor exporters started from scratch a modern biotechnology business 
and these are the ones having a hard time getting to takeoff.  
It is well known that a great deal of difficulty is faced by biotechnological start-ups. 
Substantial connections with R&D are needed and expensive facilities and laboratories, as well as 
regulatory and legal knowledge (including a thorough understanding of intellectual property 
issues), financial expertise, and, in general, know-how to manage this particular kind of business. 
Access to human resources with all these qualifications may be beyond the means of such start-
ups. This has much to do with the difficulties involved in developing exports in technology-
intensive sectors. 
In this case, connecting with R&D does not seem to be the main problem. According to 
the survey, the biotechnology sector in Uruguay has a particular feature compared with other 
knowledge intensive sectors in the country: there are well established links between firms and 
research laboratories.
119 Furthermore, there is a relatively strong commitment of the research 
laboratories to work on biotechnological-based solutions for issues related to the productive 
sector. 
The regulation of biotechnology related issues and the legal protection of its products is 
one way of making modern biotechnology a business. In Uruguay a regulatory system for modern 
biotechnology is presently being designed by the government authorities. It is a fact that very few 
biotechnological related patents have been registered at the National Office for Property Rights 
                                          
118 The survey was carried out in 2003-04, and firms declared their exports until 2002. 
119 The 68 research laboratories in the survey included different schools of the public university, the public biological 
research center Clemente Estable, and the national institute for agriculture research INIA, which all had at least one 
research line in biotechnology.    199
(DNPI) and most of them are not from residents, a clear sign of how modern biotechnology is 
still not seen as a business opportunity by locals. And there is not a single lawyer specializing in 
biotechnological issues in the country, a strong limitation for emerging entrepreneurs.           
Another major problem lies in the management side of the business. There is little 
experience in managing biotechnology-based undertakings, an issue that is worsened when the 
start-up is created by scientists, as often occurs. In Uruguay, the researcher-entrepreneur who sets 
up his own company usually has to learn on his own how to become and remain competitive, 
because support for entrepreneurship is scarce. In this context, business and strategic 
management is either not considered as essential as technological matters or is neglected because 
of limited means to hire the required expertise. The learning path is then very troublesome and 
limited initial gains leave little room for trial and error.   
A related issue concerns the lack of sound projects emerging from the academy, with 
notable exceptions. Ideas are seldom developed into viable projects backed up by a business plan 
or a feasibility study. This comes as no surprise considering the rather traditional university 
curricula as far as entrepreneurship is concerned. Subjects involving intellectual property rights 
and other legal matters are restricted to the Law School, while entrepreneurial skills and 
knowledge are only developed in administration and business schools, with no such courses in 
the science or engineering schools. Fellowships to provide young researchers with working 
experience in industrial firms and laboratories are very recent. The divorce between science and 
business is thus still in force at the educational level.  
At the world level, it is a common fact that biotechnological entrepreneurs emerge from a 
university, a research institution, or a company with which they have been working. In Uruguay, 
there exists indeed some critical mass of researchers in biotechnology and many of them work in 
applied research and on concrete development related issues, as was previously made clear (see 
Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). But few of them start their own firm, in spite of the very low wages at the 
public university (private universities have no basic science schools) and the Clemente Estable 
research institute.  
Until recently, no policy instruments existed to promote and support start-ups in the field 
of biotechnology, such as project incubators or clusters. However, recently several public and 
private initiatives have emerged. The successful (public-private) software oriented Ingenio 
incubator has now extended its field of action to include biotechnology projects, although it does   200
not yet offer specific infrastructure. Neither has it developed as a hub allowing easy connections 
to state-of-the-art research laboratories or access to expertise in the specific business models 
needed. BiotechPlaza, by contrast, offers a specific environment for biotechnological firms in the 
privately owned free trade zone, Zonamerica, but this is a costly location for national firms.
120 
The Polo Tecnológico de Pando is a scientific and technological park for chemical and 
biotechnological firms that were established by the Chemical School of the public university, 
with funds from the European Union. PACPYMES, a governmental program also mainly funded 
by the European Union, is presently supporting a life science cluster, among other clusters. Still 
another initiative is AMSUD-Pasteur, a Uruguayan branch of the famous French Institute Pasteur; 
it will develop a regional pole anchored in biology, biomedicine, and biotechnology. Most of 
these undertakings are however too recent to evaluate their impact.   
Finally, investors such as angels and venture capitalists have not yet appeared in the local 
biotechnology field, and public agencies have not provided seed capital. This seems to be part of 
the explanation for the very slow diffusion process. Again, two recent initiatives could make a 
difference in the near future,
121 assuming that adequate project profiles can be presented. Risk 
aversion as an idiosyncratic Uruguayan trait is a more general explanation, which deserves to be 
considered in a set of instruments to generate adequate incentives to create biotechnological-
based firms.   
In short, new biotechnology-based firms have not been able to export because—even if they 
share with vaccine pioneers and other traditional biotechnological exporters the local R&D 
infrastructure—they lack management tools and other entrepreneurial skills to enhance their 
global competitiveness.  
                                          
120 BiotechPlaza targets companies ranging from start-up and mid-size companies to multi-national ones that 
concentrate in life science areas (humans, animals, and plants) and wish to develop an international business strategy 
taking advantage of leading-edge infrastructure, tax benefits, and synergistic effects derived from an agglomeration 
of high-tech firms (see http://www.zonamerica.com/english/biotech.asp). 
121 One is led by Prosperitas Capital Partners, a financial management company that recently established the first 
venture capital fund in Uruguay. It seeks to identify and invest in small and medium-size companies that apply new 
technologies and know-how (at the country level) in the technology, service, and agribusiness sectors 
(www.prosperitascp.com). The other one comes from the restructured Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo (CND). In 
addition to providing seed/venture capital, it aims at “promoting an entrepreneurship culture of high added value, 
through systematic increase in the quantity and quality of new undertakings or young firms in dynamic sectors” 
(www.cnd.org.uy).    201
 
4.5.7 Conclusions  
Three firms located in Uruguay have produced and exported bacterial vaccines in the past ten 
years: a branch of a multinational firm and two local companies. These exports are considered a 
“discovery” because they represent a successful export activity that recently emerged and 
experienced strong growth. The key reason for targeting bacterial exports arose from the need and 
low opportunity cost to replace FMD vaccines when local production of these vaccines was 
prohibited. The choice of this new export activity was facilitated by the prior technological, 
productive, and commercial knowledge of animal vaccines accumulated by the former FMD 
vaccine manufacturers. In other words, what the country discovered was the capacity to continue 
exploiting a comparative advantage indirectly related to the important livestock of the country.  
The three exporting firms found simultaneously but separately positive signals to invest in 
bacterial vaccines: Merial received them mainly from its parent company; Prondil, from the 
multinational from which it emerged; and Santa Elena, from its own in-house and external 
previous trials. Hence, the present case is not a typical “H-R discovery” as there was no 
individual pioneer firm that discovered the underlying cost structure of the new activity. These 
three pioneers were not savvy investors looking for broad opportunities but rather prudential 
discoverers looking to exploit close and accessible opportunities. Discovery thus entailed low-
cost activities, as firms jumped from one product to another with no need for a knowledge 
breakthrough at the firm level. However, even if bacterial vaccines were not new developments, 
their production and export involved some degree of uncertainty. 
Two factors are considered to be important “preconditions” that made possible the export 
discovery: the three firms had a common origin in biological production, and they inherited the 
country’s institutional set-up that was built for FMD vaccine production. They also took 
advantage of two critical public goods: the scientific base and the technological capacities and 
generally high-quality basic education. Global markets offered niche opportunities but several 
barriers to entry had to be overcome.  The three pioneers invested in R&D activities, quality 
control systems, and production know-how and production capacity; they also developed 
upstream and downstream activities and distribution links; and they obtained vaccine registration 
in foreign countries.  
The bacterial export discovery is truncated in the diffusion phase. Again this case 
withdraws from the typical “H-R discovery” because the development of the profitable bacterial   202
business did not give rise to an imitation process by other firms. This was because cost 
information discovered by the pioneers was kept private by two channels: the firms transformed 
an ex-ante productivity advantage acquired from prior bacterial and FMD vaccine production into 
a manufacturer’s secret and the process by which they constructed new barriers to enter global 
markets did not require the resolution of the basic coordination failures of the industry.  
The coordination failures that held back investments in activities that are crucial for the 
sector’s development beyond the three pioneer firms involved mainly the lack of agglomeration 
economies that could have been generated by thick labor market externalities, the existence of 
scientific and entrepreneurial infrastructure for emerging projects, and the development of a 
network of specialized input providers. Government policy should attack the above coordination 
failures; these are, in conclusion, the policy lessons that emerge from this case study. 
The modern biotechnology-based sector was used as a comparator for this discovery 
because it has not been able to develop exports, or only marginally, in spite of enjoying the same 
local R&D infrastructure as traditional biotechnological exporters. It was stated that the lack of 
management tools (such as for managing property rights, for example) and other entrepreneurial 
skills to enhance global competitiveness were essential to explain these different performances.    
Finally, the following table outlines the market failures, public goods, and incentives 
associated with the vaccine discovery. 






Market Failures, Public Goods and Incentives in the Animal Vaccine Discovery 
Market Failures  Public Goods 
Externalities Coordination  Failures 
Public and Private Instruments 
(and starting date) 
Impact 
-Common background in 
“biologicals” production  
-Institutional 
building–up and 
regulation for FMD 
vaccines 
-Education at public 
university   
-Scientific base and 
technological capacities 
-Quality basic education  
-Few local knowledge 
spillovers  
-Few local information 
spillovers 
  
-Failure to experience 
significant agglomeration 
economies: 
• No thick market effects 
• Inexistence (until 








-Fiscal incentives: VAT exemption  on capital goods   
-University-industry agreements. Public University, 
UdelaR, 1990 
-Business association AUDEBIO, 1980 
- BiotecPlaza in free trade business and technology 
park (Zonamérica), 2003 
-Public program to foster firms upgrading (innovation 
and quality management), applied research & 
postgraduate education: PDT, 2001 
-Public-private program to foster entrepreneurship in 
life science: Incubator Ingenio, 2005 
-Public program to foster clustering effects 
(PACPYME), 2006 
-Chemistry School Technological Park: Polo 
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5.   Conclusions and Policy Lessons 
In this study, we explored new tradable activities that emerged in Uruguay in recent times, with a 
view to reaching a better understanding of the drivers of export growth. A consistent export 
database at the firm and product levels was constructed for the period 1981-2005, which allowed 
us to observe long-term trends. The clearest findings so far mainly relate to the evolution of: the 
number of exporting firms and their sales value; the concentration by firm size; the flows of entry 
and exit of exporting firms; the relative contribution of long-lasting firms and new entrants to 
export growth; the number of products; the concentration by product; the flows of entry and exit 
of products; and export specialization, diversification, and destination at the firm and product 
levels.  
However, as far as tracking export discoveries is concerned, the statistical database 
showed limitations mainly due to the data sensitivity to the four changes in the product 
classification of the official export records throughout the period considered. In spite of 
constructing conversion tables to generate a unique, consistent database, there are spikes in entry 
and exit of products that seem to be ascribable to the change of system. 
The study investigated four export discoveries as case studies, each one accompanied by a 
comparator to check the consistency of the analysis: software (comparator: electronics), forestry 
(wine), sturgeon and caviar (frogs), and animal vaccines (biotechnologicals).  
Conclusions for each case were presented in the corresponding chapter. Therefore, the 
present concluding chapter focuses on the policy lessons that can be drawn from the research. We 
first discuss a number of findings that relate to the general conditions affecting investment and 
export discoveries in Uruguay, including several coordination issues at the national level (Section 
5.1). Next, we consider how our cases contribute to the “H-R export discovery model” and some 
specific policy lessons. We begin by treating the following issues in some detail: public goods as 
preconditions for the selected discoveries (Section 5.2); uncertainties solved by pioneers and 
knowledge diffusion patterns (Section 5.3); and coordination failures in the diffusion phase and 
their eventual resolution (Section 5.4). Finally we present a systematized outline of other findings 
for each case according to different concepts included in the research methodology (Section 5.5).   205
 
5.1  General Conditions Affecting Export Discoveries 
5.1.1  Real Exchange Rate Volatility 
Microeconomic strategies to enhance competitiveness in markets, sectors, and firms should be 
parallel with other types of policies, namely those that assure adequate macroeconomic 
conditions, such as a reduced vulnerability to crises, especially in the neighboring nations. Our 
analysis confirms that exchange rate volatility played a significant role in hampering the 
development prospects of some of the sectors analyzed. This is particularly relevant for those that 
had a prominently regionally oriented export strategy, such as winery and frog cultivation. Sharp 
variations in bilateral real exchange rates, such as those experienced at the start of the 1990s, 
seem to create very short-term windows of opportunity for temporary exports of virtually 
anything to neighboring countries. The opportunities tend to disappear without a trace once 
macro conditions swing the other way. It is noteworthy that some of our counterfactual cases 
(wine, frog breeding) suffered particularly during the 2002 crisis due to marketing strategies 
largely focused on regional markets. 
This does not mean that Uruguayan exports should not reap the benefits from the 
opportunities offered by the large markets of its neighbors. Obviously, the simultaneous presence 
of global and regional goods contributes to the stability of the Uruguayan economy. When Brazil 
devalued in 1999, followed by Argentina in 2001, with demand falling in both countries, 
Uruguay as a result depreciated its currency vis-à-vis that of the United States. This led to a 
financial and solvency crisis. But at the same time, the profitability of exports to the world was 
reestablished and the way out of the crisis was eased. When regional demand goes up, Uruguay’s 
neighbors’ real exchange rate appreciates vis-à-vis the dollar. Resources are attracted to regional 
goods and there are pressures for real exchange rate appreciation also in Uruguay. 
There is no sound theoretical link between high real exchange rates and long-term growth, 
although empirical results are at best controversial.
122 However, there might be clear real 
exchange rate growth effects via the volatility and size of real exchange rate fluctuations. Every 
time Uruguay experiences such deep fluctuations, price signals are severely distorted and the 
profitability is dramatically altered. Discount rates increase as well as preference for the present, 
thus affecting saving and investment decisions. 
                                          
122 Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004) find some degree of correlation between real exchange rate depreciation 
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There are multiple effects of real exchange rate volatility on firms and their product 
strategy, especially in an open and small economy, with a limited domestic market. On the one 
hand, it is obvious that changes in the relative prices of non-differentiated products are 
instantaneous because buyers are more sensitive to prices than in the case of specialized products 
and can easily shift to different providers without altering other aspects of their management 
strategy. In the case of differentiated products (and services), finding another provider is usually 
costly and thus represents a barrier to entry. Therefore, product differentiation acts as a “defense” 
when reduced levels of exchange rate instability are faced.  
On the other hand, exchange rate instability and even its threat lead to a lower investment 
level in the production of specialized goods for a certain market (for instance, regional). 
Commercial flows cannot be foreseen in the delays that are required for investment to mature. 
Obviously, market instability also acts against upgrading and optimization processes that 
normally emerge from extended relations between sellers and buyers, as well as against 
innovation discoveries in products and services. 
In terms of policy lessons, less than discussing whether a high exchange rate is required 
for growth or how high it must be, a firm consensus is required as to which policies might smooth 
its fluctuations. 
 
5.1.2 Business  Conditions 
Investment in activities new to the country with a view to exporting is highly dependent on the 
general local business climate. The main deficiencies of Uruguay in this regard have been 
extensively documented in recent literature on the country, namely in Fernández-Arias and Sagari 
(2006). 
It is common knowledge that evolving from a “one man in a garage” business, or any 
other type of small enterprise, toward an export oriented enterprise is a complex question 
involving management abilities that turn out to be equally important as the technological capacity 
of the firm. Entrepreneurship and management skills are still a scarce resource in the country, 
which in part explains why export discoveries in Uruguay are often associated with the 
“exceptional” personal abilities of a pioneer (skills, insights, and commitment). We consequently 
refer to three specific aspects that are critical in Uruguay in this regard and leave room for policy 
intervention.    207
Strategic Vision 
Contemporary firms need to define a strategy that guides them through their development 
process. The entrepreneur who only takes care of the operative aspects of his firm will rapidly 
face problems deriving from a constantly changing competitive environment. It is clear that the 
strategy depends on the firm structure (organization) and culture (value system, beliefs, and 
habits).  
Many Uruguayan firms lack a strategic vision and their partners lead the business without 
a strategic orientation, in a sequence of short-term lapses. In this context, the pioneers of the 
software and caviar cases (ARTech and BRS) are outstanding. They started their business with a 
clear strategic vision and progressively built up a complete firm that evolved through different 
stages of development.  
In designing instruments for small and medium enterprises, policy analysts should pay 
attention to the way firms that are granted support will develop their activities within the 
framework of such a medium or long-term strategy, and the way they will maintain an adequate 
investment level in “soft” resources. Positive habits should be promoted, such as participating in 
prospective seminars, exchanging information, and, more generally, integrating networks for 
selected activities. 
A special concern is marketing strategy: very few Uruguayan firms export products with 
their own brand or develop activities (or associations) to position their brands in foreign markets. 
ARTech and BRS are again exceptions showing that this is feasible. 
 
Firm Management 
There are clear signs of a lack of professionalism in the country regarding firm management, 
especially in those with no foreign capital participation. This phenomenon is usually explained by 
a combination of several factors, including business climate, macroeconomic instability, lack of 
education in business administration, family-type management, etc. In recent times, the more 
stable macroeconomic environment in Uruguay, the emergence of business schools (essentially in 
private universities), and increasing requirements in terms of product and process certification 
have contributed to reduce the vulnerability of firms. However, firm management is still a 
problematic issue: to a large extent, Uruguayan firms behave with a limited rationality, settling 
for results that they believe to be satisfactory. It seems advisable to observe and pick up cases of   208
well managed firms and make successful practices known to others in different spheres, without 
restricting this type of exercise to the business administration curriculum.  
One of the obstacles to overcome is the concealment of information, either in the private 
sector, as a management practice reflecting the prevailing business culture, or in the public sector, 
revealing bureaucratized behaviors. Public entities should foster the circulation of quality (i.e., 
accurate and timely) information;
123 this would, however, exclude information used for inspection 
and disciplinary ends. Improved information flows to firms could be an important input for 
promoting, for example, the development of a venture capital market, one of the country’s great 
deficiencies in financing new activities. 
Another important aspect to achieve professional management concerns the need to 
improve labor relations through the implementation of policies that include productivity as one of 
the main components. 
 
Entrepreneurship 
In the software and vaccine case studies and their respective comparators, electronics and 
biologicals, we referred to the educational divorce at the public university between, on the one 
hand, hard sciences and, on the other hand, knowledge related to entrepreneurship, science and 
technology management, and other soft sciences. Scientists and engineers are not prepared to 
move research and scientific discoveries from the lab to the market. Including in curricula topics 
such as how to create enterprises that combine scientific innovation with market opportunities 
and how financial markets value scientific knowledge is still pending. 
 
5.1.3  Imperfect Information on Foreign Market Opportunities 
In spite of the spread of Internet resources, most firms still lack information on opportunities in 
foreign markets. This market failure (imperfect information) was recognized at the state level 
long before the development of the Web, and several instruments have been launched to 
overcome it. According to a recent study (Zurbriggen, 2006), in 2004 there were 16 public and 
private entities in charge of export promotion with no formal division, specialization, or 
coordination between them, although informal interaction was common. That study also 
                                          
123 This now happens with export records at the firm and product levels. Firms in Uruguay are often reluctant to 
provide precise information on turnover, exports, etc. In the course of this study, several firms were surprised to 
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described the role information networks, the absence of performance indicators for evaluating  
promotional instruments, and the predominance of programs designed without taking due account 
of the demands of the private sector. 
Uruguay does not possess an institutionalized and professional system to identify 
interests, objectives, and options for the country’s international insertion.
124 The shortcomings in 
the development of the political-technical capacity of the state to define and negotiate the 
country’s position in the international scene hamper the exploitation of new opportunities 
emerging from trade liberalization. 
 
5.1.4 Foreign  Investment 
Foreign direct investment has been a most relevant factor in our four discoveries. It was essential 
in the first phase of the forestry chain (plantations) as well as, in a later stage, in industrial 
transformation (pulp mills and sawmills). In the caviar discovery, FDI provided complementary 
investment funds to the pioneer at a critical stage. In animal vaccines, the main exporter is a 
subsidiary of one of the largest animal product multinational corporations. It recently laid a wager 
on Uruguay as a regional supplier, investing significantly in the Uruguayan laboratory upgrading. 
In the software sector, the investment of Tata Consulting in Zonamerica to establish a 
development center for its activities in Latin America holds great potential in its demonstration 
effect for other outsourcing activities. 
As is well known, attracting FDI may be an effective way to bring in foreign technology, 
increase the quality of domestic suppliers through backward linkages, or induce the local 
production of an advanced intermediate good by a foreign firm (Rodríguez-Clare, 2005). 
However, considering the national economy in general, FDI still has a limited impact in Uruguay 
and actions to promote investment in new activities have not been undertaken systematically or 
under the guidance of a strategic vision. 
                                          
124 Zurbriggen (2006) concludes that this deficiency can be ascribed to the following factors: lack of strong political 
leadership in commercial negotiations and in a strategic vision; ambiguous delimitation of functions, scope, and 
competencies between different public sector entities in charge of commercial negotiations; lack of coordination at 
the inter-ministerial and public-private levels; informality of the internal decision-making processes of the public 
administration; inexistence of systematic follow-up and evaluation mechanisms; ensuing lack of institutional 
memory, which implies that information and experience are essentially restricted to the authority of the moment; and 
delay in building up a professional and consistent bureaucratic team, due to a culture that is not prone to 
professionalism and sound technical capacities.    210
 
5.1.5  Recent Policy Instruments 
In our case studies, we discussed various promotional instruments that are now being applied to 
address various market failures. They all aim to foster the development of what the international 
literature conceptualizes as the National Innovation System: incubators, technological and/or 
business parks, cluster and network promotion programs, subsidies for individual and collective 
innovation projects, brand-new financing available for new ventures, etc. Some of them are 
public-private initiatives, and most are backed up by international cooperation funds or loans. 
However—as was illustrated for one field of action in Section 5.1.3—the evaluation of policy 
measures and program performance has traditionally been erratic in Uruguay (often restricted to 
the requirements of the donor of the funds) and often indulgent. Cross-program evaluation 
according to national benchmarks is virtually nonexistent. However, it is common knowledge that 
many instruments experienced shortcomings in their implementation. 
Therefore, the issue now at stake in policy intervention for self-discovery is not so much 
about convincing on the need to attend different market failures with a number of instruments, as 
about identifying coordination failures in the application of the existing instruments and 
modifying them according to the ultimate goals pursued.
125 To this end, the country should 
implement (i) an “umbrella” evaluation system to address implementation failures, and (ii) a set 
of strategic objectives deriving from a vision for the country’s future.  
 
5.2  Public Goods as Preconditions for Discoveries 
Our analysis of Uruguay’s successful export experiences confirms the leading role of some public 
institutions and policies in providing relevant public goods that allowed the private sector to seize 
critical opportunities for growth. At the policy level, we might refer to the stability of the 
economic policy because, in spite of the 2002 crisis, it showed a significant degree of continuity 
among different government administrations. This stability does not only relate to the monetary, 
trade, fiscal, and investment policies, but also concerns continuity in the openness process. The 
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present government. The creation of a National Agency for Innovation and Research (ANII) was approved by the 
Parliament in 2006; it will centralize the administration of all science-technology-innovation related resources. This 
should occur in the framework of a national strategic plan for science, technology, and innovation that is being 
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case of forestry is also noteworthy because a key ingredient for the sector’s development has been 
the longstanding forestry policy. 
The existence of research units in the public university (UDELAR) and government 
entities has been a precondition for discovery in several of our cases. The following were mainly 
involved: the Institutes for Computer Sciences (InCo) and Electrical Engineering (IIE) of the 
School of Engineering (UDELAR) in the software and electronics cases; the School of Agronomy 
(UDELAR), the National Institute for Agricultural Research (INIA), and the Forestry Department 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, in the case of forestry; research units at the Chemical School 
(UDELAR) in the case of wine; the Veterinary School (UDELAR) and the Department for 
Aquatic Resources (DINARA) in the case of caviar; and, in the case of animal vaccines, various 
research units of the Schools of Sciences, Medicine, and Veterinary (UDELAR) as well as the 
biological public research center Clemente Estable. It is clear that the research level is extremely 
variable among these entities, and so was their contribution to the discoveries. 
The public university’s provision of highly-skilled human resources for the software and 
animal vaccine discoveries (as well as for the counterfactual cases of electronics and wine) was 
also an essential precondition.
126 The telecommunication infrastructure provided by the state 
enterprise ANTEL in the 1990s was indispensable for the emergence of the software and 
electronics sectors. The setting up of regulations and quality control for the eradication of foot-
and-mouth disease in an earlier period eased the emergence of new vaccine exports. 
Interestingly, the mentioned public goods were not only exploited in the successful cases, 
but also in some of the “unsuccessful discoveries.” Obviously, it was the combination of these 
public goods with other factors that made them relevant for a successful discovery path. Public 
goods that proved relevant for the discoveries were often the result of investments carried out a 
long time ago. Institutions such as UDELAR and ANTEL have not always been able to sustain an 
investment rate allowing them to maintain their standards. Several institutions could not avoid the 
fact that research lagged behind the diffusion process, which occurred notably in the context of a 
lack of resources or when the new activity had a long production cycle (forestry).   
Two observations come to mind for policy purposes. On the one hand, if the provision of 
adequate public goods has been an important precondition for the emergence of new export 
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activities. Their upgrading process is not only an essential condition to ensure productivity in the 
diffusion stage, but also to allow the emergence of new discoveries. 
On the other hand, in our discoveries, the role of researchers and, more generally, research 
capacity could easily be traced. At least in the long run, the above-mentioned research entities 
were able to create relevant expertise and collaboration with the private sector. Nevertheless, on 
the whole, the distance between science and production is still large.
127 Therefore, one way to 
stimulate greater spillovers from research would be to provide more support for collaborative 
long-term projects between the private sector and those research entities that created such 
expertise. 
 
5.3  Resolution of Uncertainties by Pioneers and Information Revelation Patterns  
Due to uncertainty and information externalities, a firm will only invest in developing a new 
export if it is possible to capture sufficient monopoly rents to avoid quick profit erosion from 
imitation. What do our cases reveal on innovation appropriability? And what do they show 
regarding diffusion patterns of the knowledge that pioneers generate when solving uncertainties 
entailed in the discovery? This is important because the information revelation process has 
essential implications for the diffusion and growth of new exports. 
 
5.3.1 Software  Case 
In this case, uncertainties related to: production costs (highly uncertain for an R&D based 
product), upgrading costs (new versions of the product with incremental innovations), foreign 
demand (for a highly differentiated and technology based product coming from an unknown 
“southern” country), and commercialization strategies (for an intangible good). These are 
classical types of uncertainties and they were solved without public intervention. An interesting 
point concerns the information revelation process that followed their resolution: there was a 
combination of externalities contributing to diffusion and monopoly rents limiting profit erosion 
for the pioneer.  
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Three types of knowledge goods can be distinguished according to their diffusion pattern: 
- Proprietary knowledge, which is generated and maintained through intensive 
R&D and a clear long-term product strategy. The first mover regularly 
renovated its temporary monopoly through improved versions of its product 
and this operated as a barrier against imitative entry. 
- Club goods, i.e., non-rivalry but excludable goods. The pioneer developed a kind 
of community of practice around its product (a software tool for software 
developers), creating incentives and systems for practitioners to solve 
problems together. Through formal and informal collaboration mechanisms, 
the community generates a common, shared understanding of different types of 
events and an action orientation for dealing with such events the next time they 
arise (Sharp, 1997).  
- Public goods derived from externalities flowing freely from the pioneer toward 
the economy in general. Information externalities generated for subsequent 
entrants into the software industry were of a market revealing nature, by 
establishing a reputation for Uruguayan software goods and services in foreign 
markets. They also had a demonstration effect in the domestic market: in the 
context of a country with no risk-taking culture and with scarce 
entrepreneurship resources, the pioneer’s role was important in showing the 
feasibility of exporting world-scale technology and establishing partnerships 
with the leading firms in the world. Knowledge spillovers also occurred, 
notably through collaboration of the pioneer with the public and the private 
universities. 
 
This paradigmatic case was paralleled by other self-discoveries in the local software 
industry, since the very nature of ICT opened the way to a continuum of new products or 
segments, once the existence of local comparative advantages had been discovered.    214
 
5.3.2  Caviar Case 
Caviar exports representing an intriguing self-discovery case. A private actor decided to use 
original, specific information revealing the country’s comparative advantage to invest in a new 
activity in Uruguay with a view toward exporting a differentiated product with bright 
perspectives in global markets. Ex-ante uncertainty about local production costs (and other costs) 
was high so that this pioneer had to sink capital into experimentation to learn about the costs. 
Uncertainties were solved without public intervention. The pioneer reduced uncertainty by 
acquiring foreign technology and hiring permanent advice, as well as through a learning process 
in relation to species adaptation to the local environment. On the commercial side, he developed a 
brand of Uruguayan origin associated with a quality product. Process certification was also 
needed to access foreign markets. A basic policy lesson stemming from the successful strategy 
implemented by the pioneer is that professional management is a necessary condition to 
transform an innovative idea into a competitive firm, an issue that was discussed in Section 5.1.2.  
Considering that caviar exports are recent and diffusion is thus incipient, can we anticipate 
anything about innovation appropriability in this case? The pioneer is not willing to share his 
know-how on caviar production (i.e., the transformation of sturgeon roe into a commercial 
product), considering that he proposed a price out of proportion when a follower showed interest 
in it. This specific know-how is thus what the pioneer seems to consider as a source of temporary 
monopoly rent.  
In contrast, the sturgeon breeding and reproduction technology appears to be more prone 
to imitation because another, independent experimental project got positive results at about the 
same time as the pioneer’s. Other relevant information for potential followers is directly related to 
the uncertainties solved by the pioneer. Conditions thus exist for the imitation phase, despite 
some degree of appropriability of the pioneer’s discovery that limits the extent of knowledge 
spillovers.  
However, diffusion is not feared by the pioneer because he will benefit from the 
consolidation of Uruguay’s image as a caviar producer. His idea is that producers “join forces in 
order to maintain a country image associated with quality.” Furthermore, diffusion will allow him 
to provide services and inputs (such as special food for sturgeon breeding from the plant he built) 
to followers.   215
This discovery reveals broader opportunities for aquaculture related activities in Uruguay. 
This is still an incipient activity in the country and its economic potential and profitability are not 
yet common knowledge. Therefore, policy lessons point to accelerating the diffusion process by 
(i) ensuring appropriate conditions for entrepreneurship, (ii) perhaps promoting opportunities 
abroad to attract FDI (or joint ventures) because the aquaculture business is usually capital 
intensive, and (iii) stimulating research, technological development, and experimentation.  
 
5.3.3 Vaccine  Case 
This case is a good illustration of how “the probability that a country will develop the capability 
to be good at producing one good is related to its installed capability in the production of other 
similar or nearby goods for which the currently existing productive capabilities can be easily 
adapted” (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006). In Uruguay, three firms simultaneously discovered the 
profitability of producing and exporting bacterial vaccines, largely as a consequence of the 
negative shock in demand associated with the prohibition on using and even producing the foot-
and-mouth (FMD) vaccine. These firms thus jumped from a closely related product. The human, 
physical, and institutional capabilities needed to produce the new vaccines were close to those 
needed to produce the FMD vaccine.  
This was not the case for other biotechnology-based firms, which have not been able to 
develop exports successfully in spite of the existence of R&D capacity and other preconditions. 
First, they could not count on the kind of positive signals that the animal vaccine firms received 
in one case from the parent company; in the second case, from the multinational from which it 
emerged; and in the third case, from its own in-house and external previous trials.  
Second, the vaccine firms had some specific assets for solving the uncertainties related to 
foreign trade, in spite of the fact that FMD vaccines had virtually not been exported. One was 
fully integrated into a global value chain as a subsidiary of a multinational; the second partially 
participated in a global chain because it used a multinational as a market intermediary; and the 
third had recently established regional connections through market prospecting for another 
product. 
Third, it appears that firms that were able to restructure from a traditional business to a 
biotechnology-based and export oriented business have been, in general, more successful than 
new undertakings starting a biotechnological business from scratch. Several factors are involved   216
in this, but a critical issue seems to be accumulated management skills in the former case. By 
contrast, biotechnology start-ups in Uruguay are often managed by “scientists” who not only lack 
business experience, but also a pool of skilled labor from which to draw management skills 
(especially strategic management, including technology and commercial issues). We previously 
referred to the country’s shortcoming in this regard. This does not imply that start-ups are 
destined to fail (there are indeed a few successful experiences), but rather that exit is particularly 
uncertain, left to the eventual business abilities of the researcher-entrepreneur. 
One policy lesson from this case study is that, to reach a critical mass of biotechnology-
based firms, it is necessary to generate conditions allowing the new researcher-entrepreneurs to 
acquire the needed managing capacities, in addition to strengthening institutional mechanisms for 
a smoother transfer of R&D results from academy to production. 
In our analysis, we concluded that the three pioneers solved different types of 
uncertainties and overcame the barriers to entry in global markets, but that during this process 
some coordination failures were not resolved. This restrained the emergence of imitators and 
diffusion did not take place. We also identified two channels by which pioneers have been 
capturing monopoly rents: (i) they internalized an ex-ante productivity advantage (from prior 
related activities) that persists even after the new activity proved profitable, and (ii) they 
introduced barriers to entry (scale economies, knowledge production secret, upstream and 
downstream arrangements, vaccine registrations in foreign countries, and quality control systems 
of processes and products).  
 
5.3.3 Forestry  Case 
In the forestry case, the pioneer jumped to a new sector (from wool to forestry), applying his 
previous know-how in international trade. He reduced uncertainty by starting large-scale planting 
only after two ships of wood logs had been successfully sent to the interested party. He also went 
into partnerships with a foreign investor interested in developing plantations in Uruguay and 
opened up technology. 
Other uncertainties concerned: large-scale harvesting costs and specialized equipment 
requirements; specific international contract procedures (considering all issues that can affect the 
final price, like volume varying according to its measurement at the departure port or at the 
destination); and, significantly, Montevideo’s port capacity to handle large wood shipments. This   217
last issue was resolved through a reform of the National Port Administration that allowed private, 
specialized firms to participate in the freight movements.  
Interestingly enough, uncertainty on tree breeding costs for the whole production cycle 
remained long after the forestation process began. In fact, production costs for different species 
and locations have only been discovered recently, when massive harvesting started. The pioneer 
thus did not reveal these costs to followers. Instead, planting subsidies have been the instrument 
used for avoiding the effects of uncertainty on the diffusion process, in addition to accelerating 
the sector’s learning curve. Subsidies were eliminated in 2005, more than 15 years after they were 
introduced, with no negative effect on the diffusion process. 
 
5.4  Coordination Failures and the Public/Private Response 
This section deals with coordination failures that might hamper the diffusion phase of an export 
discovery. Table 5.1 synthesizes the coordination failures detected and the way they were 
eventually resolved. They are classified according to their relation with specific requirements for 
the diffusion phase. It is a “historical” look and does not include those failures that could be 
anticipated nowadays for the future development of the sectors considered. 
 
Table 5.1 – Coordination Failures (Potential or Actual) in Successful Discovery Cases 
 
SOFTWARE  FORESTRY  CAVIAR  VACCINES 
1. Related to specific infrastructure needs 
Telecommunication 
infrastructure (potential): 
it was updated during the early 
diffusion phase, though it 
sometimes lagged behind the 
needs.  
 
–Inadequate infrastructure for 
heavy load transportation of raw 
materials and final products.  
Resolution: 
-Public investment in basic 
infrastructure (port access, roads, 
railways).  
-Regulations allowing private 
participation in ports and 
railways. 
-Public-private cooperation for 
road maintenance and fire 
prevention. 
(Investment level is still well 
behind needs.) 
 Inadequate  infra-




-Updating of the 
biotechnological 
division in the Institute 
of Hygiene (School of 
Medicine). 
-Creation of Biotec-
Plaza in Zonamérica 
-Recent private 
investments to upgrade 
two vaccines plants.   218
Table 5.1, continued 
 
2. Related to capital requirements 
SOFTWARE  FORESTRY  CAVIAR  VACCINES 
  -Inexistence of a capital market 
in Uruguay and limited saving 
capacity (this hindered the large 
scale development of the whole 
forestry chain  
Resolution: 
-Partially overcome by FDI 
(stable conditions offered in 
Uruguayan laws).  
-Forestry law: subsidies awarded 
with plantations as guarantee. 
-Special credit lines of public 








3. Related to human resources 
-Management skills to evolve 
from small start-ups to export 
businesses. 
-Higher requirements of 
graduates in computer sciences 
than the public university 
provision. 
Resolution: 
Private universities developed 
education in management and 
computing. 
-Shortage or unavailability of 
specialized skills in different 
stages of the forestry chain. 
Unsolved 
The largest multinational 
(Botnia) opted for training 
Uruguayans in Finland's 
headquarters. 
  -Lack of skilled labor to 
sell in global markets. 




4. Others (inputs/services; property rights, regulations and norms) 
-Inadequacy of (industrial) 
exporting procedures and norms. 
-Informatics property rights were 
not included in the intellectual 
property law in force. 
-Limited capacity to develop 
connectivity with the high tech 
world (e.g., international 
certification) 
Resolution: 
-The spreading of the Internet 
allowed selling through it instead 
of resorting to traditional ways. 
- Law 17.616 of 2003 now 
includes software programs as 
copyright protected products. 
-Solved in a case by case 
approach. 
-Specialized services along the 
whole forestry chain 
Resolution 
-Initial subcontracting by the 
pioneer and foreign firms 
spurred the development of 
services firms.  
 
-Research lags well behind the 
sector requirements. 
 
-Week coordination in 
environmental issues between 
research institutions, entities in 
charge of norms and regulations, 
and firms. 
Unsolved 
-No providers of 













of a food plant) 
-Unsolved for 
technology. 
   
-No providers of quality 
inputs (raw materials, 
bottling and  packaging) 
Resolution: 
Solved individually by 
pioneers but not for 
newcomers.  
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The pattern of intervention (public or private) to resolve coordination failures appears to 
have been as follows: 
•  In the software and forestry cases, the private sector organized and asked the 
government for action. In the former, government was responsive because 
export capacity had been built in a high-tech sector and because demands were 
channeled through an organized body (CUTI). In the latter, the government 
responded because of the potential structural importance of the forestry sector. 
•  In the vaccine case, some coordination failures were resolved through public 
intervention for pre-existing activities (R&D infrastructure, quality control, 
and regulations) but others were not resolved at all (thin labor market, lack of 
specialized input providers, and lack of support for start-ups), which hindered 
diffusion. Firms overcame individually the barriers to entry in global markets, 
and created barriers to entry in the local industry. 
 
In terms of policy lessons, the following stand out:  
•  Collective actions within an emerging industry are slow to develop in spite of 
apparent common interests.  
•  Public-private partnerships are less difficult to establish once there exists a 
private sector entity that represents the common interests and operates as a 
valid, non-rent-seeking interlocutor in negotiation with public entities.  
•  In the forestry case, the existence of an institutional framework allowed some 
level of public-private coordination (wine is another example), but these 
institutions should be more active in identifying coordination failures and in 
generating appropriate mechanisms to overcome them.   220
 
5.5  Other Features of the Discoveries 
Finally, the following table presents several additional features of the pioneer and the diffusion 
process that were systemized as a result of the research undertaken. 
 
Table 5.2 – Pioneers and Diffusion Features 
 
SOFTWARE  FORESTRY  CAVIAR  ANIMAL VACCINES 
Nature of the pioneer  
Pioneer was a savvy investor, 
looking for opportunities to apply 
accumulated knowledge in a 
specific field. 
Pioneer used its commercial 
and agro-industrial abilities to 
jump from wool to wood. 
Enterprising pioneer from fishery 
sector took advantage of 
exceptional information on the 
country's conditions for sturgeon 
breeding.  
Pioneers looking for close and 
accessible opportunities jumped 
from one type of vaccines to 
another. 
Original stimulus for the discovery  
Technological opportunity 
discovered abroad. 
Market information from 
abroad. 
Private, foreign information on 
geographical conditions of 
Uruguay. 
Need and opportunity to use prod. 
capacity and knowledge of a sus-
pended product (FMD vaccines). 
Preconditions that made it possible for the successful discovery to take place 
Skilled human resources. 




Knowledge from previous 
forestry activities.  
Climate, soils.  
Low land prices.  
Macroeconomic stability.  
Forestry Law. 
Climate and water quality.  
Institutional framework 
(DINARA). 
Skilled human resources. 
Research capacity (public 
university). 
Common origin in ‘biologicals’ 
production. 
Institutional framework created for 
FMD vaccines production. 
Discovery costs (activities with high or low costs)  
High:  
-use of fast growing technology 
to develop a new product through 
research (uncertain, by 
definition). 
-costs associated to foreign 
market insertion. 
 High: 
-long delays before 
harvesting. 
-experimentation costs before 
implementing the project (2 
shipment trials). 
Very high: 
-long production cycle. 
-substantial investments (fixed 
costs) and need to build entire 
farm/process before starting 
exports. 
Some information was obtained at 
no cost. 
Low: 
-prior technological, productive and 
commercial knowledge on animal 
vaccines. 
What exactly was discovered? 
Classic comparative advantage: 
possibility of competing in 
international markets on the basis 
of skilled human resources with 
low wages as compared to 
developed countries. 
Classic comparative 
advantage, based on natural 
resources. 
Classic comparative advantage, 
based on natural resources. 
Related to a country classic 
comparative advantage based on 
natural resources (cattle).  
Was there any international diffusion that led to the discovery?  




Yes.  No.  International diffusion of 
biotechnologies. 
How much diffusion has there been in the sector?  
Plenty, following first movers in 
different specialization niches. 
Intense.  Incipient.  None (but three pioneers). 
How much have exports grown (US$ millions)? 
4,5 (1993) to 104 (2005)  4,7 (1990) to 141 (2005)  0,003 (2000) to 1 (2005)  2,1 (1995) to 5,7 (2006)   221
Table 5.2, continued 
 
SOFTWARE  FORESTRY  CAVIAR  ANIMAL VACCINES 
Barriers to entry 
In the nucleus model: club type 
goods and network economies.  
 




Long production cycle. 
Appropriate location (fresh water). 
Knowledge of caviar production 
process and technology. 
Scale economies.  
Production secret.  
Quality control systems of 
processes and products  
Upstream agglomeration economies 
(medium importance). 
Vaccines registrations in foreign 
countries (medium importance). 
Did the pioneer encourage diffusion?  
Yes, through the creation of 
community of practice with other 
software developers. 
Yes, by going into 
partnerships and opening up 
technology. 
Yes, by associating with another 
sturgeon farm and transferring 
farming technology. 
No 
Impact of diffusion on the pioneer?  
Network economies. Collective 
development of project (and 
capacities). 
Positive impact: production 
costs decreased. 
Positive to neutral.  n/a 
Was there price erosion? 
Price of the pioneer's product 
remained stable over time.  
No.  No. (Could happen in the future if 
diffusion is high) 
No 
Were there cost increases due to competition for inputs? 
Not yet.  Labor cost could 
increase in the future if supply 
does not adjust. 
In the medium run, the price 
of land increased. 
Not in the mid-term.  No 
Pioneer benefited from diffusion by supplying inputs or buying production from entrants? 
Pioneer benefited from diffusion 
by supplying a software tool for 
the development of software 
applications and systems. 
Pioneer sells services.  Pioneer will provide food and 
technology to the follower, and 
will process caviar from roe 
coming from the new farm. 
n/a   222
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